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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines some approaches to madness in England and
Scotland in the period 1650-1800. It does so at a number of different
levels but does not attempt to be comprehensive. The various approaches
to madness selected for discussion are those which shed light on the
developing tendency to seclude the mad in asylums. Attention is focussed
primarily on the separation of madness from other types of social
disorder and its emergence as a subject of medical enquiry. The
treatment of insanity in literature, for example, is not extensively
discussed.
The main source material for the first part of the thesis is a number
of English medical texts. Attempts by the medical profession to subject
lunacy to rational enquiry are discussed, as is the general view of the
disorder which emerged from this enquiry. Particular attention is given to
the use of metaphor by physicians. A growing emphasis on the therapeutic
power of self-restraint and self-discipline is seen as particularly
significant, both for changing methods of treatment and the establishment
of asylums. The refinement of therapeutic methods and principles is
also discussed.
It is argued, however, that the emergence of asylums cannot be
explained simply in medical terms. The thesis examines the tendency
to confine lunatics alongside other social deviants in response to a perceived
growth in crime and argues that problems of overcrowding, disruption and
the unsuitability of placing 'curable' lunatics in the same institutions as
criminals and other social transgressors must also be considered. It
is further suggested that the growing distinction between public and private
behaviour is of relevance. In a final, more speculative chapter the
importance of this distinction is traced in some eighteenth century Scottish
court cases and the response to insanity at the level of everyday social life
is considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the nineteenth century and for the greater part of the
twentieth century, those suffering from psychiatric illness have been
placed in mental hospitals to be cured of their disorder or, where the
illness proved particularly stubborn, to be safely looked after. In these
special institutions, many of them purpose built, the mentally ill have
been attended by those who have a particular expertise in dealing with
this distinctive disorder. In terms of both institutional provision and
medical care the mentally ill have been treated as a distinct population
and, at least until relatively recently, it was believed that the most
effective way of dealing with their disorder was to remove them—albeit
temporarily—from the wider community. In the last decade or so both
the principle of segregation and the very concept of mental illness have
been challenged but such questioning has not seriously eroded the
special and separate status accorded to psychiatric disorder. For
the purposes of legislative control, social policy and medical training
madness, in all its forms, is regarded as a distinctive medical and
social problem.
In many respects it is simply a truism to assert the distinctiveness
of mental illness, and its separate status as a category of social dis-
ability, but it is a truism of relatively recent origin. The mad have not
always been treated as a separate group requiring particular treatment,
separate legal provision and special status in the framing of social
policy. On the contrary, the victims of mental disorder were for a
long time accorded no special status, particularly so far as their general
custody and treatment were concerned. Throughout the seventeenth
century and for the greater part of the eighteenth century the records
show that the insane were confined alongside an array of social
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transgressors whose idleness, vagrancy or criminality brought them
to the attention of the Justices of the Peace. In the houses of correction,
workhouses and jails to which the insane were dispatched they were
simply one among many categories of social deviant similarly confined.
This is not to say, however, that madness was not recognized as
a separate species of disability or that its sufferers were regarded as
if they were no different from those who were locked up because they
lacked employment, were poor, or had been convicted of criminal
offences. Although lunatics were, throughout the period of this study,
somewhat arbitrarily confined with a heterogeneous group of social
transgressors this does not mean that no distinction at all was drawn
between lunatics and their fellow workhouse inmates. Indeed, the
evidence suggests that at the level of day-to-day administration of the
workhouse, distinctions were made and, moreover, that there were
attempts to curb the disruptive behaviour of the insane by placing
them in specially built cells or other rooms adapted to their custody.
In other words, workhouse superintendants and those in charge of
local jails or houses of correction recognized madness as a distinctive
and peculiar disorder and one that required, on occasions, special
measures to control it. But such measures that were taken represented
an ad hoc response to the problem and at best constituted a temporary
solution.
It was not until the latter half of the eighteenth century that separate
provision on any significant scale was made for lunatics. Before the
middle of the eighteenth century madness was not identified as an im-
portant and unique social problem, and one that cannot be dealt with
by the institutions developed to accommodate the idle, unemployed or
criminal. The important point therefore is not the recognition—at
the day-to-day level of workhouse administration—of the special problems
posed by the insane but rather the emergence of lunacy as a significant
social problem in its own right. By their inability to observe the conven-
tional limits of social life, and the associated failure to internalize
appropriate norms of social conduct, the insane are thought—at least
by the late eighteenth century—to represent a particular type of
social problem; one that must be controlled, curtailed and, where
possible, 'cured'. And it is in the purpose built lunatic asylums of
the late eighteenth century that these objectives are most likely to be
realized. As John Aikin noted in his Thoughts on Hospitals (1771),
"by placing a large number of them [the insane] in a common
receptacle, they may be taken care of by a much smaller
number of attendants; and at the same time they are removed
from the public eye to which they are multiplied objects of
alarm, and the mischiefs that they are liable to do themselves
and others, are with much greater certainty prevented". 1
Underpinning Aikin's proposal is the assumption that the insane consti-
tute a distinct group requiring special provision. They are to be
segregated into large asylums and, once secluded from society, an
attempt should be made to eliminate their malady and rehabilitate
them. Between 1650 and 1800 madness emerges as a separate social
problem requiring specific legal, institutional and therapeutic provision.
During this period it also emerges as a separate branch of medical
enquiry.
From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards madness comes
within the orbit of medical enquiry. Before this date certain physicians
devoted their attention to the problem and, indeed, the belief that
madness is a disease can be traced back to the Greeks. But during
the course of the eighteenth century an important development occurs.
Madness is finally removed from the realm of theological and astro-
logical enquiry as the perspective provided by medicine becomes pre-
eminent. By the late eighteenth century what may be called a 'medical'
explanation of the disease has superseded other explanations that present
the disorder in terms of divine or demonological possession, or the
atrophying of those faculties that distinguish man from animals and
perhaps savages. Seventeenth century 'medical' accounts of madness
do of course exist but as the subsequent analysis will show many of
these accounts are based on imaginative insights rather than founded
upon the reliable data furnished by observation and experience.
During the course of the eighteenth century madness appears, to
physicians at least, to shed something of its mystery and as with other
branches of enquiry so too in medicine the widening horizons of
scientific understanding seem to encompass an ever increasing range
of phenomena: madness among them. In Locke's view there exists
a "large field for knowledge proper for the use and advantage of men"
and certainly by the middle of the eighteenth century madness came
within the boundaries of that 'field'. 2 Although the disease remained
inscrutable and, according to the physician William Battie in 1758,
"as little understood as any that ever afflicted mankind", it was none-
theless believed that the phenomenon was amenable to rational medical
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enquiry. By attending carefully to the various forms that madness
takes, and by proceeding cautiously from these discrete observations
to general principles, the physician should be able—according to the
late eighteenth century view—to shed some light on the phenomenon.
Although it may be impossible to formulate an acceptable definition of
the 'essential character' of madness it is nonetheless legitimate to
expect that carefully conducted analysis will remove something of the
mystery in which the disease had hitherto been shrouded. It is this
confidence in the power of rational medical enquiry, and the associated
belief that the perspective provided by medicine is most suited to the
study of this disease, that decisively separates late eighteenth century
accounts of the disorder from those written during the preceding century.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine these developments. More
specifically, the thesis will consider the emergence of madness both
as a distinct social problem and as a discrete branch of medical enquiry.
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The eighteenth century sees an end to the process whereby madness
was subsumed under other forms of social disorder and other branches
of quasi-scientific enquiry. The various processes and developments
which brought about this change form the focus for this thesis. Through-
out the argument will draw upon English and Scottish historical records
and upon the writings of physicians working in both countries.
The thesis does not, however, provide an exhaustive coverage of
all the levels or areas where the topic of madness receives attention.
Perhaps the most notable ommission concerns the treatment of
madness in literature for although the eighteenth century provides an
extremely fertile source in this respect literary discussions of the
topic have not been included. The reasons for omitting literature are
threefold. First, to do justice to the topic required more space than
is available here and indeed the entire work could easily have been
devoted to this subject alone. Secondly, earlier attempts to relate
developments in literature to those at other levels were not entirely
satisfactory; in the case of Tristram Shandy, for example, it was
possible to establish links between this work and developments in other
areas but such links seemed, on occasion, slightly forced and, more
importantly, they did little to enhance either the strength of the general
argument or the coherence of the work as a whole. Thus the exercise,
although interesting, seemed rather tangential to the intention of the
work. Finally, and related to this, it became apparent that the
changing conceptions of madness and developments in the social response
to it could be most fully explicated if attention was limited to those
parts of the historical evidence that impinged most directly upon the
problem; namely the medical treatises on madness and the more
general changes in the way in which it was controlled and treated.
The following chapters examine the problem at a number of different
levels, the most important of which are: the attempt made by physicians
to analyse, understand and describe the disease; the image of madness
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that emerges from this enquiry; the gradual separation of madness from
other types of social disorder; the incarceration of the insane in special
institutions, to which they were consigned for custodial and therapeutic
purposes; the development and refinement of therapeutic principles;
finally, the response to insanity on the part of those who encountered it in
the course of their everyday lives and who had no particular interest, let
alone expertise, in dealing with this disorder. It is to developments at
each of these levels that the following chapters will be addressed and
although the chapters are necessarily organised sequentially this should
not be taken to mean that changes at any particular level are accorded
precedence or that changes for instance at the level of social control have
a temporal and causal priority over developments in other areas. On the
contrary, it is essential to emphasise that many of the changes examined
occurred simultaneously and it would be a mistake therefore to read the
work in terms of a gradually unfolding narrative in which changes at one
level precede—and indeed generate—changes at another.
The first three chapters deal with various aspects of the medical
investigation of madness. At the outset the methodological principles
and assumptions guiding medical enquiry are elucidated and this method-
ological orientation is placed in the context of more general eighteenth
century views concerning the nature of scientific enquiry and the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. More specifically, the chapter analyses the response,
on the part of physicians, to an important question. What is the most
appropriate perspective or point of view from which to approach the
study of madness ? This question is central to many medical treatises
on insanity, particularly those dating from the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth century, and the thesis will begin with a discussion of how
physicians approached their subject, the principles upon which they
based their enquiry and the degree to which they were able to adhere to
these principles.
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In Chapter Two this line of analysis is pushed further by way of a de-
tailed consideration of one particular path taken by physicians in their
approach to madness; the approach provided by metaphor. The purpose
of this chapter is to elucidate various metaphors of madness and, more
significantly, demonstrate that in eighteenth century medical enquiry
metaphors provide a basic mode of apprehending and understanding the
phenomenon of madness. It is through metaphors that physicians are
able to visualise the disease for both their readers and themselves, to
relate this phenomenon to others and, finally, to delineate the defining
qualities of the disorder.
Having tried to reconstruct the process by which medical interpre-
tations of the disease are arrived at the focus widens to take into account
the actual substance of the medical interpretation. In place of the
question, how did physicians approach the study of this disorder,
Chapter Three addresses the question, what did physicians have to
say about madness and how did their characterisations of the disorder
develop over time? More particularly the chapter deals with changing
shifts of emphasis in the medical description of madness and, most
notably, the shift whereby each individual is finally accorded a degree
of responsibility for his own mental wellbeing. Madness is increasingly
seen as something that can be avoided and perhaps cured by the due
exercise of self restraint. In other words, the view of madness as
something which literally takes possession of an individual slowly
diminishes, and it is possible to detect the emergence of a view which
sees madness as a quite distinct form of disability and one induced
by an individual's failure to curb unhinging flights of imagination or
those excesses of passion that disorient and finally completely unsettle
the mind. In the late eighteenth century madness is presented in terms
of the failure on the part of the individual to internalise effectively
appropriate norms of social behaviour, and to ensure that private
vagaries are not translated into public indiscretions. This account
serves to represent the disorder as a distinctive type of illness and one
requiring particular therapeutic measures. By the latter half of the
eighteenth century physicians portrayed this disease in terms of a par-
ticular combination of circumstances associated with an individual's
failure to regulate appropriately each of his faculties—notably imagina-
tion, passion, attention and association—and to observe the distinction
between private vagaries of thought and their public display. And on
account of their inability to sustain the appearance of mental wellbeing
the case of the insane is, as Aikin had noted, "in a peculiar manner
distressful, since besides their own sufferings, they are rendered a
nuisance and a terror to others". 4 This reconstruction of the medical
image of madness in the eighteenth century concludes the first half
of the work.
The remaining three chapters are addressed to more general questions
concerning the confinement of the insane, their treatment in asylums
and the 'public' reaction to insanity. Thus Chapter Four looks at the
range of measures used to control the insane, the institutions in which
they were confined and the ways in which the predominant rationales of
confinement developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Throughout this period the insane were somewhat arbitrarily confined
in the same institutions as rogues, vagabonds or criminals and particular
attention is given, in Chapter Four, to the changing reasons for this
confinement and the links between this process and the establishment
of asylums.
Against this general backdrop Chapter Five examines, in rather more
detail, two important developments. First, the emergence of the asylum
as the institution specifically designed for the insane and the gradual
separation of this group from other categories of social deviant; secondly,
the evolution of a therapeutic system intended to cure and rehabilitate
lunatics, rather than simply to punish them or contain their disorder.
In addition Chapter Five also explores the relationship between certain
forms of treatment and prevailing medical explanations of madness. It
is proposed that many bizarre and ostensibly irrational therapeutic
measures can be more fully understood if they are seen in the context
of prevailing medical interpretations of the disease.
Finally, the discussion assumes—in Chapter Six—a more speculative
quality as an effort is made to tackle the rather awkward question, how
was insanity perceived by those who had no particular interest or
expertise in understanding or controlling it? How did ordinary people
respond to the presence of this disorder, for instance in their friends
or relatives, and what does this response tell us about the more general
view of madness that was coming to prevail at a particular time? In
other words, the chapter consists of an investigation of the various ways
in which ordinary people recognised and identified the presence of
madness, and, having done so, how they responded to it. What is of
interest in this discussion are the criteria by which people judged
an individual's state of mind and the relationship between these criteria
and other social practises regarding insanity. The intention of this
somewhat speculative discussion, as in the preceding chapters, is
quite simple. It is to shed some light on the various approaches to
insanity during the eighteenth century and to show that this period marks
the origin of the view that madness is distinctly different from other
types of disorder and that the mad are, inevitably, set apart.
* * * * * * * *
Historical and sociological research in this area has now yielded a
handful of books, among which Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilisation
has perhaps provided the most provocative isolated insights. Like
Foucault's book this thesis is centrally concerned with the history of
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ideas but it differs from Foucault's work in an important respect. Foucault
accounts for the emergence of the asylum, and the segregation of the
insane, in terms of the abstract and somewhat metaphysical triumph of
reason over unreason. Both the confinement of the insane and the
development of the asylum itself are portrayed as the visible expression
of a rather intangible struggle between the opposing forces of reason
and its antithesis—unreason. In the asylum,
"reason reigned in a pure state, in a triumph arranged for it
in advance over a frenzied unreason. Madness was thus torn
from that imaginary freedom which still allowed it to flourish
on the Renaissance horizon. Not so long ago, it had floundered
about in broad daylight: in King Lear, in Don Quixote. But
in less than a half-century it had been sequestered and, in the
fortress of confinement, bound to Reason, to the rules of
morality and to their monotonous nights". 5
As with so much of Foucault's work such an account is initially persuasive
but finally exasperating, for in some ways it does not take us very much
further in trying to understand how and why the insane came to be con-
fined in asylums. Moreover, such an interpretation comes close to
explaining historical developments exclusively in terms of ideas and their
evolution.
Andrew Scull's Museums of Madness marks another valuable contribu-
tion to this area, particularly so far as developments in the nineteenth
century are concerned. However, in trying to account for the definition
of insanity as an 'illness' (over which the medical profession has sole
jurisdiction) and the choice of the asylum as the institution in which the
insane are to be treated Scull does not devote very much attention to
changes in the medical interpretation of this disease and one is left
with a somewhat shadowy impression of exactly how physicians charac-
terized it and accounted for its onset. In this thesis detailed attention
is paid to the substantial corpus of relevant medical literature and to
providing a framework within which to interpret this literature. The
thesis attempts to demonstrate that well before the nineteenth century
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physicians took more than a cursory interest in madness and, more-
over, that their interpretation of the disorder illuminates both
institutional and therapeutic changes. These are changes which, in
Scull's analysis, seem in large part attributable to a series of
manoeuvres, on the part of certain physicians interested in madness,
that were intended to,
" secure such a position for themselves and acceptance of
their particular view of the nature of madness, seeking to
transform their existing foothold in the market place into
a cognitive and practical monopoly of the field, and to
acquire for those practising this line of work the status pre-
rogatives 'owed' to professionals—most notably autonomous
control by the practitioners themselves over the conditions
and conduct of their work".
A process such as this may indeed have been taking place during the
first half of the nineteenth century but in the somewhat earlier period
covered by this thesis there is less evidence of it and the argument
developed in the following chapters pays greater attention to a range
of other factors.
The difficulties associated with an account that leans heavily on
theoretical notions concerning the role of elites in society, the formation
of social classes and the activities of those who assume unto themselves
the right to tule, are rather more evident in Michael Fear's Ph. D.
thesis on The Moral Treatment of Insanity: a study in the social cons-
truction of human nature. In Fear's study a highly developed theoretical
perspective is used to explain changes that fall slightly outside the focus
of the present thesis and are dealt with more briefly.
Within a narrower compass than that adopted by Foucault, and a
rather earlier historical focus than that of Scull and Fears, this thesis
tries to provide a concrete grounding for the developments being
examined and to explain them within the wider context of the response to
other types of social deviant, of the growing preoccupation with crime
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rather than idleness, and the associated changes in the function of the
workhouse. In addition, the segregation of the insane into asylums is
seen in terms of a particular conjuncture of forces, among which one
must include specific historical changes, such as the problems of
overcrowded workhouses, as well as prevailing ideas concerning the
nature of madness, the scope for therapeutic efforts informed by
rational principles and the capacity of each individual to regulate his
public conduct in a reasonable manner.
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CHAPTER 1
EXPERIENCE AND OBSERVATION
The purpose of this and the subsequent chapter is twofold. First, to
identify and analyse the goals, methods and assumptions guiding eighteenth
century investigations of insanity. Second, to analyse in rather more
detail one particular strategy adopted by English physicians as they attempted
to understand, or at least to describe, madness; this particular strategy
concerns the use of metaphors and it is with the metaphors of eighteenth
century medical treatises that Chapter 2 will be principally concerned.
The immediate focus of the discussion therefore is not so much the substance
of the medical account of madness but rather the methods by which this
account was arrived at and, on a more critical note, the failure of physicians
to adhere to the guidelines and limits which they had imposed upon their
enquiry. The word failure is used advisedly here, for what is at issue is
not so much the adequacy of eighteenth century medical accounts of madness
as the difficulties which confronted physicians studying this disease; dif-
ficulties which, to a certain extent, made it inevitable that the actual process
of enquiry should depart somewhat from the guidelines and principles
laid down.
At the risk of presenting a reductionist interpretation it may be said
that the question common to so many medical discourses on insanity, par-
ticularly those dating from the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth
century, is, quite simply, from what point of view of from what perspective
should madness be studied? Medical treatises from the seventeenth and
early eighteenth century period rarely open with questions such as, what is
madness, or what is the precise difference between madness and insanity,
or where should one fix the point at which excitement yields to curiousity,
meditativeness to melancholia, passion to bestiality, or imagination to
delusion ? In place of these one finds another no less important question.
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Is there, in studying madness, a settled perspective, or shared point of
view—common to physicians and readers alike—from which the description
of madness, in all its forms, can begin? What is the common ground
upon which enquiry should be based ? It is questions of this order, rather
than those concerned with an exact definition or explanation of madness,
that present themselves to readers of medical literature, particularly
that dating from the first half of the eighteenth century.
In most of the replies to such questions there is, perhaps surprisingly,
an often repeated and almost uniform declaration. This is articulated
most forcefully by the great physician and mentor of Locke, Thomas
Sydenham in 1696. 'I declare that I have published no general method
that had not been established and verified by frequent experience". 1
Experience, "the soul of the art", is the ground upon which all enquiry
should begin and to which it must return for validation. If diseases are
to be accurately described it is imperative that the physician should
attend not to hypotheses but solely to experience and that "in writing a
history of diseases every philosophical hypothesis which hath possessed
the writer in its favour, ought to be laid aside, and then the manifest and
natural appearance of diseases, however minute, must be noted with the
utmost accuracy, imitating in this the great exactness of painters who,
in their pictures, copy the smallest spots or moles in the original".
Like the painter the task of the physician, as outlined by Sydenham, is
to observe carefully, for it is only "faithiul and accurate observation
which are the principal foundations of the pathological and curative
branches of physick". And experience is "the result of a number of
such observations made by ourselves and others". 2
Here then, Sydenham clearly enunciates the cardinal principles of
medical enquiry. The soul of the art is experience which may in turn
be defined as the sum of diligent observations—observations made in
the belief that the object or 'end' of enquiry is to provide an exact
description of the phenomena, to paint, in minute detail, the appearance
of disease. The basic datum of medicine is provided by observation
and any attempt to go beyond observation, thereby removing the problem
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from the solid ground of experience, will provide only false solutions;
false because they explain what is unknown in terms of that which is
even less understood.
Before going on to analyse these principles, however, and before
interpreting the special significance ascribed to experience in medical
treatises, it may be helpful to set the analysis in the context of certain
more general views concerning the nature of scientific enquiry and the
acquisition of knowledge.
Ernst Cassirer, in his valuable study of The Philosophy of the
Enlightenment, has observed that,
"the eighteenth century had seen the real task of philosophy in
the construction of the philosophical system. Truly philosophical
knowledge had seemed obtainable only when thought, starting
from a highest being and from a highest, intuitively grasped
certainty, succeeded in spreading the light of this certainty
over all derived being and all derived knowledge. This was done
by the method of proof and rigorous inference, which added
other propositions to the first original certainty and in this
way pieced out and linked together the whole chain of possible
knowledge". 3
The first original certainty from which the great rationalistic systems
of the seventeenth century begin is the conviction that those innate ideas
or "primitive notions" with which each person is born constitute not
only the origin of knowledge but also the model for all other knowledge.
Philosophy, according to Descartes, begins with a consideration of these
primitive notions, notions which are imprinted by God and which provide
the guarantee that concepts—when clearly defined—will correspond to
empirical reality. Or, as Cassirer notes elsewhere, "reason, as the
system of clear and distinct ideas, and the world, as the totality of
created being, can nowhere fail to harmonise; they merely represent
different versions or different expressions of the same essence". 4
That essence is "the archetypal intellect" of God that guarantees, in
the philosophy of Descartes, the bond between thinking and being, between
truth and reality. Since both concepts and empirical reality have, as their
origin, the same divine source there is accordingly little need to question
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the connection between clearly defined concepts and things, nor the
applicability of these concepts to the empirical world. If by virtue of
his concepts and knowledge man participates in divine being then the
certainty of both is assured. In a rationalistic system, therefore, the
centre of gravity is marked by clearly defined concepts, derived from
innate ideas, and by clear definitions from which inferences can be
drawn and the compass of knowledge gradually broadened, The starting
point from which philosophy should begin is, so Descartes argued,
provided by those innate ideas of 'primitive notions' with which each
individual has been divinely endowed. These ideas, which are proof
of a divine agency, serve also as the models for all other knowledge.
Building upon this firm foundation philosophy progresses by means of
clearly defined concepts and judicious inferences.
In England, however, where Cartesianism never gained the same
unlimited influence as it did in France, Descartes' fundamental
assumptions and methodological injunctions were both challenged and
decisively rejected. And it is this rejection, particularly Locke's
rejection of the principle of innate ideas and the form of enquiry that
is the corollary to this principle, which provides a context in which to
place much of the medical literature being examined. At the centre of
Locke's enquiry are the same questions which Descartes had grasped.
What are the limits of the mind, and related to this, what are the
objects commensurate with man's capacity for knowledge ? But in
answering these questions and in trying to provide a solution to the
problem of knowledge Locke decisively rejects any flight into trans-
cendent worlds and, of course, rejects the premise that each individual
is endowed with a set of innate ideas. In its place Locke installed, at
the very centre of his psychology, the simple axiom, "nothing is in
intellect which was not first in the senses". Instead of the Cartesian
metaphysics of the soul Locke endeavours to provide a history of the
soul and one based, moreover, on the "historical, plain method". 5
The method that is of careful observation and faithful description.
For present purposes, the importance of the work of Locke is not the
substance and detail of his "history of the soul", as Voltaire called it,
but rather the method by which this history was elaborated. 6 When studying
eighteenth century medical accounts of madness there are two decisive
considerations to be borne in mind, both of which concern Locke. First,
Locke's authority on many questions of psychology and the theory of
knowledge went virtually unchallenged in the first half of the eighteenth
century. Second, and directly related to this, the aims and methods of
his psychology completely dominated subsequent investigations of the mind
and its disorders. What Locke provided was a method whereby the inves-
tigation of madness could be guided, a method which was itself closely
related to Locke's own training in medicine for he combined, like many
physicians later, his philosophy and medicine, and indeed, taught his
philosophy on medical principles.
What was this method? Perhaps the most succinct statement of Locke's
views is provided in the following piece of advice which he gave to
Molyneux.
"I perfectly agree with you concerning general theories, the
curse of the times and destructive not less of life than of science,
they are for the most part but a sort of waking dream, with
which men have warmed their heads, they pass into unquestion-
able truths. This is the beginning at the wrong end, men laying
the foundations in their own fancies, and then suiting the phenom-
ena of diseases and the cure of them, to those fancies. I wonder,
after the pattern Dr. Sydenhara has set for the better way, men
should return again to this romance way of physics. What we
know of the works of nature, especially in the constitution of
health and the operation of our own bodies, is only by the sensible
effects, but not by any certainty we can have of the tools she
uses or the ways she works by". 7
The advice might equally well come from Sydenham, who collaborated
with Locke, for both fully shared the view that experience is "the only
teacher". It is the corollaries of this consistent affirmation of experience
that inform so much of the medical literature. The most important of
these corollaries are the following.
First, since experience provides the ground on which all problems must
be studied—and solved—any recourse to transcendent truths is wholly
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invalid since it negates both the indubitable principle, "nothing is in
intellect which is not first in the senses", and the associated assumption
that the intellect is self-sufficient. Second, the path to be followed
by enquiry is not that taken by Cartesian philosophy in which one begins
with axioms and concepts and then proceeds to apply these to empirical
reality. Rather, the route outlined by Locke consists in beginning with
the data generated by observation and experience and then, on the basis
of this data, proceeding to a cautious formulation of general principles
and laws. All who are concerned with diseases must, like Locke the
philosopher/physician, abandon themselves to the abundance of
phenomena, to the varieties of disease in all its forms and appearance.
Third, adherence to this "logic of facts" will finally reveal the regularity
in phenomena and the repeated conjunction of particular appearances.
It is only on the basis of these observed regularities and resemblances
that rules may be cautiously generalised. What has to be retained, there-
fore, is the specific form of appearances, of empirical reality, and the
means by which this form will be retained is the art of carefully describing
and recording observations. Finally, the goal of enquiry is that of pure
description; it is the ideal of a purely descriptive science of nature.
Description rather than definition is required, and description based on
a wealth of unprejudiced observations which, taken together, constitute
the 'experience' or bedrock of observed facts from which to generalise.
When, as Bacon remarked, the "stock of experience has increased an
infinite amount and the granary or storehouse of matters" is replete,
it will then be possible to present a faithful "dissection and anatomy of
the world"—and of disease. 8 This dissection could, in principle at least,
be performed by anyone, since the great merit of empiricism, of the
patient recording of observations and detailing of experience, is that this
"way of discovering science goes far to level men's wits, and leaves but
little to individual excellence; because it performs everything by the
surest rules and demonstrations". 9
It is time now to return to the medical literature and to examine how
physicians applied the rules inherited from Locke and, more distantly, from
19
Bacon. These rules have as their principle the patient gathering of facts
and as their object the ideal of a purely descriptive science of nature in
which recurring regularities are judiciously observed and carefully
described. It is a science at the centre of which we should expect to
find "a fair copy of the smallest moles or spots in the original", rather
than the clear definitions of Cartesianism. 10
Open any eighteenth century medical work on insanity and one will
discover that it is rooted in the anxieties, hopes and fears of everyday
life. The text is alive, the illustrations vivid, and there is, in the whole
tenor of the work, a powerful sensation of an experience being recounted;
the experience of an encounter with madness. Given the enormous
influence exerted by Locke, particularly at the methodological level, it
is not surprising to discover in much of the work in this period an almost
unanimous endorsement of the principle that frequent, diligent and sus-
tained observation holds the key to medical knowledge. In the manner of
both Locke and Sydenham physicians studying madness roundly condemn
abstract speculation or the 'false clue of theory', preferring instead to
place their trust in the weight of accumulated observations. 11 "I lay
much greater stress", wrote George Cheyne in his treatise on The English
Malady (1733), "upon experience and observations themselves than
upon any philosophical reasons I, or any other one, can suggest". A
few years earlier Archibald Pitcairne had urged fellow physicians to
"cultivate phy sick upon the trials of experience", and in the middle of
the century William. Battie, who was physician to St. Luke's Hospital
from 1750-1764, observed impatiently in his Treatise on Madness (1758),
that "it is time to quit the schools of philosophy and content ourselves
with a vulgar apprehension of things". 12
But of what does this vulgar apprehension consist? One answer at
least is provided in Cox's Practical Observations on Insanity (1804) in
which the author announces that the plan of his work is "to avoid all
abstract reasoning, and to detail the results of my own experience in
plain ungarnished language"; an ambition which the majority of Cox's
predecessors thoroughly endorsed. 13 Indeed, it would be possible to
20
compile an extensive—but rather tedious—catalogue of statements each
endorsing Sydenham's fundamental dictum, "experience is the soul of
the art".
What is perhaps more interesting, however, is the consequence that
this reliance upon the lessons of experience has for the way in which
madness is investigated and described. Having challenged the authority
of tradition, and having questioned the disquisitions of the 'Ancients',
physicians install the new authority of experience but as a result of this
their work takes on a rather special character. The character that is
of autobiography. For there is, in many of these texts, a trace of that
distinctively autobiographical style so evident in the work of a philosopher
such as Montaigne and, indeed, Descartes. What physicians attempt
to do is to describe their own particular experience and in so doing they
fill their treatises with autobiographical anecdotes.
The medical practitioner and philosopher Bernard Mandeville, for
example, in his Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions
(1711) vividly recounts his melancholic fluctuations and tormenting
delusions during which he became convinced, on at least one occasion,
of the imminent possibility of "the losing of my nose, my palate and my
eyes"; a delusion associated with his imagined syphilis. During one par-
ticularly severe attack of melancholy Mandeville so vividly recalled
an account of the influence of the air upon the inhabitants of Virginia—
and most notably the case of a woman whose condition deteriorated "upon
the rising and coming nigher of the clouds"—that he finally became
convinced that the same fate might befall himself; a consideration which,
"put me under strange apprehensions". 14 In a rather similar vein the
physician George Cheyne, the 32 stone "valetudinarian" and friend of
David Hume, dedicates his study of  The English Malady to "fellow
sufferers" who may find comfort—and instruction—in the author's
moving account of his own breakdown. Chronicling, in almost mawkish
detail, each onset of bleeding, vomitting, headache, vertigo, delirium,
anxiety and terror, Cheyne concludes his dreadful chronicle with an
apposite apology. "I know", he confesses, "how indecent and shocking
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egotism is, and for an author to make himself the subject of his works,
or words, specially in so tedious and circumstantial detail". But Cheyne
justifies his autobiographical approach on the grounds that his account
may assist those "whose condition may have some resemblance to mine;
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which everyone's has in some degree".
Personal accounts of breakdown were not, however, confined to the
medical profession. Melancholy, in particular, provided the inspiration
for many 'lay' disquisitions, as for instance that written by a non-
Conformist minister by the name of T. Roger whose Discourse Concerning
Trouble of Mind (1690) contained abundant advice on caring for melan-
cholic patients; advice based on the author's own 'trouble of mind',
from which he had first suffered during his early twenties.
Reliance upon personal experience may be seen therefore as part of
an attempt to provide fellow sufferers with insight into their diseases and,
ideally, guidance as to how these diseases may be cured, or accommodated.
It would be a mistake however to conclude that the autobiographical mode
is simply a feature of certain types of work, specifically those in which
the author himself has suffered. On the contrary, most treatises on
madness retain an autobiographical quality and even in those cases where
the author does not have personal experience of melancholia, for example,
there remains nonetheless a marked tendency in favour of describing
experience and of making that experience available to the reader. The
reason for this is important. Given that the task of medical enquiry
is to present a point of view or a common perspective from which author
and reader alike can consider madness, it is essential that physicians
demonstrate that between their own experience and that of the reader there
is no hiatus. When physicians cite the principle of experience as the
indispensable basis of enquiry they are referring not so much to an undif-
ferentiated and unordered multitude of observations as to those particular
observations or experiences drawn from the common course of everyday
life. In the context of medical enquiry what distinguishes relevant from
irrelevant experience is it proximity to common, everyday experience.
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By now it should be clear that there is, in principle, nothing special
or unique about the experience upon which this approach to medical is
grounded. The concerns of the physician are of a piece with those of the
reader, his prejudices and interests are much the same and, most
decisive of all, his approach or method is not distinctive. Indeed, recourse
to the authority of experience really marks a denial of the necessity for
any method. Neither description nor experience has any theory; in both
instances validity is determined by the accomplishment of naturalness,
or what Locke calls 'the historical, plain method'. Of course, the very
act of recounting experience serves to order and compose that experience,
but the guiding aspiration of medical texts is the preservation of the
original unity and natural coherence of first-hand experience; coherence
and unity which mirrors that indivisible unity and regularity of nature.
By placing the problem of madness on the firm ground of experience, and
by resisting any transcendent flights—such as a theological interpretation
of the disease would entail—physicians hope to provide a true description
of the disease. It is the observance of this restriction which ensures the
validity of enquiry, for once nature is conceived of as an enormous book
then the task of the physician is subsumed under the requirement of
reading this book and of doing so in a style that is accessible to all. "I
cannot", writes Thomas Sydenham in The Preface to his Complete Works 
(1696), "forbear mentioning again this fear and jealousy of my own,
which I am persuaded is not altogether groundless, that there never will
be any great and considerable advances made in the art of healing, till
all hypotheses and mechanical reasoning are out of vogue, and till men
are come about again to the method of pure experiment, and common
obvious reasoning entire from thence". 16
The apparent naturalness of medical enquiry, the absence of any obvious
method or artifice should not, however, obscure the fact that neither
experience nor observation are purely neutral activities unguided by
interests, prejudices, or hypotheses. Of course, in the work of Bacon,
and later of Sydenham, Locke and their successors, the call is to eradicate
hypotheses and all preconceived notions which may distort observation
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and force description into a Procustean bed. But if one considers the
twin principles of enquiry, observation and experience, it soon becomes
evident that physicians cannot but fail to depart from the objectives set
for enquiry and the constraints within which it ought to be conducted.
Closer examination of the medical literature reveals that physicians
were unable to restrict themselves to the limits of experience and
uncritical observations from which interpretation and argument have been
banished. Concerned that the compass of experience may be too narrow,
and their observations fallible—based as they are on the unreliable
instruments of the senses—physicians extend the boundaries of that
experience on which their accounts of madness draw. In so doing they
employ observations which are not derived from what Hume referred
to as "the common course of the world" and, moreover, they effectively
deploy these observations in support of particular arguments. Indeed,
in the sequence, ordering and juxtaposition of these observations and
illustrations the thesis and argument of any medical work is implicitly
expounded. The regularity that recollection imposes upon experience,
upon singular encounters with the disease, is the regularity of an
argument in full command of itself. Experience is not, as physicians
like to suggest, magically preserved in its original unity; it is constantly
transformed and reinterpreted in accordance with the intention of a
particular thesis. Each illustration and the menner of its presentation
is an abridgment of the argument and it serves to outline, in abbrevia-
ted form, an overall picture or interpretation; every recorded observation
condenses and exemplifies an argument. True to the spirit of both
Locke and Sydenham many physicians, in espousing the method of natural
observation, ignored the fact that like seeing or hearing, observing
and understanding are not ultimate indivisible qualities but, on the
contrary, late developments acquired through learning and constantly
refined by learning. Significantly, when the accomplishments of a
physician such as Sydenham were later assessed it wai his very lack of
method and the naturalness of his observation which commentators singled
out for highest praise. 17
Just as physicians fail to adhere to the principle of neutral observation
so too they trespass beyond the limits of experience upon which Bacon,
Locke, and Sydenham insisted. Of these limits the most important was
the restriction, particularly by Sydenham, of experience to the observa-
tion of visible appearances. Only that which is immediately visible
should concern the physician whose knowledge must be confined, as
Sydenham observed "to the surface of things; and can by no means obtain
to discover their causes. " 17 If this restriction were lifted and if
access were granted to a realm beyond appearance "it would perhaps
answer no other end than that of useless speculation and amusement". 18
In much the same spirit one Sam,Bowden, in a poem praising Thomas
Morgan's Philosophical Principles of Medicine (1725) commended the
author for prudently limiting the scope of his gaze to external appear-
ances.
For nature is governed by mechanick laws,
With nicest skill you paint her outward dress,
In vain we'd penetrate the deep recess"19
Observation freed of the tutelage of tradition succumbs instead to the
power of the visible. Seeing is equated with knowing, seeming with being,
and while it may be possible to penetrate the essence of madness—since
all reasoning which transcends appearance is "full of confusion and
uncertainty"—it is at least possible to observe the superficial identity
shared by all forms of the disease. 20 In place of the impossible ideals
of obtaining an accurate representation of the thing in itself, madness—
an ideal which promises transcendence—physicians attend instead to the
task of observing coexisting properties. Knowledge of madness can
thus be defined in terms of what the disease looks like, for it is the
external physiognomy of the disease, the visible surface of it, which
stands in for an appreciation of its essential quality. What is essential
or definitive about madness are those characteristics by which it can be
recognised. The hope of physicians is that their enquiry will offer
instruction in "the external face of diseases" and by so doing render the
face of insanity familiar.
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Viewed then as a composite of regularly recurring properties
madness takes on a clearer outline and assumes a particular form.
As expressed by Nicholas Robinson, the goal of any philosopher or
physician—and often the distinction is nebulous—is to discover "the
habitudes of things, and their connection and relations with each other;
so far, and no further, can we discover certain truth and knowledge". 21
In the discovery of the relation that things bear to one another physicians
find a way of gaining a particular perspective upon insanity. From the
point of view of relation, of observable resemblances, the visible fea-
tures of madness can be easily grouped together, named and contained.
Madness is, of course, set apart but it does not stand in complete isolation,
for it can be shown to be like other things; and one grows accustomed
to it.
This limitation of medicine to the realm of appearance raises two
significant problems. The first concerns the validity or truth of any
knowledge derived exclusively or even primarily from the observation
of visible effects. The problem is that the accuracy of such knowledge
can only be assured if the infallibility of the senses is beyond question,
and few would have endorsed such an optimistic conclusion. Reliance
upon the senses as the chief instruments of enquiry inevitably raises a
whole series of questions relating to the 'truth' of such enquiry and the
status of its findings. Implicit in much of the medical literature,
therefore, is a defence against scepticism and the lines of this defence
will be examined shortly.
The second problem, which has already been alluded to, concerns
the value of any enquiry founded exclusively upon the limited experience
of an individual observer. In recognition of this fact physicians
endeavour to base their observations and descriptions upon events and
situations with which the majority of their readers should be familiar.
In other words, physicians invoke the reader's own experience as a
way of enlarging the foundation upon which their interpretations of
madness can be elaborated. In addition to this physicians cast their
net beyond the horizon of everyday life in the hope of finding suitable
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observations and illustrations with which to embellish their work. One
particular way in which they do this is by using the accounts that travellers
have given of their voyages.
Even Sydenham, who had firmly insisted upon the necessity for first-
hand observation, recognized that "knowledge must needs be contracted,
and narrowed while only confined to the objects of his [the observer's] own
country". 22 In view of this it is perhaps inevitable that physicians should,
like many other writers, enlarge the compass of their enquiry so as to
take in travellers' accounts of exotic places, species and occurrences.
This strategy had received considerable impetus from the Royal Society,
and from Boyle in particular, in the form of a series of fairly precise
instructions to travellers concerning the collection of specimens and the
recording of observations. Travel was seen as an integral element in
a much wider movement that had as its goal the establishment of history,
both human and natural, upon secure foundations. In the case of diseases
and their history Boyle, for example, expressly urged travellers to
take particular care in noting their nature and symptoms and throughout
the mass of travel literature, especially that dating from the mid-seventeenth
century onwards, one finds scattered references to diseases of the mind.
From Jamaica, for example, Hans Sloane reported that the effect of
the sun and the moon was a decisive factor in the cause of insanity there,
while Sir John Chardin noted that in Persia the hot climate induced such
perspiration and "vaporization of the spiritous parts of the blood" that
people were immune to that bodily disquietude which "goes often to
extravagance and madness". Similarly George Sandys, whose Relation of 
a Voyage Begun in 1610 became something of a classic in the literature of
travel, noted that in Turkey those who had lost their wits were highly
esteemed "as men ravished in spirit and taken from themselves, as it
were, to the fellowship of the angels". 23 The accounts of travellers
served, therefore, to augment the experience of those whose knowledge
would otherwise have been limited by the horizons of their own country.
And in the case of the effect that climate has upon the mind—and its
disorders—the accounts of travellers proved a particularly fertile source
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of empirical evidence. Thus Sir Richard Blackmore, who was physician
to William m and Queen Anne, implicitly invoked travel literature, in his
Treatise of the Spleen and Vapours when he noted that "in foreign climates,
especially those nearer the sun, disorders of the mind, Lunacy and disturbed
imagination are very frequent". 24
It would be rather limited, however, to conclude that travel literature
simply augmented the storehouse of facts about madness. This corpus of
work plays a more significant role in the medical literature for it serves
to extend the boundaries of medical experience in other less tangible but
certainly more important ways. First, in its description of savage customs,
extraordinary freaks of nature or simply the dramatic evocation of foreign
parts, travel literature provides a source for the metaphors, images and
comparisons which physicians employ. Despite the protestations of those
who claim to simply detail the results of their own experience in "plain
ungarnished language", physicians often abandon the orbit of their own
experience and observation in favour of the more vivid images and the
more dramatic experience detailed by travellers. As Lord Shaftesbury
noted in his Advice to an Author, "monsters and monster-heads were
never more in request", and a few years later Blackmore, again in
his Treatise of the Spleen and Vapours, drew directly upon the exotic
imagery of travel in painting his picture of madness.
"Predominant judgement and discretion are settled as the
limits, which circumscribe the man of sense.... If you pass
this frontier you enter into a wild uncultivated region, an
intellectual Africa, that abounds with an endless variety of
monsters and irregular minds. These absurd understand-
ings are errors and deviations of nature in the formation of
the head". 25
In trying to define the boundaries of wit or sense, hoping thereby to
reveal the area occupied by madness, Blackmore abandons faithful
description of the disease's appearance in favour of that potent image
of a continent untamed, barely explored and populated by extraordinary
races. Redolent with mystery the image of an "intellectual Africa"
conjures up the impression of a mind not in control of itself, flouting
the limits of discretion and of nature. Blackmore's image locates
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madness, it fixes it in relation to other phenomena and helps to provide
a perspective from which the observer can consider this disease and
identify other phenomena to which it bears a resemblance. It is an image
which, moreover, conjures up for the reader a far more exciting and
memorable picture of this disorder than any detail of Blaclunore's own
experience might do. Blackmore's description is effective because it
locates madness in relation to an experience removed from both his own
and the reader's common course of everyday affairs. The image employed
by Blackmore, as a supplement to the account of his own experience, thus
provides a context in which madness may be examined and described.
Although the chosen metaphor refers to a distant and rather exotic continent
it is, nonetheless, an image with which some of Blackmore's readers
are likely to have been familiar. In other words, the author chooses a
metaphor that is striking but not too esoteric or incongruous. To the
contemporary reader of the Treatise of the Spleen and Vapours the
association between barbarism and Africa would almost certainly have had
considerable currency and by relating fairly generalized notions concern-
ing barbarism and Africa to the more specific problem of madness,
Blackmore, with considerable effect and economy, creates a useful
framework for understanding madness and grasping its particular qualities.
There is one further way in which the accounts of travellers serve
to increase the general stock of experience on which medical enquiry can
draw. Just as these accounts serve as a useful source of potent images
so too they provide, in their descriptions of savage and barbarous tribes,
a yardstick against which such an unnatural phenomenon as madness
may be measured. One consequence of exploration and the discovery,
as Bacon observed, "of a multitude of climates and zones, wherein
innumerable nations breathe and live", is the relativization of all
customs, assumptions and settled perspectives. 26 Exploration has
revealed, according to Blackmore, "great diversity in the countenance,
humour and disposition of mind of different people", and the upshot of
this apparently infinite addition to the stock of knowledge is, inevitably,
the discovery that the established distinctions and classifications are
29
relative and that there may, after all, be no fixed point from which to
determine the precise difference between those who are barbarous or
civilized, and perhaps between those who are sane or mad. 27
The discovery of new continents and customs thus has two significant
results. First, such discovery directly increases the basic stock of
knowledge about climate, customs and so on, thereby providing a valuable
addition to what Bacon referred to as the 'granary or store-house' of
known facts. Secondly, this broadening of horizons and the associated
increase in knowledge dramatically reveals the range of human behaviour,
the immense variation in customs, manners and ways of life. The inevitable
corrolary, therefore, of the exploration of new worlds is the discovery of
diversity, of the seemingly limitless variety of races, laws, religions,
climates and nations. As a result of exploration almost everything is
called into question and all the categorizations or divisions that had hitherto
seemed to stable and invulnerable are suddenly shown to be unsteady
and somewhat arbitrary. When applied to the study of madness the immedi-
ate consequence of this relativization of knowledge is to conclude that
"the species of madness are as various as men are in their complexions". 28
This conclusion does nothing to settle the problem of perspective with
which most physicians grappled.
Rather than settle for such a 'pessimistic' conclusion physicians study
the travel literature in the hope of discovering those particular features or
attributes that separate the civilized from the barbarous and, by implica-
tion at least, the sane from the mad. In the context of medical enquiry
travel literature does not provide instruction in the relativity of all know-
ledge and distinctions, rather it is treated by physicians as a mine of
information concerning barbarous behaviour which may, in certain
respects, resemble and shed greater light on the behaviour of the mad.
In mining this rich vein of information physicians adopt a principle
advocated by Bacon. The principle of observing similarities and relations
between phenomena, or "the resemblances and analogies of things", no
matter how different these phenomena or things seem at first sight. 29
The centrality of observation is again affirmed but it must be given a
specific focus and orientation; the identification of phenomena that
resemble each other in some respect. An example may illustrate this
process.
The discoveries of travellers have revealed that the one facility
common to all those who claim to be 'civilised' is the capacity for scien-
tific enquiry. On occasions where man's unique and distinctive capacity
for "science and art" is not employed then, as Thomas Tryon remarked,
"man is much worse than the beast and as appears in most or all
countries where the nations have no art, sciences or trade, are they not
much more brutish than the savage beasts of the desert". Likewise Boyle had
observed that "beasts inhabit the world; man, if he will do more, must
study and spiritualise it". 30 Those afflicted by madness, seem, at
least temporarily, to have lost the facility for science and art and their
condition may, as a result, be justifiably compared with the brutish or
barbaric side of creation. In the eyes of many physicians madness is
clearly analogous to animality or barbarity, conditions characteristically
bereft of the capacity to regulate or control behaviour. It is for this
reason that Nicholas Robinson, entering the "most gloomy scene of
nature" in which the melancholic resides, finds this "lordly creature
man almost debased below the brutal species of creation". A finding
echoed by Z. Mayne who, in his Two Dissertations Concerning Sense,
proposed that when a man' 'takes part with the brute against his own
nature", such as occurs during fits of madness, just retribution should
entail the individual assuming the shape of the animal whose appetites
he had imitated: "into a goat is lascivious, into a pig if a glutton". 31
There seems, finally, to be very close similarities between the behaviour
of those who are barbaric and those afflicted by madness. Like the
Hottentots of the Cape whose "inordinate way of living, and lust, makes
them grow old before their time and makes them crazy and weak' the
insane are similarly, "immoderately given to venery, so that they caress
publicly without either dread or shame". 32
These examples illustrate the way in which the study of madness may
be advanced by means of apt analogies and judiciously observed
resemblances between ostensibly different phenomena. In the accounts
that travellers have given of their voyages some physicians find
descriptions of behaviour which resembles that of their insane patients
and it is this discovery of similarities or resemblances that forms an
integral element in the method of medical enquiry, particularly so far
as the study of madness is concerned. Just as Bacon argued that the
endless accumulation of facts serves no useful purpose unless it is
accompanied by diligent attention to the way in which specific facts
resemble each other, so too one finds in certain of the medical texts a
profound concern not with the obvious diversity of mental states but
rather with the similarities between certain states and, more importantly,
the relationship between particular aspects of 'mad' behaviour and the
behaviour of other creatures or races. One of the most frequently
observed similarities is that between the behaviour of the insane and the
instinctual activity of animals, which seems devoid of volition or judgment.
By analysing and describing the way in which animality is analogous to
madness physicians hope to shed greater light on the latter condition.
In many of the eighteenth century medical treatises, especially those
dating from the first half of the century, one thus finds either direct
borrowing from travellers' accounts, particularly those concerning the
effect of climate on the mind, or other more distant echoes such as
the descriptions of savagery and the wilder types of insanity. These
same discoveries were of relevance to medicine in much the same way
as the discoveries of travellers augmented and enriched the experience
and writings of historians and philosophers. At the level of both direct
empirical evidence and of imagery the literature of travel seems to
have supplemented the medical experience of at least some physicians.
In addition to this, travel literature is relevant because many of the
problems to which it is addressed were common to medical accounts
of madness; problems concerning the distinction between men and animals,
for example, and the difference between those who are barbaric and
civilised. In these respects travellers' accounts may be said to have
supplemented and widened the otherwise limited experience of physicians.
Both the exploration of new continents and the investigation of disorders
of the mind potentially have relativising consequences and one way of
stemming the intrusion of relativism, and finding a stable vantage point,
is by elucidating the similarities between phenomena; by demonstrating,
for instance, how madness is like animality. In brief, therefore, the
literature on travel constitutes—albeit to varying degrees—part of the
experience on which medicine may draw, and this experience is particularly
relevant in the context of the study of madness.
Reference has already been made to the two problems posed by the
reliance of psychology upon experience and observation. The first concerns
the narrowness of such experience and the second its validity. Given that
enquiry is based largely upon the observation of visible appearances, given,
in other words, the dependence of medical science upon the reliability of
the senses, what guarantee is there that such knowledge will be accurate?
This dependence upon the senses raises critical questions concerning the
status of scientific truths in general and of medical findings in particular.
Given that the ideal of scientific enquiry consists in exactly describing
the observed regularities in nature, what assurance is there that these
descriptions are based on true observations? Can physicians assume that
the senses are infallible, or at least sufficiently so?
No detail of personal experience, however carefully executed in plain
ungarnished language, will be valuable unless there can be some assurance
that the senses are reliable. Just as Locke begins his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding with an essentially sceptical formulation of questions
concerning the limits of knowledge and the objects commensurate with
our knowledge, so too physicians confront the issues raised by scepticism
and the doubts which scepticism throws upon the value of their findings.
While Locke remains something of an agnostic with respect to the certainty
of scientific knowledge, however, physicians try to provide arguments in
support of the certainties, albeit limited, attained by medical enquiry. As
we have already seen in the early part of the eighteenth century at least
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physicians are not so much concerned with fixing the precise and certain
points at which madness begins as with providing faithful and accurate
descriptions of its visible appearances. By the end of the century, as
will be shown later, the point of separation is fixed with apparent certainty
but in the case of most early eighteenth century treatises the more immedi-
ate task is to paint a faithful portrait of the external physiognomy of the
disease. In painting this portrait physicians necessarily rely on the senses
of hearing, seeing, and, to a lesser extent, of touching. The arguments
offered in defence of this strategy are interesting and it is with these that
this chapter will conclude.
"All knowledge is made of sense" observed Thomas Willis in his Two
Discourses Concerning the Soul of Brutes (1672). A few years earlier, in
his treatise on The Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves (1664) the same
author had optimistically declared that "where matters appear to the
senses we do not too easily run upon errors", an assertion that implicitly
recognises that the possibility of running upon errors is inextricably
bound up with the scientist's dependence upon his senses. 33 As noted
earlier Sydenham had also defined the limits of enquiry in terms of
observable, sensible effects. "We are," Syclenham believed, "entirely
in the dark as to the inward structure and composition of the minute
particles of all bodies; and can with no degree of certainty judge or de-
termine anything concerning them, but from their outward appearances
and sensible effects; when we attempt anything beyond this, all our
reasonings are full of confusion and uncertainty". 34 Others, however,
conceded that uncertainty and confusion were real dangers even where
enquiry was limited to sensible effects. Merely by observing the limits
set to enquiry by Sydenham was seen as no guarantee of certainty since,
as Nicholas Robinson observed in his New System of the Spleen (1729),nwe
daily fall into gross mistakes which arise not so much from a necessary
error in our judgement, as the imperfection of our organs while the soul
is chained down to the conduct of the senses". 35 This is a recognition
of fallibility that brings to mind Descartes' dismissal of the 'deceiving
senses' as being completely useless instruments of scientific enquiry. On
the other hand, for physicians such as Robinson who, in the tradition of
empirical psychology, had to trust to experience and observation such
outright rejection was unthinkable. It may be the case that, as Robinson
remarked, "only when the hand of Providence is pleased to divest the
soul of these walls of flesh, in which it is innured, will it arise capable
of divine knowledge", but in the meantime the physician must make do
with the inadequate instruments and defend both the status and value of
his findings. 36 This defence usually took two forms, both of which are
to be found in many of the medical treatises examined.
The first line of defence is based on the simple proposition that the
certainty of scientific evidence, including those certainties provided by
medicine, are comparable with, and indeed equal to, the certainties
on which daily life is conducted. Scientific findings should, in other words,
be sufficient to convince a man so long as they stand comparison with
the commonsense certainties of everyday life. What unites both the
certainties of science and common sense is the assumption that in both
cases doubt would, on the basis of the evidence, be unreasonable.
Perhaps one of the most forceful and certainly one of the clearest ex-
positions of this view was provided by Boyle who proposed that since it
is impossible to acquire absolute, transcendent truths—such as
Descartes had lain claim to—the certainty claimed for any enquiry
should simply be "enough for a wise man to aquiesce in". 37 To para-
phrase Boyle, it could be said that any enquiry may legitimately be
described as true where there exist no reasonable grounds for doubting
its findings.
This principle of reasonable doubt—itself a forerunner of the current
legalistic notions—is absolutely central to the medical work of this period.
Physicians claim that their findings are true and their descriptions valid
in the sense that to doubt them or throw them into question would be an
unreasonable act. If, as Nicholas Robinson proposed to do, physicians
"treat these several abstruse subjects in a way familiar to the mind",
and if on the basis of due consideration of the evidence the reader is
persuaded by the account, then one may justifiably refer to that account
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.as being certam. 38
 In other words physicians invoke the concept of moral
certainty, by which they simply mean the kind of certainty that pertains in
everyday life. As physicians demonstrate that scientific experience is no
different from ordinary experience, as they show that there is nothing
unusual about their method of studying madness, they also show, at least
indirectly, that the criteria of certainty used in everyday life are quite
appropriate to the assessment of scientific treatises. Alternatively, one
may be morally certain of the truth of scientific work in precisely the
same way as one is morally certain of the existence of God; in neither
case is doubt reasonable. The certainty of science, like that of religion,
derives from the self-evident truth of shared understanding. Physicians
do not claim absolute or transcendent certainty for their findings but they
do affirm the principle that the absence of reasonable grounds for doubt
is an adequate basis for assent. The intention of physicians is not to
demonstrate that their findings are incontrovertible. Instead they are guided
by the more modest hope of winning the agreement of their readers, of
persuading them that the particular perspective from which madness has
been studied is both sound and acceptable. It is on the basis of such
agreement that physicians hope to impose order upon the diverse forms
of madness, to outline the physiognomy of the disease and thereby fore-
stall the drift into relativism. This defence of medical findings is further
evidence of the ordinariness of medical enquiry, It takes its examples
from the common course of the world, it has no method save that of
treating abstruse subjects in a way familiar to the mind, and finally, it
aspires only to the level of commonsense certainties upon which everyday
life is founded.
The second line of defence also proceeds from the assumption that the
object of enquiry is to provide an accurate description of nature from a
point of view or perspective common to both author and reader. Although
the senses are unquestionably fallible the fact that an author feels, in an
intuitive sense, that his account is correct is quite sufficient. Again
Boyle provides a clear statement of the principle. "I think that a clear
light, or evidence of perception, shining in the understanding, affords
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us the greatest assurance we can have (in a natural way) of the truth of
the judgement we pass upon things". 39 However, this light "shining in the
understanding" is not the divine light of the Cartesian rationalists; rather
it is the quiet feeling of assurance, the inner conviction that the phenomena
have been faithfully observed and described. Since the presence of this
light can be felt rather than demonstrated it would, furthermore, be
unreasonable to demand any measure or standard for it. All that an
author can claim is fidelity to his method of observation and description,
or, as Locke and Sydenham had done, assert that he had not wantonly
overstepped the limits of experience. If, as Pitcairne noted, physick
is founded "upon the trials of experience" then the physician may justifi-
ably feel that his description is accurate and it is this inner feeling of
assurance, of a "clear light shining in the understanding", that forms
the basis for scientific truths which compare favourably with those of
common sense and everyday life.
Finally, what unites both lines of defence and effectively prevents the
incursions of scepticism is the simple proposition that although his senses
are fallible and the knowledge derived from them incomplete, such know-
ledge as is attained is quite sufficient and perfectly adequate to the needs
of man. Medical knowledge is partial, imperfect and limited to the
description of visible appearances, but it is, in the opinion of many
physicians wholly sufficient. "It is", Sydenhara argued, "aptly suited
to our present state and condition; it answers all the ends of our wellbeing
and preservation". Or as Bayne observed in his New Essay Upon the 
Nerves (1738), "it is an impossibility and downright contradiction that a
finite understanding should comprehend the works of infinity. God hath
given us faculties, not adapted to let us into the real and absolute nature
of things, but sufficient to instruct us into the relations they bear to us. " 40
To demand more either of the senses or of knowledge, to demand certain-
ties that transcend those of everyday life, is thus deemed, in deference to
divine understanding, to be quite unreasonable.
In the past such vanity has, according to Bayne, "obstructed the improvement
of arts and sciences", the pursuit of which requires due humility on the part
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of the scientist and the recognition that knowledge is limited and only
commensurate with certain phenomena. A consistent theme in the work
of Sydenham, Locke and many who studied madness is the importance
of humility and of the recognition that experience and observation, limited
though they may be in comparison with the transcendent sweep of
Cartesianism, are the sure avenues to a degree of knowledge sufficient
to man's needs. Until such time as man is delivered from what Robinson
called "these walls of flesh" any attempt to go beyond the limits of
description and observation would be mere vainglory. Perhaps the mind
is, as Bacon noted, "an enchanted glass" in which the "beams of things"
are refracted, but at least these refractions, when allied to an inner
feeling of assurance, are adequate and appropriate to the condition in
which man has resided since the Fall. 41 And again it is Locke who
provides a succinct assessment of the position.
"Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight,
as He has given us some certain knowledge, though limited
to a few things in comparison, probably as a taste of what
intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in us a
desire and endeavour after a better state: so, in the greatest
part of our concernment, He has afforded us only the twilight,
as I may say so, of probabilities, suitable, I presume, to
that state of mediocrity and probationership He has been
pleased to place us in here. "42
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CHAPTER 2
METAPHORS OF MADNESS
As we have now seen, one of the central goals of medical enquiry in
the period under consideration was to find a point of view, or shared per-
spective, from which madness could be studied. Those who studied
madness needed to find a steady orientation to the object of their enquiry—
an orientation which would facilitate the gradual accumulation of know-
ledge about this disease. As demonstrated in the preceding chapter
physicians in the eighteenth century, working in the Lockean tradition
of empirical psychology, defined the conditions for the progress of
knowledge in terms of strict adherence to the limits of experience and
the principle of neutral or natural observation. These methodological
principles seemed, implicitly at least, to present the medical investiga-
tion of madness as being neither more nor less than the judicious organisa-
tion of common sense. The absence of either method or artifice in
medical enquiry served to guarantee both the authority and accuracy of a
physician's descriptions, all of which were alleged to spring from
common perspectives provided by everyday experience and observation.
Closer analysis of these principles revealed, however, that unqualified
adherence to them was virtually impossible and that physicians frequently
overstepped the limits which Bacon, Locke and Sydenham had tried to
impose upon experience and observation. Moreover, it could be argued
that the methodological injunctions formulated by Locke and Sydenhara
could, if taken literally, actually work to inhibit the process of enquiry
and the advancement of knowledge. In the case of the principle of
experience, for example, it has been shown that recourse to travel
literature, as a means of broadening the experience upon which the
physician is able to draw, had a direct impact upon the study of madness.
Having examined the general methodological context in which physicians
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worked, and having further shown that they sometimes 'failed' to observe
the limits set to their enquiry, it is now time to consider one particular
difficulty confronting the study of madness and the methods adopted by
physicians to overcome the problem. This problem relates to the status
accorded, by Locke and Bacon in particular, to language and its role in
the advancement of scientific understanding.
A direct corollary of the emphasis placed upon experience and careful
observation is the argument that the goal of enquiry consists of perfectly
describing the appearance of phenomena. The ideal of a purely descriptive
science of nature is entirely relevant to medicine which is guided, in its
study of madness, by the model of Sydenham's painter endeavouring to
portray the smallest spot of his subject, although "it is not", observed
the physician Thomas Arnold in 1782, "every painter who can give a just
and striking representation of his original". 1 The ideal is nonetheless
striven for and its presence, as discussed above, is evident in much of
the literature examined. However, if this objective is a necessary corollary
of more general principles of enquiry then so too is the function and
status accorded to language—the instrument with which the physician
must fashion his perfect description.
Once the task of science is to duplicate fully the world through description,
once, in other words, it is assumed that description is or at least should
be isomorphic with phenomena, it is inevitable that a special role must be
assigned to language as the instrument of description. In order to
achieve a perfect correspondence between description and phenomena it
is essential that language should simply record or rather translate
sensory experiences of seeing, touching, and hearing into a series of
neutral terms faithful to the details of the original. Physicians are, of
course, dependent upon language for expressing and formulating their
observations—since the visible characteristics of madness are not
susceptible to the arts of weighing or measuring—but in order to realise
the ideal of a perfect description it is obviously imperative that language be
freed of ambiguity or equivocation. It should serve instead as a neutral
register or index of experience, playing no constitutive part in that which
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it describes. In accordance with the guiding principles of enquiry the
language of medical treatises should simply provide an undistorted resume'
of observed characteristics. Just as a logical extension of Locke's views
is that there should be no distinction between observation and reflection, so
too a necessary corollary of his plain historical method is the argument
that there should be no break or hiatus between observation and description.
Language may be construed therefore as a transparent envelope of thought
or, more precisely, of observed characteristics which are, as it were,
perfectly preserved in language.
The intention in this chapter is to analyse, in some detail, the language
of medical treatises, to suggest how the dictums concerning language
could come to constitute obstacles to enquiry and, most importantly, to
investigate one particular way in which the problem is overcome. As
indicated in the preceding references to travel literature, and also to the
autobiographical quality of much of the medical literature, an important
technique adopted by physicians in studying madness is that which places
this phenomenon in an ever increasing series of relationships with other
phenomena. Beginning with its object—madness—medical enquiry proceeds,
in a centrifugal manner, to relate or compare this individual phenomenon
with an increasing number of other occurrences, for example savagery
or animality. In addressing the question, what is madness like, rather
than the question, what is madness or how should it be defined, physicians
necessarily employ a whole range of analogies and metaphors. It is this
recourse to metaphor, seen here as a mode of apprehending phenomena
rather than as a mere ornament to language, that constitutes the principal
means by which physicians transcend the limits set to both experience
and language.
Confronted with a somewhat inscrutable disease physicians approach their
subject rather obliquely as they continuously discover other phenomena
with which madness may be compared and contrasted. In so doing they
inevitably invent a whole series of highly suggestive metaphors which help
to locate madness in relation to other aspects of life and to other natural
occurrences. Via metaphors physicians are able both to apprehend and to
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describe the slightly intangible qualities of madness in terms of more
tangible entities. Metaphors provide a perspective upon the object of
enquiry and, more significantly, they make some visualisable phenom-
enon a vehicle for portraying an interior life. Very briefly, what happens
with metaphors is that a perceived quality in one kind of existence is
transferred to define a quality in another kind of existence; to use a
concrete example, the animal metaphor of madness forcefully conveys
the impression that those subject to fits of wild behaviour act quite
instinctively. The metaphor is suggestive in that it provides a perspective
upon the disease and, at the same time, it transcends the narrow limits
set to language and experience. The following discussion takes as its
focus therefore the metaphors of madness, and, in the latter half of the
chapter, the descent of a particular metaphor into "literal" description.
By way of providing a context in which to place the discussion it may be
helpful to sketch, very briefly, the view of language that prevailed during
this period—a view which mistrusted metaphor or figurative expression,
and indeed language itself, since this was regarded as the source of so
much error in scientific discourse. For present purposes what is im-
portant about the position adopted by Bacon, Locke and The Royal Society
with regard to language is the incompatibility between this position
and the requirements of many physicians to whom the metaphoric and
allusive qualities of language were an indispensable means of conveying
the vivid, dramatic and often frightening qualities of insanity.
It is Locke who plainly notes the central importance of language.
"For language being the great conduit whereby men convey
their discoveries, reason, and knowledge from one to
another, he that makes bold use of it, though he does not
corrupt the fountains of knowledge that are in things them-
selves, yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop
the pipes whereby it is distributed to the public use and
advantage of mankind". 2
For both Locke and his mentor in medicine, Thomas Sydenha_m, the
necessity for clear and precise expression was just as important as the
argument that only careful observation would ensure that the ideas
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expressed "agreed to the reality of things". 3 Error is unavoidable once
ideas depart from reality and once the language used to convey these ideas
becomes confused or falls prey to conventional and lazy usage. Where
this occurs, or where "subtility is foolishly striven for", then the ensuing
"effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothing but noise and
wrangling about sound, without convincing or bettering a man's under-
standing". 4 This is an assessment with which Locke's predecessor,
Bacon, would have agreed for he inveighed more than most against the
danger posed by language and his hostility to language—which the Royal
Society faithfully upheld—is evident in works dating from the late seventeenth
century and early eighteenth century. Just as Bacon exerted a powerful
methodological influence so too his views on the role played by language
are of considerable importance.
Of all the idols which lead the mind into error, persuading it of supers-
tition's truth, there is none, so Bacon believed, more hazardous than
language—the idol of the market place. Insinuating itself between the
perception of a thing and the thing itself language assumes, in Bacon's
view, the status of an unavoidable obstacle to true understanding. "Words
manifestly force the understanding, they throw everything into confusion,
lead mankind into vain controversies and fallacies", but there is little that
the scientist can do to avoid this cardinal distemper of learning. 5 As
imperfect as the unequal glass of the mind language further distorts the
already inadequate and refracted "beams of things" which pass for
knowledge. Bacon's profound mistrust of language is therefore founded
on his belief that like all that is conventional or unquestioned it threatens
any attempt at fashioning a true model of the world. In the work of Bacon's
successors, notably the enthusiastic champions of a universal language,
this mistrust is translated into outright hostility directed against language
itself and against those who foolishly prefer the pleasure of words to that
of things.
"Witness the present image", requested John Wilkins in 1668, "especially
the late times, wherein the grand imposture of phrases hath almost eaten
out solid knowledge in all professions". 6 By way of remedying the defect,
so finely expressed in Wilkins's graceful phrase, the author outlines a
scheme, albeit a quixotic one, whereby a system of signs each standing
for a particular thing would render recourse to words quite unnecessary.
In this dream of a universal language Wilkins saw the curse of Babel
erased. In the opinion of many members of the Royal Society, for whom
Wilkins had drawn up the scheme, the ideal of a perfect language was
an integral element in the advancement of science. Descartes had
shared this dream but he, like the Royal Society's "virtuosi" whom
Swift ruthlessly flayed, found that language would never attain the pure
lucidity of mathematics, and when he endeavoured to persuade others of
the truth of his findings, as for instance in the late work Le Monde, he
could not avoid employing the richly allusive and uncertain language of
everyday affairs. 7 Similarly Boyle, while he could conceive of "no im-
possibility that opposes doing that in words that we already see done in
numbers", invariably falls back upon an equivocal vernacular to do with
words what only they can do: that is, persuade. 8
The task confronting those who sought to follow the dictums of Bacon
to their logical conclusion, and to give language all the lucidity of
mathematics, was quite considerable since the language of science had
already fallen so far beneath the standard to be attained. The cause of
this decline in good usage was attributable, at least in part, to the
intrusion of every kind of trope, and particularly that of metaphor.
Thomas Sprat, historian of the Royal Society, was able to observe in
1665 that the chasteness and vigour of the English Language compared
favourably with "the swelling metaphors, wherewith some of our
neighbours, who most admire themselves, adorn their books". 9 Yet
two years later in his History of the Royal Society Sprat's optimistic note
had given way to one of indignation and despair.
"Who can behold, without indignation, how many myths and
uncertainties, these specious tropes and figures have brought
on our knowledge? How many rewards, which are due to more
profitable and difficult art, have been still snatched away by
the easy vanity of fine speaking? And, in few words, I dare
say: that of all the studies of men, nothing may be sooner
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obtained, than this vicious abundance of phrase, this trick of
metaphor, this volubility of tongues, which makes so great a
noise in the world". 10
Significantly Sprat identified metaphor as the most important member
of the family of "specious tropes" that had corrupted the language of
science and obstructed the advancement of knowledge. It is this same
mistrust of metaphor, or what Locke calls the false virtue of subtility,
that pervaded much of the work dealing with language and its role in
science. In the hope of rescuing language from the condition into which it
had lapsed the members of the Royal Society adopted the only remedy that
seemed capable of stemming the intrusion of metaphors and associated
extravagances; "and that has been, a constant resolution to reject all
the amplification, digression, and swellings of style; to return back
to the primitive purity and shortness when men delivered so many things,
almost in an equal number of words". 11
When transposed to the realm of medicine, however, and particularly
to the study of madness, this ideal of delivering so many things in an
equal number of words proved to be somewhat unrealistic. While
physicians may have agreed, in principle, with the rules laid down by
the Royal Society for the presentation of scientific findings they were
unable to adhere to these rules in practice. As a result of this much of
the medical literature contains fine examples of those swelling metaphors
and other figurative extravagances reviled by Sprat, Locke, and
Sydenham. However, this employment of metaphors reflects not so much
a wilful refusal to observe the limits set to enquiry and the presentation
of findings. On the contrary it strongly suggests that the principles laid
down for other branches of enquiry, for instance natural history, are
simply not appropriate to the study of madness. In contrast to the natural
historian or the traveller, both of whom are able to describe the visible
appearances of phenomena, physicians—while they can describe the
appearance of madness in much the same way—do not, by so doing,
approach a description of madness itself. Simply to describe the external
physiognomy of the mad, or to describe specific instances of mad
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behaviour, is not the same thing as describing madness. While a
superficial description would have marked adherence to the method-
ological restrictions placed upon any attempts to go beyond experience,
or more specifically beyond visible appearances, physicians had, of
necessity, to transcend the limits of the visible as they sought to map
and describe an inner life of which mad behaviour is simply the visible
expression.
A principal function of metaphor in the medical literature is the
way in which it enables physicians to visualise madness and in so doing
to present their readers with a vivid and persuasive description of the
disease. Limited to the flat plane of experience, and mindful of the
Royal Society's strictures concerning language, medicine would
amount to little more than a bland description of that which is already
known. What is central to the study of madness is that although the
phenomenon may be recognised and identified it remains extremely
difficult to convey its particular qualities. Metaphors, however, make
it possible for physicians to express the qualitative dimensions of madness,
to present this scarcely understood disease in terms of other, better
known phenomena and to thereby visualise the disease. Medical enquiry
is, in its study of madness at least, a profoundly visual science and in
a double sense.
First of all restriction to the realm of external appearances—such as
Sydenharn had urged—is inappropriate when the object of enquiry is the
mind or the interior life of man. Just as a painter discerns in his subject's
face the outlines of his life, so too physicians—while they may dutifully
describe the obvious characteristics of the mad—do concern themselves
with invisible dimensions and they do endeavour to infer the distinctive
qualities of this disease from its visible appearance. In ascribing
such importance to experience and observation Lockean psychology
creates obstacles to the study of madness, for the qualitative essence
of the disease is invisible and intangible. In recognition of this physicians,
such as George Cheyne, while they are aware that their "broad figures"
[of speech] may be ridiculed, nonetheless endorse the principles of
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analogy and of inference from visible appearances. Cheyne argues that
in studying disorders of the mind the physician has no alternative to
C	 )beginning with sensory knowledge which he may then improve by means
of "analogy, and its appendages, trope, allegory, metaphor and
similitude;" a process that will be illustrated shortly. 12 By equating
improvement with illustration, and understanding with metaphorical
association, Cheyne concedes, at least implicitly, that in the study of the
mind imaginative insights are essential and that, as a consequence, the
physician will never be able to convince his reader by the mere weight of
things or of observed occurrences. Working, as Cheyne does, with
the "analogy carried from the things that are seen to those that are
invisible, and only intelligible", the physician concedes that the authority
of experience and observation will, in the case of medical enquiry, be
supported upon the uncertain weight of imaginative inferences. 13 In
view of this it would be unrealistic to expect this type of enquiry to deliver
"so many things, almost in an equal number of words". On the contrary
the "swelling" style of medical treatises and the frequent use of metaphor
is an essential means of expressing the invisible workings of the mind
and of visualising that which is inaccessible to the senses. Metaphors are
an indispensable means of expressing the intangible in terms of something
more tangible, the invisible in terms of the visible.
Metaphors offer, therefore, one way of visualising man's inner life
but they also play an equally important part in helping both the author and
the reader to visualise what madness is like. The second sense in which
medical enquiry is a distinctively visual science concerns the value of
metaphorical expression as a means of fashioning vivid images of the
disease and thereby generating striking impressions with which the
reader will be left. In much the same way as a story-teller conjures up
a dramatic scene for his listeners physicians, in their equally anecdotal
manner, dramatise their observations; and in doing so they naturally
employ the 'specious trope' of metaphor since the plain ungarnished
language with which some physicians tried to describe their findings is
inadequate to the task of dramatic illustration. Thus Harvey, in his Vanities
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of Philosophy and Physick (1699) noted that, "the understanding is forced
to use all or most proper words in an improper, comparative, resembling,
relative, tropical, figurative, and abstractive sense". But, he adds
later, "here you observe the use of putting words into different dresses,
modes, fashions, or habits, that will conduct you into various new thoughts
of things, in themselves very useful and pleasant". 14 By introducing the
reader to 'new sorts of things' figurative expression helps the author to
portray the phenomena described; the metaphor accomplishes a shift in
perspective, a slight reorientation of the reader's point of view, that
enables him to see the phenomena in a new and perhaps more striking
light.
To take one example. Sir Richard Blackraore, in his collection of
Essays Upon Several Subjects (1716), observed that the "language of the
present time is so clear and chaste and so different from that of our
ancestors, that should they return hither, they would want an interpreter
to converse with us. " 15 But Blackmore knew better than many of his
contemporaries how to move his readers, how to combine the chasteness
of language with the need to persuade and how to conjure up in the reader's
mind a striking visual image of natural occurrences, and particularly
mental disturbances. Recall, for instance, Blackmore's vivid evocation
of raving madness in terms of a wild and passionate "intellectual Africa,
that abounds with an endless variety of monsters and irregular minds".
In sharp contrast to the maniac, who lives in "a zone parched by too much
intellectual heat", the individual suffering from melancholia can best be
visualised as an inhabitant of "Boetian territories, barren of understanding,
extending in a frigid climate and visited but with weak and languishing
rays, whence the spirits are benumbed and half-animated". Alongside these
two categories one finds "another class of animal", a curious mixture
of foolishness and madness in which, "an individual's brain is encompassed
with a fence of such impenetrable thickness, and his spirits so clogged
with dregs and muffled up phlegm, that his head is inaccessible to all of
the powers of sense and ingenuity". 16 Finally, in an attempt to explain
the diversity of these conditions, of which the reader should by now have a
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striking visual image, Blackmore again employs a metaphor. The cause,
he argues, resides in the stomach and the "inferior neighbouring parts"
which, "seems a dark and troubled region of animal meteors and exhala-
tions, where opposite streams and rarified juices, contending for domina-
tion, maintain continual wars; these fervent and flatulent effluvia strive
and struggle for vent with great noise, they sometimes murmur, but
croak and grumble". Portrayed as a battleground upon which the constant
struggle of the vapours, "imprisoned in vaults and caverns", is vigorously
fought, the stomach, so ill-defined and so little understood, is deemed
the original location of all mental disturbance. While the reader may
appreciate the felicity of these images the unfortunate patient, deafened
by the noise from below, may easily conclude that he has, "living frogs
in his stomach, which he perceives as he thinks from their croaking and
grumbling there". 17 This conclusion may signify the onset of delusion,
of entry into a wild unciltivated intellectual Africa, or, in the case of
melancholia, into sombre Boetian territories.
Blackmore's metaphors thus enable the reader to visualise madness,
in both the senses that the world visualise is being used here. First, the
image of contending vapours waging war in the stomach and croaking like
frogs, or the image of a mind encompassed with a fence of impenetrable
thickness through which neither sense nor ingenuity can pass, provide
striking visual images of occurrences that are hidden from view. The
metaphors serve therefore to extend the knowledge gained through
observation to remoter realms that are, as Cheyne noted, "invisible and
only intelligible". In endeavouring to portray a troubled inner life
Blackmore uses metaphors in which a visualisable phenomenon, for
example the croaking of frogs, is used as a vehicle for expressing par-
ticular qualities of an inner life—in this case disorder and confusion.
Secondly, other metaphors such as those of an 'intellectual Africa' or
'Boetian territories' provide striking visual images that convey a sense
of what this disease is like. These images, if taken literally, would be
patently absurd, but they enable the reader to see madness in terms of
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other phenomena. The arresting absurdity upon which the metaphor is
based has the effect of shifting the reader's perspective upon this disease
and, as Harvey had noted, it thus "conducts him to new and various sorts
of things." What is useful about Blackmore's metaphors is that they leave
the reader with dramatic and vivid images in terms of which madness
may be seen. The importance of metaphor to medical treatises on madness
derives, therefore, from the fact that metaphors are helpful in conveying,
in a fairly precise fashion, a meaning which would otherwise not have been
exactly rendered. Moreover, it is unlikely that the same meaning would,
without a metaphor, strike the mind with an equal vividness.
It is important, however, to emphasise that the use of metaphors in
eighteenth century medical treatises on madness is not simply the sign of
mere stylistic subtlety or invention. To see the metaphors of madness
as little more than stylistic ornaments, or as embellishments upon
an otherwise dry medical discourse, would be to take too narrow a view
although one which would be quite in keeping with traditional eighteenth
century views on the role of metaphor. As a number of critics have
pointed out, the prevailing eighteenth century view of metaphor held
both this and other figurative expressions to be nothing more than stylistic
devices which enable an author to illustrate a point or, in the case of
political discourses, to sway a crowd. Such a view, which may be traced
back to Aristotle, did not therefore allow metaphor any cognitive function.
On the contrary, metaphorical expression is, as Dr. Johnson observed,
"a great excellence of style, when it is used with propriety, for it gives
you two ideas in one". 18 The corollary to this view is that metaphor
amounts to nothing more than the denotation of one thought or idea by the
name of another which resembles it in some respect. In other words,
the limited view of metaphor assumes that both the idea and the terms
used to express the idea are precisely fixed and understood. All that a
metaphor does is to effect an exchange between two ideas which, it is
assumed, are both unambiguously defined and expressed. According to
the traditional view where one has two concepts, the meaning of which is
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fixed and precise, then one can use a metaphor to make one concept stand
in for, or illustrate, the other. That is, metaphors serve simply as an
embroidery or embellishment of clearly understood facts and as such
metaphorical expression is a purely verbal matter.
In the context of this discussion such a view implies that physicians
such as Cheyne or Blackmore employ metaphors to illustrate a phenomenon
of which they have a clear grasp. But in the case of madness this is dem-
onstrably not the case. Either metaphors are used to express the in-
tangible and invisible qualities of the mind and its disorders or they are
used as a means of placing this phenomenon in relation to another that is
more fully understood. In neither instance could it be said that Blackmore,
for example, begins with two clearly defined and clearly understood
entities—melancholia and Boetia—which resemble each other in some
fairly specific way. Similarly, Cheyne's comments on metaphor make
it quite clear that this and other figurative expressions are employed
precisely because the physician's object of enquiry—the mind—is so
ill-understood and so difficult to apprehend. The physician has to begin
therefore with those phenomena of which he and his reader have a reason-
able grasp, for example animality, and then has to discuss madness in
terms of that which is already understood. By so doing physicians hope
to shed greater light on the somewhat elusive object of their enquiry.
What is being proposed therefore is that the metaphors of madness
provide physicians not so much with a way of embroidering medical facts
but rather with a way of experiencing and apprehending these facts. It is
as a particular mode of apprehending phenomena that metaphors are
important. In the case where two determinate concepts are fully under-
stood the discovery of a resemblance between them, and the metaphorical
expression of this similarity, serves to confirm rather than determine
the meaning of each concept. But in the case of madness, which is ill-
defined and indeterminate, the value of metaphorical expression is that
it enables the author to determine the meaning of the concept madness.
When madness is seen in relation to another phenomenon that is at least
partially understood then the effect is to clarify and indeed to determine
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the meaning of madness. By comparing madness with savagery or animality
the physician is able to indicate, in a fairly precise way, certain qualitative
characteristics of the insane. When Blackmore, for instance, introduces a
third category of madmen in terms of "another class of animal"he is not
suggesting that individuals are animals, but rather that those who are mad
resemble animals in certain respects: i. e. their imperviousness to "sense
and ingenuity". In this case Blackmore begins with two distinct groups,
madmen and animals, and by positing a relation between the two on the basis
of an observed similarity he succeeds in clarifying the defining character-
istics or qualities of one group. The comparison between madmen and
savages or animals therefore provides a way of experiencing or seeing
madness. When seen from the point of view of savagery, which travellers
have clearly described, the phenomenon of madness assumes a clearer
outline. The metaphor of barbarism or of an intellectual Africa provides
a perspective from which insanity can be more fully understood. In the
mind of the reader the insane assume certain of the qualities associated
say with animals and as a result the meaning of the term madness becomes
more obvious. As a result of the repeated use of the aniniat metaphor one
of insanity's defining characteristics becomes its affinity with instinctual
animal behaviour. The metaphor thus constitutes part of the definition.
Far from being a mere illustration of the phenomenon it actually determines
its meaning.
In certain instances the full significance of particular metaphors of
madness can be appreciated more fully if these individual metaphors are
seen in the context of an author's more general metaphor concerning the
origin and nature of man. Analysis of an author's root metaphors, or what
would be now referred to as a paradigm, sheds light on his metaphorical
formulations of particular conditions. In the work of George Cheyne, for
example, the particular metaphors of madness are really derivations from
an all embracing root metaphor through which the essential qualities of
man's nature and condition are apprehended. The necessity of metaphor
as a means of grasping spiritual truths, particularly concerning the nature
of man, is a cardinal principle in all of Cheyne's works; "in spiritual
truths, imperceptible and immaterial beings, (viz. ), about their nature,
qualities, and ranks, man can know nothing humanely and naturally,
but by analogy, similtude, allegory, trope, metaphor or figure". 19
Cheyne's metaphors of madness may be seen as submetaphors of his
more general theories concerning the fall of man and man's place in the
universe since the Fall. At the centre of Chenye's work is a view of the
world that sees man as struggling to escape the sensual chains and
fetters in which he has been bound since the Fall, seeking thereby to
regain that condition in which man was "simple, plain, honest and frugal";
a condition in which "there were few or no diseases". 20 Beginning with
sensory knowledge Cheyne employs analogy and its appendages as a way
of transcending the limits of experience and observation and thereby
gaining some insight into intangible realities: insights that are frequently
expressed in metaphorical terms.
Thus, when he endeavours to express the relationship between the body
and the soul Cheyne variously refers to the former as "an aggregate of
mere mechanical powers viz, of ropes, pulleys, levers, and strainers
and tubes", while the soul is visualised "like a musician in a finely formed
and well tuned organ case" or, "in a more gross similtude, the intelligent
principle is like a bell in a steeple, to which there are an infinite number
of hammers all around it, with ropes of all lengths". 21 Elsewhere the
"bell in the steeple" is portrayed as "a felon in a condemned hole or
dungeon"; the dungeon here being man's body or "Adamical temple" which
itself is nothing more than a series of "chains and fetters". It is entirely
consistent with this view that Cheyne should portray the earth as being
"really and literally a prison or a goal", the inmates of which are, "without
a figure, prisoners, slaves, and felons under a state of expiation and
purification". 22 The route to purification, to an escape from the lapsed
condition in which man finds himself after the Fall, is provided through
culture, study and reflection and all the operations of the mind which are,
according to Cheyne,
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"really (and not figuratively) but lopping, pruning, dressing
and removing obstacles and encumbrances, and forming the
bodily organs to a proper suppleness and elasticity for the
performance of spiritual exercises, and to produce habits.
But the study of arts and sciences, and all other knowledge is
but remembrance and recollection, opening passages and 23
apertures, to admit more light into the prison and dungeon". 
Where such pruning does not occur, where the mind is not exercised by
culture and study or reflection and little light is let into the dungeon then
one may speak of "idiots, brutes, and madmen". For it is only culture and
reflection that elevates man above the level of brute creation, to which he
had been reduced after the Fall. What unites madmen, brutes and idiots
is the shared inability to remember and recollect, to improve on the
knowledge gained through the senses by means of analogy, metaphor or
allegory. It is actually this ability to progress from sensory knowledge to
spiritual knowledge that gives man a special place in the chain of being and
where the ability is not exercised, as seems to be the case with madmen,
then one may justifiably conflate madness with idiocy and animality.
The argument presented so far may be usefully summarised as follows.
The necessary corollary of the methodological restriction of all enquiry to
the realm of experience and observation is that language, the means whereby
observations are transcribed, should fulfil an essentially neutral role, and
should not play any constitutive part in that which it describes. In studying
madness, however, these restrictions cannot be adhered to since the
object of enquiry is somewhat elusive, intangible and it does not admit of
the dispassionate descriptions of which a natural historian is capable. In
seeking to convey the distinctive qualities of madness, to show what it is
like, physicians go beyond a mere description of observable characteristics.
In the process of comparing madness to other phenomena, hoping thereby to
reveal its characteristic qualities, physicians have recourse to a whole
series of metaphors that generate vivid and striking images of the disease.
However, these metaphors are not simply artful embellishments upon
language or clever illustrations of well understood facts. On the contrary,
they serve an important cognitive function. They provide a perspective
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from which the disease may be studied, a way of apprehending the facts
of madness. Equally the metaphors, such as those that compare the
insane to animals, become part of the definition of madness; the metaphors
actually determine the meaning of the concept madness. If, for the sake
of argument, one was to translate the animal metaphor back into plain
language then at least one element of the metaphor—madness—would
retain the enriched meanings gained through metaphoric association.
Finally, there are occasions on which it is appropriate to examine meta-
phors for particular phenomena in terms of the more general root metaphors
around which an author's work is organised. In the example above, for
instance, the metaphorical association between madmen and brutes may be
seen as one aspect of a more general metaphorical treatment of the
Fall of man and of the chain of being.
The cognitive value of metaphors, and this is particularly important in
the study of madness, is that they provide one way of visualising the
intangible in terms of the tangible, the extraordinary in terms of other
phenomena that are closer to everyday life. Although the metaphors
become integral elements of the description of madness they still retain
much of their "as if" quality. To see something in terms of something
else, or to discover a point of resemblance between two phenomena from
quite different orders of experience, is to employ metaphor. But the
resemblance discovered is always partial. The basis of metaphorical
association is an observed partial similarity between phenomena, not
complete equivalence. Instead of treating phenomena as identical metaphor
begins from and preserves the original difference between two entities.
To compare a madman to an animal is not, except in certain instances which
are to be examined, the same thing as making an animal of a once sane
man. In brief, therefore, one of the defining characteristics of a metaphor
is its "as if" qualities. Madmen may be seen "as if" they were brutes,
savages, or indeed Hotentots with whom they share the qualities of un-
bridled lasciviousness.
Such an account is, however, limited in that it implies that metaphors
retain their "as if" quality; that they remain, in other words, living
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metaphors. But this is demonstrably not the case for metaphors do gradually
fade, they do tend to be used in an increasingly literal manner in the
course of which their "as if" qualities seem to diminish. There is always
a difference concealed in a metaphor, a difference which is identical with
the sum of the parts not included in the metaphorical association. But, in
the course of time and with usage, this difference dissolves and the once
partial resemblance or relation between two phenomena approaches
complete equivalence. As metaphors are used in an increasingly literal
manner they thus become sedimented in language, which may be seen as
the repository of numerous dead or sleeping metaphors. As metaphors fade
and as the ideas originally expressed become familiar so the original
sense of the metaphor becomes more generalised. The metaphor becomes
simply a name or a description, the compass of which is considerably
wider than that originally intended. In many such instances instead of
using a particular metaphor an author is used by it. This is a danger
to which the physician William Battle drew attention in his Treatise of
Madness (1758), when he discussed the metaphorical expressions of
"nature" and "the Anima" which had been "invented by Willis and deified
by Stahl".
"Which figurative words, though not quite philosophical, are
innocent and even useful, in case they are applied only to
animal periphrases, and in relating medical matters to fact.
But young practitioners, who are often told that they are of
imitate and assist nature, must take great care not to be
misguided by the literal sense of words, or fancy anything
like personal consciousness as intellectual agency in the
animal economy. For in such case of misapprehension these
and the like expressions become as absurd as all the faculties
of the ancients, and, what is much worse, maybe as mischie-
vous as an instrument of death in the hands of a madman". 24
What Battle is drawing attention to therefore is the danger of failing to
recognise the metaphoric status of an expression and in so doing to accept,
as a literal truth, the absurdity upon which the metaphor is founded. To
take any metaphor literally is to give credence to an absurdity: for example,
madmen are not literally animals nor do they literally inhabit an intellectual
Africa. The logical, empirical, and psychological absurdity of metaphor
59
has a specific cognitive function; it makes the reader stop and examine
it, to pause or consider the proposed relation and as a result to discover
a new way of seeing a particular phenomenon. What is important however
is that neither author nor reader should lose sight of the "as if" quality
of the metaphor, William Battie, for example, in keeping with his stric-
tures against taking figurative expressions literally is careful to alert
the reader to those instances where a metaphor is being used and those
where it is not. The result is often surprising. For instance in Battie's
analysis of the "chimercial dreams of infirm and shattered philosophers
who have variously tried to reconcile metaphysical contradictions, to
square the circle, to discover the longitude of a great secret" and who
"by excessive attention of body have strained every animal fibre and
may without a metaphor be said to have cracked their brains". 25
Elsewhere in the medical literature one comes across faded metaphors
being employed in a fairly literal manner. Thus Thomas Willis, the
inventor according to Battie of the metaphors of nature and Anima,
seems to literalise metaphors in his description of the soul's condition
during melancholy. "The soul", writes Willis, "sinks down inwardly,
and leaving the body, enters into a certain metamorphosis, and puts on
a new shape, and oftentimes different from humane matters". 26 That
is, the soul of a melancholic man loses its intrinsically human attributes,
and possibly its shape as well, in place of which it assumes an
unspecified but certainly non-human character. On this occasion there-
fore, the metaphorical association between madness and certain inhuman
or brute characteristics is developed in a strikingly literal manner.
Instead of seeing melancholia in terms of other, non-human conditions—
for example, the similarity to an animal's insensitivity to sense and
ingenuity—Willis here argues that as the soul of the melancholic sinks
downwards so it literally undergoes a metamorphosis. It is not as if the
soul were transformed—the change is, in Willis' view, quite real.
This is a point that may best be illustrated by a farther example.
Z. Mayne, in his Two Dissertations Concerning Sense (1728), observed
that,
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"Wh.erever reason is, it ought to predominate and rule, and
govern as supreme, and he who will not allow this to be so,
is most unworthy of the endowments of this faculty, and takes
part with the brute against his own nature; and ought, if his
demerits did not require a far greater punishment and dis-
grace, to lose his natural shape and be turned and transformed
into another one; that brute which he imitates, and perhaps 27
envies; into a swine, if a glutton, into a goat, if lascivious". 
With this apparent literalisation of a metaphor the process is complete.
Originally a means of relating two phenomena metaphor here lapses into
description. For in Mayne's view, and possibly the same is true of
Willis, madness may justly be compared with animality; because they
share many of the attributes of animals the mad can validly be characterised
as animal-like in their behaviour. But Mayne goes further, for here he
proposes that madness literally strips a man of humanity; it literally
converts a man into a brute. Where most authors simply compare the
two conditions, savagery and insanity, in the hope of fixing the terrain of
the latter, Mayne actually dissolves the difference between two states.
By arguing for the literalness of the animal image Mayne differentiates
one kind of man, the lunatic, from all others. The original metaphor,
while it did compare the two conditions, never posited their identity.
The difference between the mad and animal is clarified, but this was
not accomplished by translating madness into an aspect of animality.
While the shamelessly instinctual behaviour of madmen is suggestive of
animal behaviour, and while the tendency of animals to be governed by
imagination rather than by reason further confirmed the analogy, it is
significant that physicians rarely identified animality with insanity; the
latter is not subsumed under the former. The same cannot, however, be
said of Mayne's account for here the identification is explicit. Beginning
with the animal metaphor Mayne proceeds to literalise it; he creates a
new category. Madness, particularly the sort induced by intense passion,
is identified with the loss of certain essentially human attributes. Literally
debased by the disease a man abdicates his title to humanity. By sub-
suming madmen under the category of animals Mayne totalises the
metaphor; the concept of animality which was once the point of partial
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resemblance is now elevated to the status of a totality, albeit an imagin-
ary one. Madmen and animals form part of a new totality that one may
label "instinct".
It has been suggested therefore that in their search for a steady
orientation to the study of madness physicians employ metaphors and
that as the ideas expressed by the metaphors become common and familiar
so the metaphor gradually sheds its "as if" quality and assumes instead
a purely descriptive status. In much the same way as the most commonly
used ideas seem to be the clearest so too the most commonly used
metaphors gradually seem to provide the clearest literal descriptions.
It is as if the mind has an irresistable tendency to equate understanding
with familiarity, clarity with convention. This is a tendency that is
quite evident in the medical literature where one finds particular metaphors
passing into common usage and, as a result, an originally metaphorical
association between two conditions takes on the status of a real associa-
tion. As metaphors fade, therefore, imaginative insights—for example
that which discovers a resemblance between madness and savagery—
acquire all the solidity of objective findings and clear empirical
observations.
What is perhaps more interesting than this gradual sedimentation of
metaphors in language is the evidence, in the medical literature, of a
ceaseless to-and-fro between metaphors. Although metaphors sometimes
manifestly take on the quality of literal descriptions this is not to say that
they disappear entirely and, indeed, it is always possible that sleeping
or faded metaphors may be revived. In other words, it should be possible
to trace the descent of a particular metaphor; to show how it is first
used, how it is subsequently literalised and, at a somewhat later stage,
employed once again as a metaphor. To take an ostensibly literal or
unmetaphoric discourse upon madness as a sign of the advancement of
medical science—in that this science is now grounded upon a firm material
base—would, therefore, be shortsighted since this text may, on closer
examination, be found to be full of faded metaphors. What is being sug-
gested therefore is that even on those occasions where metaphors appear
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to have been banished, and the metaphorical dimension of medical
enquiry diminishedr it may still be possible to reveal the essentially
metaphoric basis of enquiry and to show how the literal descriptions
of one generation may subsequently reveal themselves as a meta-
phorical formulations. To demonstrate therefore that metaphors
fulfil a central cognitive function in medical enquiry, however literal
the presentation of its findings, it is necessary to show how metaphors
are originally used, subsequently employed in a more literal manner
and, finally, how their original "as if" quality is restored once again.
By tracing the descent of at least one metaphor, that which compares
life to light and disease to darkness, it should be possible to show the
process at work. And it is with this analysis of the constant interchange
between metaphors that the chapter will conclude.
Among all the metaphors drawn from natural occurrences to express
the nature of disease, one of the oldest and certainly the most common
is that which compares life to light, and disease to darkness. In works
as widely separated as those of Aristofle, Galen and Paracelsus this
image of life as light regularly recurs. Aristotle, in his essay On Youth 
and Old Age, defines death as a literal extinction of the heart's innate
heat or the flame of life and Paracelsus, considering life to be "like
a flame" tried to discover the appropriate fuels with which to rekindle
the flame. But none of these authors attempted to draw any connection
between the changes in the flame and alterations in an individual's state ot
mind. Such a comparison is, however, explicitly made by Thomas Willis
is his Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of Brutes (1672) and it is this
metaphor which provides the focus for the following discussion.
The origin of Willis's light metaphor is to be found in his discussion
of the animal spirits which constituted, in his view, the source and
spring of all action. According to Willis the animal spirits, which are
mysteriously distilled from the blood, may be held responsible for all
mental and physical activities. As such they occupy the central place in
Willis's work and it is with the description of these spirits that much of
his work is concerned. This description, however, has to overcome one
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major obstacle. The spirits are invisible and, moreover, their existence
cannot be proved by "occular demonstration" since they "leave no foot-
prints of themselves". In view of this Willis reverts to a richly meta-
phorical description of the spirits, the presence of which can be "proved
demonstrably by their effects". 28 Amongst the effects that most intrigued
Willis were those mental disturbances which could be directly attributed
to a particular movement of the animal spirits.
Thus in melancholia, for example, "where every object appears an
horrid and huge monster", the animal spirits, instead of being "trans-
parent, subtil and lucid become obscure, thick and dark, so they represent
the images of things, as it were, in a shadow, or covering darkness".
In addition the animal spirits are, in this condition, subject to continued
and slow movement, but within rather narrow bounds. "From the
analogy of these conditions", Willis concludes, "it comes to pass that
melancholic persons are ever thoughtful, they only comprehend a few
things, and they falsely raise or institute their notions of them". 29 In
mania, by contrast, the rapid impetuous fluctuations of the mind and the
inability to sustain attention, are attributable to the fact that the spirits are
"imbued with a notable mobility or unquetness". Observing that in mania
or madness the mind is "perpetually busied with a form of impetuous
thought", that many of its notions are either "incongruous or erroneous",
and that maniacs are prone to outbursts of "audaciousness or fury",
Willis tries to account for these symptoms in terms of particular dis-
turbances in the natural movement of the animal spirits. The presence
of incongtuous and false images, for instance, is to be accounted for in
terms of the fact that in mania the animal spirits,
"becoming very movable, and very much sharpened, out of their
morbid nature, do so likewise leave their former tracts of going
and returning to and fro, and do cut for themselves, every-
where in the brain, new little spaces and walks, and plainly
devious; in which, whilst they flow, they produce unaccustomed
notions, and very absurd, whence there is a necessity, that the
distempered do speak, and imagine for the most part incongruous
and distempered things. "3°
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Willis thus attributes all visible effects or symptoms of madness to
the animal spirits and in seeking to describe these spirits he has no
alternative but to employ a range of metaphors. In addition to the "new
little spaces and walks" quoted above, the animal spirits occupy, on
different occasions, "various tracts of labyrinths, as it were, so many
conclaves and chambers", or "private troops of spirits are shut up within
passages, as it were pipes and other machines". 31 The effect of these
metaphors, and many other variations on the theme of porticoes and
walks, is to convey a sense of the places occupied by the spirits rather
than an impression of how they actually move. In order to express the
movement of the spirits, and the various disturbances to which this
movement is subject, Willis makes use of the old light metaphor. Thus
the spirits, "seem as it were light, or the rays of light", and their
movement "is compared to the beaming forth of divers rays of light". 32
In his earlier treatise on The Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves (1664),
having first tried to illustrate the movement of the animal spirits in
terms of the motion of water Willis concluded that "because there is no
slight difference between the motions and consistency of the spirits and
waters, perhaps it will better illustrate the matter if the spirits are
compared to the beaming forth of divers rays of light". 33 This metaphor
is subsequently developed in some detail.
What is rather striking about Willis's work is both the range of meta-
phors and the selfconsciousness with which each metaphor is employed.
In drawing on analogous phenomena to illustrate his point Willis almost
invariably prefaces the comparison with the phrase, "as it were", and
in so doing warns the reader against taking the metaphor literally. The
animal spirits are manifestly not rays of light and although they are the
spring of all activity it is their movement, rather than their capacity to
provide illumination, that is centrally important. In sleep, for example,
the "eclipse" of the animal spirits, to which Willis refers, occurs at the
level of movement rather than of light; that is, it is their capacity for
movement, rather than the capacity to generate light, that is impaired
or eclipsed. In sleep the animal spirits are stilled, rather than dimmed,
just as in mania they move very rapidly, as distinct from becoming very
much brighter. Willis's light metaphor therefore relates to wholes,
animal spirits and light, on the basis of an observed similarity between
one element of each, i. e. their diffusion. Schematically this may be re-
presented as follows:
Metaphor: the animal spirits are, as it were, rays of light.
Whole — part — whole
Animal spirits — diffusion/ — light
movement
i. e. the animal spirits move, and are diffused, in a way that resembles
the diffusion of light.
In other words a metaphor moves from one whole to a part to another
whole; thus the light metaphor unites two wholes—light and the animal
spirits—through a common part: their shared capacity for motion and
diffusion.
The interest of Willis's work extends, however, beyond his use of
metaphor for closer examination of his Two Discourses Concerning the
Soul of Brutes  reveals the presence of another trope; that of metonymy.
Metonymy is here taken to mean the strategy that enables one to simul-
taneously distinguish between two phenomena and to reduce one to the
status of a manifestation of the other. Alternatively, in terms that are
directly relevant to this discussion, metonymy provides a way of con-
veying some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of one that is
corporeal or tangible. This definition should not be confused with the
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earlier definition of metaphor for where metonymy differs decisively from
metaphor is that in conveying an incorporeal state in terms of a corporeal
one it actually reduces the former to a manifestation or expression of
the latter. Where metaphor provides a perspective upon a phenomenon
metonymy reduces one phenomenon to a function of another. For example,
the metonymic reduction of emotion to a function—or manifestation—of
motion. This reduction introduces relations of cause and effect that are
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not present in metaphor,i. e. emotion is an effect of the motion of the
animal spirits.
Whereas metaphor establishes a relationship between two phenomena
on the basis of a partial similarity metonymy, although it distinguishes
between two phenomena, actually reduces one to a function of the other.
It provides not so much a perspective or point of view upon the phenom-
ena as a way of formulating relationships of cause and effect between
them. For example, where metaphor compares life to light, metonymy
actually reduces life to a function of light. In place of the partial
resemblance established by metaphor this metonymic reduction sub-
sumes one element under a new totality—for example, the element of life
is subsumed under the totality of light.
In the case of Willis's work both the tropes of metaphor and metonymy
are present. Thus Willis establishes a metaphorical relationship between
the animal spirits and light, but in reducing all of life and disease to a
function of the animal spirits he employs a metonymy. To say, as
Willis does, that the animal spirits "cause animality and life in all" is
to make life/animality a function of the animal spirits. 34 Equally, the
cause and effect relationship is evident in Willis's metonymic reduction
of all mental states to a function of the movement of the animal spirits.
This reduction serves to convey an incorporeal state, for example
melancholia, in terms of a corporeal one, such as the sluggish move-
ment of the animal spirits. Schematically the difference between the
tropes of metaphor and metonymy may be illustrated as follows.
Metaphor:
	
Whole	
— part	
— whole
	
Animal spirits	
— diffusion — light
Metonymy:
Part	 _	 whole	
— part
Life	 —	 animal spirits	
— 'effects '/emotion
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The metonymic movement from part to whole to part again serves in
this case to subsume both life and emotion under an imagined totality—
the animal spirits—of which both life and emotion are simply manifes-
tations.
But what, it may be asked, is the relevance of metonymy to an
analysis of the metaphorical basis of medical enquiry? How does the
analysis of metonymy help to advance the argument that metaphors
provide, in eighteenth century medical enquiry, the basic mode of
apprehending and representing madness ? Finally, what light can such
an analysis shed on the attempt to trace the descent of a particular
metaphor? In answer to these questions there are three important points
to be made.
First, the presence of metonymy is often the sign that a faded
metaphor is present or that an association which was originally meta-
phorical has been totalised: i. e. that a resemblance between two
phenomena which was once thought to be only partial is, through metony-
mic reduction, and the literalisation of the metaphor, later deemed
to be total. Metonymy provides, in other words, a clue to a metaphor's
progress, to its gradual sedimentation in language and the attendant
loss of its "as if" quality. Second, the analysis over time of a corpus
of work dealing with a particular topic, for instance medical treatises on
madness, sometimes shows that the metonymies of one generation are
subsequently re-read as metaphors. That is to say that the ostensibly
real relationships between cause and effect, which a particular
metonymy establishes, are later reinterpreted as merely metaphorical
relationships. To push the point further, it could be argued that
scientific progress consists of the gradual revelation that the metonymies
of the previous generation are simply metaphorical, and that the
postulated causal relationships, which a previous generation assumed
to be grounded in material conditions and in reality, are simply imagined
relationships. Alternatively, it becomes clear that the totalities out of
which the elements are drawn—for example the animal spirits totality—
are not real totalities but exist only in the imagination. Thus
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metonymies in science and the postulated causal relationships are only
as true as the totalities to which they belong. In concrete terms, the
causal relationships established by Willis between the animal spirits
and various mental states are valid to the extent that the assumed
totality—in this case the animal spirits—is real rather than metaphorical.
Finally, and related to the previous point, it therefore follows that any
equation of scientific progress with the disappearance of metaphor, and
any suggestion that the literalisation of scientific discourse is a mark
of its increasingly scientific character, would be ill-founded. On the
contraryl it could be argued that the literalisation of scientific discourse
and the apparent ascendancy of metonymy over metaphor is liable to
create the erroneous impression that the metaphorical dimension had
diminished and that, as a result, the discourse itself had found a secure
base.
In the case of Willis's work it might, for example, be suggested that
although the work is self evidently metaphorical at a superficial level—
that being the description of the animal spirits—it has, nonetheless, a
secure foundation in a demonstrable empirical fact: the movement of
the animal spirits. And yet, as will be seen shortly, what seemed a
firm material base to Willis is seen by his successors as a metaphorical
association. In sum, therefore, the analysis of metonymy is pertinent
to the present discussion in that this trope is an essential element in what
was earlier referred to as the continuous to and fro of metaphors. To
the extent that metonymies totalise certain metaphors s and that the same
metonymies are subsequently reread as metaphorical association, it is
necessary to widen the inv estigation of the cognitive value of metaphors
to include the trope of metonymy. Returning now to Willis's work it
will be demonstrated that metaphors are subsequently literalised and
replaced by metonymies and that his metonymic reduction—which makes
life/disease an effect of the animal spirits—is later re-read as a metaphor.
In George Cheyne's study of The English Malady (1733) the author, who
well appreciated the value of metaphors, directly confronted the problem
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that Willis had thought he had solved in ascribing such a central role to
the animal spirits. The problem of accounting for physical activity or,
as Cheyne expresses it"the most difficult problem in all the animal
economy, is, to give any tolerable account of muscular action or
animal motion". 35 By way of a preface to his own account Cheyne
reviews the efforts of his predecessors and particularly those, including
Willis, who had placed their trust in the animal spirits. But, Cheyn.e
argues,
"the similtude of a machine put into action and motion by the
force of water conveyed in pipes, was the nearest resemblance
the lazy could find to explain muscular action by. On such a
slender and imaginary similtude the precarious hypothesis of
the animal spirits seems to be built. But as their existence is,
I fear, precarious, so, were it real, they are not sufficient
to solve the appearances of muscular action or animal
motion". 36
Bringing his account closer to home Cheyne does concede, however,
that "Willis gave the animal spirits hypothesis all the advantages of
eloquence and metaphor". 37 And although Cheyne is willing to concede
that "life and animation may have some resemblance to light, in its
activity, for both spring from a single source", he is not prepared to
accept that this single source is the animal spirits, as Willis had
postulated. 38 On the contrary, Cheyne rejects the metonymic reduction
of life and emotion to a function of the animal spirits and he re-interprets
Willis's metonymy as a metaphor, albeit one expressed with considerable
eloquence.
In Cheyne's view Willis gave to the animal spirit hypothesis the
advantages of metaphor but he did not establish the animal spirits as a
real basis from which life and animation could be inferred. What was to
Willis a real causal relationship—between the movement of the animal
spirits and mental states—is to Cheyne merely an imagined or metaphorical
association. The totality on which Willis's account is founded, that of
the animal spirits, is seen by his successor Cheyne as an imagined
totality, having no real empirical base. Having rejected the "slender
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and imaginary similtude" upon which the account of his predecessor is
founded, Cheyne then proceeds to articulate his version of animal
activity and he tries to identify the material base upon which such activity
must be founded. According to Cheyne the only way of accounting for
the phenomenon is in terms of "an infinitely subtil elastic, fluid or spirit,
distended through the whole system—and by this aether, spirit, or most
subtil fluid, the parts of bodies are driven forcibly together and their
mutual attractive virtue arises and the beforementioned appearances are
produced". 39 Although Cheyne concedes that the existence of this aether
has not been established beyond doubt and that it only provides, therefore,
"an imperfect account of these difficulties", he nonetheless feels
sufficiently confident to account for all diseases in terms of a disorder
in this fluid or in the so-called "juices".
"The most universal and comprehensive sources and causes
of chronical distempers are first, a glewiness, fizyness,
viscidity or grossness in the fluids, either accidental, or
acquired by those persons who were born with sound or good
conditioned juices—and secondly, some sharpness or cor-
rosive quality in the fluid". 40
Having claimed Willis's metonymic reduction as merely metaphorical
Cheyne then proceeds to establish a new metonymy in which all activity—
including diseased activity—is made a function of the juices or Newtonian
aether. In place of the metaphorical association between the animal
spirits and mental states Cheyne establishes the real relationship between
the juices and mental states; the latter being seen as effects of alterations
in the former. Cheyne therefore'Improves'upon Willis's account by
restoring its metaphoric basis and by formulating a new relationship
that seems to him to be firmly grounded in reality. Although the existence
of the animal fluids or juices has not been uncontestibly established
they at least provide a more secure foundation for explanation than the
slender and imaginary similtude upon which the precarious hypothesis
of the animal spirits had been fashioned; an hypothesis to which Willis
had lent the benefit of metaphor rather than the sure weight of truth.
So far as Cheyne is concerned the flaw in Willis's account is that it is
founded upon an imagined totality.
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Whereas Cheyne reads Willis's metonymy as a metaphor others, such
as Sir Richard Blackmore in his Essay Upon the Spleen (1725), tend to
literalise Willis's metaphorical association between the animal spirits
and light. Recalling Willis's discussion it should be emphasised that
he was at pains to point out that the animal spirits should only be considered
"as it were beams of light", for the real point at issue was the consequence
of the movement of the animal spirits. To Willis therefore the animal
spirits were clearly not beams of light and they did not have therefore any
capacity to generate light or, in the case of their diminution, any
association with real darkness. In Blackmore's Essay, by contrast,
although the author retains Willis's concern with the movement of the
spirits he nonetheless proceeds to use Willis's light metaphor in a
strikingly literal fashion. Perhaps by the time Blackmore wrote this
metaphor had become quite conventional and had, as a result, begun to
fade a little. Whatever the reason it is instructive to juxtapose Willis's
richly metaphoric description of the spirits with Blackmore's argument
that the movement of the spirits literally generates light.
In place of Willis's reference to the spirits being "as it were sooty"
131ackmore refers to the "bright and elevated" spirits that are consonant
with health and the dark depressed spirits associated with disease.
Although Blackmore does on occasions refer to the spirits metaphorically
"darting like rays of light through the roads of the nerves" he none-
theless suggests that this movement is literally illuminating. Where the
movement of the spirits is obstructed or restricted, as in melancholia,
then "the mind is under a total and lasting eclipse", an eclipse unbroken
by "lucid intervals". In the absence of the "bright and elevated" spirits
"all the images formed by a melancholy imagination are sad, dark and
frightful, while gay and delightful objects are always shut out, or very
seldom admitted to the fancy and lighter faculties of the mind". Thus it is
that the days of the melancholic man are, without a metaphor, "varied
and chequered with black and white" and although his mind occasionally
seems sedate and calm "yet in a few hours the clouds gather again;
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41the brain is overcast with darkness". 	 In Blackmore's view therefore
the gloomy despondent thoughts of melancholia are genuinely dark;
rare moments of lucidity, of light, are soon eclipsed as the mind is
once again denied the illumination provided by the spirits. What dis-
tinguishes Blackmore's discussion of the animal spirits from that
provided by Willis is that the former uses the latter's metaphor in a
literal manner. Although Blackmore retains Willis's metaphorical
description of the animal spirits moving like rays of light he nonetheless
concludes that this movement actually generates "bright" ideas. Clear-
headedness is, for Blackmore, not so much a metaphor as an accurate
description of a real condition. It could be argued therefore that by the
time that Blackmore comes to write his Essay the light metaphor has
faded; sedimented within language it assumes litteral connotations and
passes for description. Where Willis had defined melancholy in terms
of the continued movement of the spirits Blackmore equates the disease
with darkness—"the brain is overcast with darkness". In place of
Willis's reference to melancholic ideas being presented "as it were in a
shadow"one finds in Blackmore's work frequent reference to melan-
cholic ideas as being genuinely "dark and frightful".
The preceding analysis thus indicates that Willis's successors read
his work in at least two ways. The first consists in the interpretation
of his metonymic reduction of life to the animal spirits as a metaphor—
as in Cheyne. The second takes the form of a more literal use of his
metaphor which compared the animal spirits to rays of light; the meta-
phor being used in such a way that it acquires the status of a literal
description, as in Blackmore. However, any attempt to trace the descent
of this metaphor further is confronted with a problem. For in the work
of Blackmore's contemporaries and successors the light metaphor seems
to be abandoned and in its place attention is focussed upon the relation-
ship between life and motion. In much the same way as Cheyne had read
Willis's metonymy as a metaphor and had discovered, in the movement
of the fluids and the juices, a firmer basis on which to ground his discussion
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so too physicians writing in the middle of the eighteenth century take up
the question of motion and seek, as Cheyne had done, to find a new
material base upon which to elaborate their explanations. With almost
remarkable uniformity physicians discover in the motion of the blood
the key with which to unlock the secrets of many diseases, including
madness.
In texts as widely separated as Archibald Pitcairne's  Philosophical and 
Mathematical Elements of Physick (1718) and Thomas Arnold's two
volume collection of Observations on the Nature, Kind, Causes, and 
Prevention of Insanity (1782-1786) the recurring emphasis is upon the
relationship between the motion of the blood and disease. Physicians
studying madness in this period thus share Willis's concern with movement
and his association of life with regular motion, but in place of the animal
spirits they install a new totality—that of the blood and its circulation.
In the work of Mead, Pitcairne, Whytt, Arnold, Robinson and many others
all activities—including disease—can be understood in terms of the
circulation of the blood. To Pitcairne, for example, "health is perfect
life, or the longest circulation of the blood", and the corollary to this
view is that "disease is a circular motion augmented or diminished". 42
This observation is confirmed by Robinson in his New Theory of Physick
and Diseases (1725) in which he noted that "an animal body destitute of
motion is an animal body destitute of life". Wherever this motion is dis-
turbed disease must follow. In melancholy, for example, "the blood will
remit of its motion and hence arises that sudden lapse of the senses, those
failures of the spirit, and that casual absence of reason". 43 Similarly
James in his Medical Dictionary (1745) attributed the "long continued
dejection, dread and sadness" of melancholy to "the difficult circulation
of the blood through the vessels of the brain, where it is too copiously
congested and becomes stagnant". 44 In James's view, therefore, the
brain constituted the seat of this disorder but the cause was to be found
in the circulation of the blood and in the changes in mental conditions—
for example intense passion—which altered this circulation. Somewhat
later, William Rowley in his Treatise on Female, Nervous, Hysteric and 
Hypochondriacal Diseases (1788) concluded that "the greater quantity
of blood flowing to the brain accounts for the great strength of the
insane". 45
In all of these accounts, therefore, and their number could be
easily multiplied, Willis's original concern with movement is taken up
but his attempt to ground his analysis in the analogy of the animal spirits
is dismissed, by his successors,as simply a metaphorical account.
Implicitly at least, authors such as Pitcairne, Whytt, Robinson, Rowley
and James, interpret the animal spirits as being nothing more than
an imagined totality, having no material existence. The account
provided by these later authors represents an improvement upon that
offered by Willis and also by Cheyne—who had failed to appreciate that
the so-called juices were, like the animal spirits, an imagined entity—
in that the circulation of the blood, and the associated loss of movement,
provides a secure material base; this circulation is a demonstrable
empirical fact, unlike the movement or indeed the very existence of the
animal spirits, and as such it provides a real basis upon which to
establish enquiry.
But such insistence upon the importance of circulation has a number
of significant consequences. First, it indicates clearly the extent to
which certain physicians, particularly those writing during the middle
of the eighteenth century, had transcended the limits set to enquiry by
Locke and Sydenham, for the emphasis upon circulation implies that
enquiry cannot be limited to the realm of visible appearances and that
Sydenham's embargo upon any attempt to go beyond the surface of things
actually constitutes an obstacle to progress. A corollary therefore
to the role accorded to circulation is a refusal to limit knowledge "to
the surface of things". In place of this authors such as Rowley
established the centrality of anatomical enquiry, "the most certain of
all" forms of enquiry. Second, the importance attributed to motion,
and particularly that of the blood, marks a further departure from
experience and observation in that psychology, or the science of the
mind, only advanced by borrowing from other branches of enquiry.
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Whereas Locke's historical plain method is, as it were, entirely self
sufficient in that the data provided by experience and observation are
deemed quite adequate, those who follow Locke ignore the restrictions
placed upon experience as they look to other branches of investigation
for principles upon which to base their theories and explanations. In
place of the Lockean emphasis upon an autonomous science of the mind
later physicians sacrifice the autonomy of their enquiry as they import
rules and principles from other sciences, particularly from physiology
and mechanics. Thus, as T. Perceval noted in his collection of
Essays Medical, Philosophical, and Experimental (1772) the discovery of
the circulation of the blood "gave rise to the introduction of mechanics
into medicine; and as that system was founded on the general laws of
nature, it was obvious to infer its application to the human body.
Which was supposed to differ only from the universal things, in the
wonderful complication and variety of its machinery". 46 The importance
of mechanistic principles is very evident in the work of many who saw
in the circulation of the blood the key to disease. 47 Thus the science of
the mind advances by borrowing from mechanics and in more extreme
formulations of the role played by mechanistic principles in determin-
ing mental states psychology seems to have become an auxiliary to
other sciences.
Thirdly, the emphasis upon circulation satisfies the desire for unity
in that it justifies the reduction of all activity, and of all diseased
activity, to this one central principle. Mental states, whether healthy
or diseased, could be accounted for in terms of this single occurrence—
the circulation of the blood. The decisive advantage of this metonymic
reduction, which translates all incorporeal states into measurable corporeal
conditions, is that it seems to be grounded in an incontestibly real and
observable totality. With the theoretical underpinning provided by principles
borrowed from mechanics late eighteenth century theories concerning
mental life tend increasingly to represent the continuous flux of mental
conditions as the mere epiphenomenon of physiological changes.
When physicians such as Whytt or Arnold seeks to explain madness in
terms of disturbances in imagination, passion, attention, association
and so on their concern is twofold. First, to show how disturbances
in each of these 'faculties' can upset the balance of the mind and,
secondly, how the extremes of say passion generate a disordered
circulation of the blood.
This fairly extended discussion of metaphor has thus shown that the
methodological constraints within which physicians claimed to operate—
notably the constraints of experience, the observation of visible effects
and the reporting of these observations in plain ungarnished language—
are not wholly appropriate when the focus of enquiry is the mind, in
both its healthy and disordered states. hi both chapters I and II an
attempt has been made to sketch the general methodological context
in which enquiry was conducted, and to show how physicians, when
studying madness, departed from the guidelines laid down by authors
such as Locke, Bacon and Sydenham. More specifically, the dis-
cussion of metaphor in this chapter has indicated how physicians were
unable—when portraying madness—to employ language in the neutral
manner advocated by Bacon and Locke. Confronted with an elusive
object of enquiry, which could not easily be described in plain language,
physicians used metaphors as a way of visualising madness and of
representing—rather than explaining—its essential characteristics
to their readers. Metaphors served therefore not as subtle embel-
lishments to medical discourse but, more significantly, as valuable
tools of investigation; it is as instruments of enquiry that metaphors
are important. For example, Blackmore's metaphor of an 'intellectual
Africa' is a useful tool of analysis in that it provides the author with a
way of visualising mania, of sketching the characteristic qualities of
this disease and, finally, of helping his reader to appreciate what mania
is like. The metaphor therefore provides a point of view from which the
phenomenon can be apprehended; a way of conceiving of this particular
disorder.
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In the study of madness metaphors thus contribute to solving the
problem of perspective, of the point of view from which the disorder
can be considered. They do so principally because they enable the
physician to compare and contrast two ostensibly different conditions,
for example savagery and insanity, and in so doing to throw into sharper
relief certain attributes of the latter. What metaphors do not do is to
provide physicians with complete models or explanations of this disorder.
The animal metaphor, for example, constitutes one way in which madness
can be characterized or represented, rather than explained. Similarly,
Willis's light metaphor enables him to characterize the movement of
the animal spirits, but the metaphor does not explain this movement. In
other words, both of these metaphors provide a partial answer to questions
such as, what is madness like, what are the animal spirits like, or what
is the common vantage point from which both the physician and his reader
can begin to visualize these phenomena? What the metaphors do not
do is provide explanations of these phenomena. The animal metaphor
could only provide an explanation of madness if it was used in a literal, i. e.
non-metaphorical, manner. In other words the animal metaphor would
constitute an explanation of mania if this condition was accounted for in
terms of a regression to a condition that exactly resembles animal life.
However, the statement that metaphors are not explanations must be
qualified. As we saw in the analysis of metonymy, a characteristic
feature of some metaphors is that over time and with continued usage they
gradually fade and their 'as if' quality diminishes. In the case of the
light metaphor, for example, we saw how an author such as Blackmore
interprets an originally metaphorical relationship in a literal manner.
As a result of this Willis's originally metaphorical association between
the animal spirits and light is taken by Blackmore as a literal descrip-
tion of what actually occurs when the animal spirits are either excited
or depressed; i. e. their movement actually generates light or darkness.
Here an originally metaphorical relationship is interpreted in a literal
fashion; the metaphor is literalised. In other words the light metaphor
assumes, in Blackmore's work, the status of an explanation albeit one
based on an imagined totality.
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Having devoted considerable attention to the question, how did
physicians in the eighteenth century approach the study of madness,
it is time now to take up another question. What substantive conclusions
did physicians reach and how did these conclusions develop over time?
Against this general methodological background, and the related
analysis of the framework provided by metaphor, it would now be
appropriate to look closely at the medical image of madness. The
first two chapters have demonstrated how this image was built up and
how physicians used their own experience and observations in painting,
as it were, their portrait of this disease. The next chapter will
consider in some detail the portrait they painted.
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CHAPTER 3
DIMENSIONS OF DISORDER
Introduction
The intention of this chapter is twofold. First, to provide a general
overview of the conclusions reached by physicians in their study of
madness. Second, to show how these conclusions developed over time
and how they changed. How, in other words, the medical portrait of
madness evolved and, in so doing, threw into sharper relief different
aspects of the problem posed by this disease. The focus of this discussion
differs significantly, therefore, from the focus of the preceding chapters.
This chapter is primarily concerned with the substance of medical
treatises, with what one might call the substantive 'findings' of medical
enquiry, rather than with the methodological principles that guided this
enquiry. As was pointed out in the Introduction this thesis examines
eighteenth century approaches to madness at a number of different
levels and the present chapter marks a shift in the level being analysed.
Although attention is still directed at the substantial body of medical
literature the questions around which the analysis is organized have now
changed. Rather than ask, how did the physicians study madness and
what methodological precepts did they follow? the question informing the
following discussion is, quite simply, what did physicians actually say
about this disorder? How did they describe and characterize it? What
this chapter will attempt to do therefore is to reconstruct the medical
interpretation of madness and to consider changing shifts of emphasis
in this interpretation.
Even the most cursory examination of the medical literature reveals
that physicians endeavoured to produce a coherent portrait of madness
and that in doing so they adopted a strategy used by Locke in the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding. This strategy consists of breaking the
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object of enquiry—the human mind—into its constituent elements and then
endeavouring to show how these particular elements combine to produce the
mental processes with which everyone is familiar. In approaching the study
of the mind physicians try to accurately characterize and describe its opera-
tions, rather than to discover its nature. In so doing they proceed—as
Locke did—to analyse the mind in terms of its constituent parts, to show
how these parts relate to and interact with each other and, finally, to show
how changes in any one of these elements effects the stability and balance
of the mind. It is rather as if physicians were endeavouring to grasp the
anatomy of the mind; an anatomy that would show what the key elements
were and how they combined together to produce the variety and flux of
mental life. What is perhaps most striking about this process of enquiry
is the spirit in which it is conducted. Despite the modesty of the claims
made and despite the ostentatious limitation of concern to observing the
operation of the mind—rather than discovering its essence—one is struck
by the increasing confidence with which the enquiry is conducted and the
implicit conviction that the methods of rational analysis will finally elucidate
all the workings of the mind. Having concentrated their attention on what
could be known, rather than speculating about the unknowable, physicians—
particularly those writing in the middle of the eighteenth century—
proceeded to develop an extremely ambitious science encompassing both
mental and physical occurrences.
The framework within which physicians in the eighteenth century
conduct their study is provided by the following basic elements; attention,
association, imagination, memory, passion or the so-called 'affects',
and to a lesser extent, dreaming. Physicians try to grasp and account for
the complexity and diversity of mental life in terms of these fundamental
elements and it is around the everyday occurrences of imagining, feeling,
attending and recalling that the majority of the medical treatises are
organized. These activities, which are so much a part of everyday
experience, are the raw materials that constitute the medical image of
madness. In considering each of these activities physicians try to do two
things. First, to show the part played by each element in mental life
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and the effect that each element has upon the mind. Second, to examine
the degree to which an individual is able to regulate and guide the activities
of imagining, attending, recalling and so on. Medical enquiry is therefore
rooted in everyday experience, or what Hume called 'the common course
of the world', in this special sense. It takes as its starting point the
familiar experiences of feeling, imagining or associating ideas. This
is not in conflict with the preceding analysis of the part played by physio-
logical processes—particularly the circulation of the blood or the movement
of the animal spirits—in insanity. What is of interest to physicians,
including those who saw disease as a manifestation of disorders of the
circulation, is the relationship between such disturbances and the
experiences of extreme passion, disturbing and frightening dreams, or
other imagined terrors.
In much the same way as Locke endeavoured to trace the formation
of the understanding from its beginning to its full development so too
physicians, in their study of madness, endeavour to trac e the development
of various mental activities, such as imagining or recollecting and, more
importantly, to demonstrate how mental stability is dependent upon the
harmonious interplay of these various faculties. An interplay in which
no one element gains a predominant influence, as for instance happens
when a man erroneously believes himself to be "inspired" and acts as if
this were really the case. A predicament succinctly characterized by
Hobbes when he defined madness as "nothing else but some imagination
of some such predominancy above the rest, that we have no passion but
from it." When studying madness physicians try to show how such a
situation develops and to analyse the extent to which it may be avoided,
or at least guarded against. What is of interest, therefore, is both the
interaction of the various faculties and the possibility of regulating this
interaction.
In formulating the relationship between the faculties, and more par-
ticularly the interaction between various physiological and mental
processes, physicians employ metaphors. Indeed, it would be quite
possible to analyse the substantive 'findings' of medical inquiry in terms
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of the metaphors used and this chapter could extend the analysis of the
preceding chapter by elucidating the metaphors employed to represent
the operation of the imagination, the activity of attention or the fluctua-
tions of the passions. Recalling the examples cited in the previous chapter,
and particularly Cheyne's richly metaphorical account of the relationship
between the mind or soul and the body, one could continue to analyse
medical treatises in terms of their metaphorical dimension. Rather
than do this, however, the present discussion will take the corpus of
medical literature at face value, as it were, and only in the discussion
of dreaming and its relationship to insanity will attention be given to
metaphors.
In reconstructing the image of madness the intention is not to reproduce
this image as a particular point in time but rather to show the changes it
undergoes and to indicate changing shifts of emphasis in accounts of the
disorder. As a prelude to the later chapters of this work, in which changes
in the treatment of the insane will be investigated, this chapter provides an
analysis of changing medical interpretations of the disease. These
changes are inextricably bound up with those more general therapeutic
developments analysed later. The most important of these changes,
as reflected in both the medical literature and in particular therapeutic
methods, can be formulated as two propositions.
First, that throughout the period of this study those suffering from
madness are increasingly held to be responsible for their misfortune. By
the end of the eighteenth century, individual responsibility for madness,
combined with the belief that due exercise of self-control will prevent its
onset, is a cardinal principle of therapeutic practice and a basic assump-
tion informing almost every medical treatise onthe disease. Earlier
accounts of madness, including those dating from the late 17th century,
tended to portray the sufferer as the hapless victim of powerful influences,
such as passion or an unruly imagination. Madness, in the opinion of
Willis for example, literally seemed to take possession of an individual
who appeared scarcely able to resist the -wild onrush of ideas associated
with mania and equally incapable of diverting his attention from the
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gloomy preoccupations of melancholia. Similarly Blackmore's image of an
"intellectual Africa" reflects the author's view that madness is, like the
wild instinctual behaviour of savages or animals, something over which
control cannot be exercised. Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century
this interpretation had clearly lost the ground to an alternative view which
held that even the most violent excesses of passion, or the most extravagant
flights of imagination, were susceptible to control. Subsequently it is the
diligent exercise of self-control and sell-restraint in all matters that
becomes established as the hallmark of a sound mind.
The second proposition follows from this. By the end of the eighteenth
century 'custom' had been installed as the indispensable rule by which
behaviour should be measured and governed. In the medical literature
and therapeutic practice alike the lessons of custom, of the established
conventions of conduct, are seen as the secure basis upon which life
should be ordered, thereby forestalling any decline into extraordinary or
mad behaviour. At the centre of the late eighteenth century view of
madness is the conviction that social life can only be sustained if all
who participate in it observe the limits imposed by custom and, more
importantly, internalise the norms of appropriate conduct.
This insistence upon the supremacy of custom and the internalisation
of social norms has two related features. First, it marks a departure
from the belief that behaviour should be measured against and governed
by essentially external standards. Thus in place of the Hobbesian belief
in a binding contract or the Swiftian affirmation of tradition, one
encounters the view that adherence to the dictates of custom will, almost
imperceptibly, generate habits of thought and action that are beyond
reproach. Secondly, in judging an individual's state of mind what is
important is the public face that is presented rather than a private inner
world. No matter how extravagant or exotic an individual's private
thoughts and behaviour might be there is no basis for calling him mad
so long as these private vagaries are not translated into public indiscre-
tions. It is this distinction between the private and public world in which
life is conducted that comes to play such an important part in both the
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medical interpretation of madness and the associated attempts to regulate
it. It is against the background of these two related developments, the
ascendance of the principle of self-control and of the significance accorded
to custom, that the following discussion should be set. As physicians
attempt to relate madness to the constituent elements of psychological
reality—dreaming, imagining, attending, associating, or feeling—it is
possible to detect a gradual shift of emphasis that finally makes the
individual the author of his own misfortune and custom his only sure
guide.
It is now time to examine these constituent elements and to show how the
medical image of madness developed over time. In pursuing this examina-
tion the framework used by physicians will be borrowed and each of the
following four sections mirror the major divisions to be found in most of
the medical literature.
I. ATTENTION AND ASSOCIATION
In accord with the Lockean principle that knowledge is based entirely
upon sensation, and that the strength of a particular sensation will de-
termine the vividness of an individual's ideas, physicians studying
madness identified two principal disorders to which the faculty of atten-
tion is subject. One disorder arises from unusually strong sensory
impressions and the other from exeeptionally weak impressions that
generate rather faint ideas which are tenuously associated with each
other and to which the mind can scarcely attend. On occasions where
impressions are particularly strong and have in consequence "so
thoroughly possessed the mind with a belief of the realityof the thing
represented, it is some time before they can be worn out, or the mind
recover itself from the astonishment it was in". 1 Similarly where a
forceful impression prompts the mind to brood on a particular idea this
results in an inability to redirect attention and the mind finally becomes
literally passive. As Thomas Arnold noted, "the thus fascinated and
unopposed mind, which is not now at liberty to look around, will become
the sport of a variety of absurd ideas and notions which have little or no
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proper relation to the real existence of external objects; in a word reason
will be overpowered and insanity will assume its place". 2
What is important in this account is the relationship that pertains
between ideas and the real order of the external world. If sensation
is seen as the basic spring of knowledge, and if correct ideas are regarded
as copies of the external world, than true perception must logically be
seen as that which faithfully imitates or duplicates the external world.
True perception thereby retains, in the relationship established between
ideas, the same link as exists between material objects and the sensory
experience of these objects. In the context of such a view the faculty of
attention is portrayed as the mere plaything of sensation, and its task
is simply to hold in view the objects and sensations upon which knowledge
is based. Unguided by hope, desire or intention in any form the faculty
of attention may be regarded as an undifferentiated power which, rather
like a searchlight, reveals what is already there. Moreover the world
of associated images and impressions that attention reveals is held to be
completely independent of the activity of the mind. In a process com-
parable to that of drawing a picture by joining together dots on the page,
attention simply unites the different points of sensation thereby forming
a picture of experience. It founders once it lingers too long on a
particular point—melancholic fixation—or accomplishes the union of
points in a disordered and incoherent manner. In consequence, the
corresponding ideas will be united by "the most slight and accidental
connections and a most unnatural and fantastical association". In both
instances what is important is the force of the original impression.
Thus, 'Tear and terror produce insanity, by the liveliness of the impres-
sion, from which the mind cannot afterward free itself". 3
By according a central role to sensation as the fountain of all ideas
psychology, as derived from Locke, thus provides a remarkably
deterministic view of human subjectivity; a view ivhich may be seen
as part of a more general attempt to define all of consciousness in terms
of the exact form of scientific consciousness. But in trying to establish
an objective science of subjectivity, and one consistent with its basic
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philosophy of knowledge, Lochean psychology throws up a contradiction.
It formulates an entirely determined version of subjectivity, a version
which makes the subject and the various faculties—for example attention—
the mere plaything of sensation, and yet it cannot, having asserted that
sensation is essentially true, locate error anywhere else but in the subject.
In so doing it implies that the subject may, after all, retain a degree of
freedom sufficient at least to allow for the voluntary association of ideas
and self imposed restraints upon both imagination and passion. In other
words, the problem confronting those who wished to hold each individual
responsible for his own state of mind is quite simple. How can the
argument that each is the author of his own misfortune be made compatible
with the seemingly self evident truth that sensation, in its varying
degrees of intensity, determines an individual's ability to direct his
attention and associate ideas in a manner consistent with sanity?
The relevance of this question will become more apparent in Chapter
5, which traces the development of particular therapeutic principles and
techniques. The most striking and significant of these developments has
already been referred to. By the latter half of the eighteenth century one
finds a therapeutic regimen based almost entirely upon the principle
that the due exercise of self-control is the key to curing madness and,
indeed, preventing its onset. The work of a physician such as John
Ferriar (1761-1815), makes it abundantly clear that each individual
is responsible for maintaining the delicate balance between the various
faculties and for ensuring that the excesses to which each faculty is
prone—particularly the extremes to which a man may be driven by over-
bearing passion or imagination—are curbed. For the moment, what is
of particular interest is not so much these therapeutic developments as
the evolution of a theoretical underpinning for them. In the present
context the most significant 'theoretical' development consists of the
attempt to demonstrate that the faculties are susceptible to control
and are not entirely determined by the vividness of sensory impressions.
This argument is most clearly developed in the account that is offered
of the association of ideas and the role played by association in
madness.
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The first to describe madness in terms of the associating and sensing
mechanisms was Locke himself who suggested, in a strikingly simple
formula, that madmen associate ideas incorrectly while idiots are in-
capable of associating ideas at all. What happens in madness is that an
individual, "having joined together some ideas very wrongly, mistakes
them for truths", but having joined his ideas together the madman none-
theless remains perfectly capable of making "right deductions" from
them. The consequence of this erroneous association of ideas is quite
serious. 'Wrong connections", argues Locke, "is of so great a force to
set us awry in our actions, as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings,
and notions themselves, that perhaps there is not any one thing that
deserves more to be looked after". 4
 Among those who heeded Locke's
advice to investigate further the influence of false association one finds
many who were particularly concerned with the relationship between this
phenomenon and madness. This question assumed particular importance
in the latter half of the eighteenth century—most notably in the work of
Arnold, Cullen, Crichton and Faulkener—and it is noticeable that in
the works of these authors the influence of Locke's definition of madness
plays a significant role.
Thomas Arnold's Observations on Insanity (1782), for example, draws
heavily on Locke and the later refinements to the doctrine of association
provided by Hartley in his Observations on Man, His Frame, 'His Duty 
and His Expectation. Following Locke Arnold believed sensation to be the
basis of sanity and of knowledge and, furthermore, the mind is assumed to
operate according to mechanical principles. Where these principles are
disturbed, and particularly the principle by which ideas are associated,
then insanity will follow for it is entirely "owing to erroneous associations".
This view is also to be found in the work of William Cullen, who noted
that the "very unusual association of ideas" that characterised delerium
also disturbed the faculty of judgement. Similarly the philosopher/
physician Sir Alexander Crichton, in his Enquiry into the Nature and Origin
of Mental Derangement (1798), combined the philosophical arguments in
support of association with careful medical observation when he chose
to define madness in terms of "certain combinations of thought which
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experience does not yield". As Crichton went on to observe, "although
we are indebted to the principle of association of ideas for all the benefits
of knowledge and genius, yet it often becomes the source of such misery
and distress, as well as of many false judgements which, although not
commonly considered as deleria, are no less aberrations from sound
sense".
5
 Thus with increasing regularity insanity was regarded in terms
of the erroneous association of ideas and one consequence of this is the
implication, contained also in Locke's work, that madness consists really
in a disease of ideas rather than of men. A further and more important
consequence, hpwever, is that when conceived of in this way madness
was regarded not as something which literally took possession of an
individual but rather as a misfortune which could be guarded against and,
where it did take hold, eventually cured.
What is significant about the principle of association is that it provides
at least a partial justification for such therapeutic optimism for although
the principle seems, as Hume said, to operate imperceptibly it is,
nonetheless, subject to influence and control. In the work of Locke the
precise limits of such control are not fully spelled out and although Locke
attributes an important role to chance in mental life, and while he also
recognises that false associations can prove particularly stubborn and
impervious to reason, he nonetheless suggests, at least by implication,
that an individual retains some freedom regarding the manner in which
ideas are associated. In Locke's view the essence of an albeit limited
control is to be found in custom which, "settles habits of thinking in the
understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of motions in
the body". 6
 Indeed it is Locke's concern with custom, and the related
concept of reasonableness, that lies at the heart of his discussion of
association and which accounts, in large part, for the importance he
attached to education—the chief medium through which reasonable habits
of thinking and acting may be settled in the understanding. While Locke
concedes that making "wrong connections" is virtually unavoidable his
point is not that one should therefore see the world as a "great Bedlam",
but rather that madness is to be equated with those erroneous associations
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that grossly violate custom; associations which find expression in various
forms of unreasonable, immoral, and mad behaviour.
In much the same vein those who drew on Locke's work recognised, and
in certain instances emphasised, the voluntaristic aspect of association.
Crichton, for example, commented on the fact that "we often detach a per-
ception from its usual alliances and give it a place either among an old
assemblage of ideas or with a new combination of them". Rather later in
his work, in an attempt to illustrate the importance of instilling from an
early age correct habits of association and customary connections between
ideas, Crichton cited the example of women given to passionate excess in
whom, "no sooner does desire rise to a certain degree, than by the laws of
association ideas of immorality, danger and degradation attending loose
indulgence of such passions will present themselves to their minds and
rescue them from danger". 7
The central importance of association derives therefore from this fact:
that it makes it possible for each individual to develop and sustain reason-
able habits of thinking and behaving that will spare him from the distress
of madness. If the foundations of correct and customary associations
have been laid at an early age then so much the better. Hence Locke
invites "those who have children or the charge of their education" to "think
it worth their while diligently to watch and carefully prevent the undue con-
nection of ideas in the mind of young people". 8 Should this task be
neglected or should it happen that an individual becomes deranged by
reason of a powerful but false association of ideas it nonetheless remains
possible for something to be done. In treating those who are mad what
is required, according to the argument put forward by John Gregory, is
a knowledge "of the artful association of ideas and of the art of breaking
false or unnatural associations, or inducing counter-associations". 9
Once broken these false associations can be replaced by correct ones and,
with the assistance of appropriate self-control, new habits of thought can
be installed.
Therapeutic methods will be examined in Chapter 5 but for the moment
it is sufficient to note that this doctrine implicitly ascribes to each individual
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responsibility for ensuring that his ideas follow the associations laid down
by custom which, as Hume noted, acts as the "cement of the universe". In
fact custom is so important that it may "indeed be the sole principle of
correspondance between ideas". 10 Custom justifies our unquestioned con-
fidence in the world and it serves to sustain a minimum degree of social
harmony. Without it each would be free to associate his ideas at will and
to act upon these associations. But the value attached to custom and the
faith placed in the principle of association carries with it a more significant
implication. Taken to its logical conclusion the Lockean belief that
appropriate habits of thought can be settled in the mind, thereby militating
against the possibility of unreasonable, immoral or mad behaviour,
projects a view of the world in which all differences are eliminated and
life is reduced to a bland uniformity. Such a conclusion was drawn by
Hartley in his series of Observations on Man (1749).
"If beings of the same nature, but whose actions and passions
are, at present, in different proportions to each other, be exposed
for an indefinite time to the same impressions and associations,
all their particular differences will, at last, be overruled, and
they will become perfectly similar, or even equal. Association
tends to make us all ultimately similar; so that if one be happy,
all must". 11
However, as Hartley also acknowledged, imagination and passion, if they
are not brought under control, constitute obstacles to the realisation of an
ideal world in which the thought and behaviour of each individual perfectly
harmonise.
II. IMAGINATION AND MEMORY
The danger posed by imagination is that it can dominate all the other
faculties and sunder the customary association of ideas. Wherever this
faculty is "disproportionately great in regard to the other faculties" then,
as Alexander Crichton observed,"such a case is to be considered as
highly dangerous, not only inasmuch as it is the source of many errors in
judgement, but also as it is a powerful genetrix of many permanent kinds
of delerium". 1
 Thus construed as a threat to sound mind and sober
judgement the imagination occupies a central place in many medical
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treatises on insanity and it is striking that throughout the eighteenth century
medical and philosophical discussions alike generally approach the problem
of imagination by way of a discussion of memory; for it is usually in rela-
tion to this apparently antithetical faculty that the imagination, and the vexed
question of how to constrain it, is analysed.
Approaching this question authors frequently take examples from their
own experience or invite their readers to reflect upon the predicament that
their own flights of imagination—or episodes of forgetfulness—place them
in. In drawing upon everyday occurrences such as dreaming, imagining,
remembering or attending, physicians frequently illustrate their arguments
by way of examples familiar to every reader; and in so doing they suggest,
at least indirectly, that madness—which is born of disorders in these
faculties—is not as remote as it may seem and that if it is to be avoided
it is important that the disorders to which the various faculties are subject
should be scrupulously guarded against. In the context of the present
discussion physicians take particular pains to point out the ease with which
this magical faculty of imagination may usurp the place of reason and, as
Thomas Willis noted, give the understanding "a wrong byass and inclina-
tion". 2
In trying to elucidate the cardinal features of imagination physicians
compare and contrast its activities with those of memory. At the heart of
eighteenth century discussions of the two faculties one encounters a
central distinction. Memory represents the original sequence ot sensations,
and thereby faithfully preserves the original order of experience and of
the world, while imagination reorders sensation, experience and ideas into
a dream-like sequence. Memory replicates original impressions and ideas,
in sharp contrast to the imagination which refracts and distorts what Bacon
had called "the beams of knowledge". Many who wrote on this topic contras-
ted the kaleidoscopic tendency of the imagination with the tendency of memory
to reflect the world, as if in a mirror. "Memory", noted Hobbes, "is the
world, though not really yet so as in a looking glass". 3 One hundred years
later Hartley echoed this definition when he defined memory in terms of the
recalling of sensations "in the same manner, and proportion, accurately or
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nearly, as they were once actually presented". 4 Memory therefore
preserves experience and retains the original relations that pertain
between objects, between ideas and objects and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, between correctly associated ideas. It is for this reason that
Hobbes, like many who subsequently wrote on the subject, equated truth
with recollection, "for to know truth is the same thing and to remember".
When the power of memory fades, or fails entirely, then the hapless
individual will "live a life scarcely arising to the dignity of brutes"; 5
a conclusion in which Nicholas Robinson was by no means alone.
Memory is esteemed because, as Addison observed, "it relieves the
mind in her vacant modes, fills up the caverns of thought with ideas of
what is past". 6 But once the faculty becomes worn out, as with age,
or once its influence is overwhelmed by extravagant flights of imagination,
as with madness, then the chasms of thought to which Addison referred
are likely to become filled with phantasy. It is for this reason that
Locke suggested that those who work amidst "a fair of mad beasts" should
instruct their charges in the art of training the memory in "checking
• extravagant and towering flights of imagination"; a task made difficult
by the fact that the insane "make very little use of their memory".
As a result they inevitably join together "some ideas very wrongly and
7
mistake them for truths". Whereas memory preserves the original
sequence and order of experience, imagination simply re-combines
rather than re-presents ideas and in so doing diverts the mind from the
path which it ought to follow; a path marked by customary associations.
In essence the threat posed by imagination derives from the fact
that it can both distort an individual's conception of the world and at the
same time imbue these new fanciful conceptions with all the appearance
of truth or reality. In place of the reflective quality of recollection the
imagination creates "as it were, monsters from a multiplying or distorted
glass" and the result, according to Willis, is that the mind is led away
from its usual path and takes another path "going crooked, or out of
the right or straight way". 8 It is this tendency of imagination to cut
the mind loose from the safe anchor provided by memory that provides
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a consistent and often repeated theme in discussions of the faculty. Those
of either a medical or a philosophical inclination are unanimous in the view
that imagination, if unchecked, contains the seeds of profound mental
disorder. While none believed that the mystery of the imagination would
ever by fully elucidated many agreed that its effects were disturbing
and frequently ended in madness. lb Hume the danger lay in the fact
that the imagination was at liberty to "transpose and change its ideas",
and Hartley likewise drew attention to its ability to arrange ideas "without
any regard to the order observed in past fact". 9 In much the same vein
physicians such as Willis were alarmed by the ease with which the faculty
"falsely conceives, or evilly composes or divides, the species or notions
brought from the sense or memory". 10
 The inevitable consequence of
this was, in Robinson's view, that "the whole magazine of most beautiful
ideas is shattered, and jumbled into the greatest and most irregular
confusion by the force of the labouring imagination". 11
Small wonder then that an unchecked imagination should be identified
as the cardinal feature and frequent cause of madness. Although mad-
ness is often compared to savagery and bestiality, and although one finds
many references to the dream-like quality of delusion and the related
tendency of those suffering from delusion to behave as if gripped by a
waking dream, it is nonetheless in terms of the imagination and its
disruptive consequences that madness is most usually defined. Meta-
phors of savagery and of animality provide ways of visualising this
disease, of capturing its particular qualities, but it is the imagination—
often working in alliance with passion—that precipitates a man into
madness and causes him to behave in such a way as to create a notice-
able difference between him and his fellow beings. Thus William Battie,
having quit the schools of philosophy in favour of a "vulgar apprehension
of things" chose in his Treatise on Madness (1758) to define "deluded
imagination as not only an indisputable but an essential character of
madness that precisely discriminates this from all other animal dis-
order". In much the same way Mayne declared madness to be
"always proportionable to the intenseness and impetuousity of the
imagination" since the faculty is invariably "hurtful or prejudicial to
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the understanding" and gives it "a wrong byass and inclination". This
assessment was shared by Cheyne who went so far as to suggest that the
victims of an overbearing imagination are likely to become mad and, in
view of their proclivity for sensual pleasure, to die young. 12
It would be easy to add similar definitions to the catalogue but in the
present context it would be more useful to proceed to two important
questions concerning the imagination and its relationship to madness.
First, if madness is defined in terms of an overactive imagination, and
if it is conceded that everyone is to some degree endowed with the
faculty, then where should the line be drawn between those who are mad
and those who, unbeguiled by the faculty of fiction, retain their senses?
Is one to conclude, as Blackmore did in his Essay Upon the Spleen (1725)
that no dramatic metaphors will ever encapsulate all the fine distinc-
tions between the two conditions and that although many "express the
signs of a distracted imagination, approaching to suspension of reason,
or a bestial, distracted state", there nonetheless remain some who
"hang pendulous a long time between sober and mad, yet never wholly
go over to the lunatic side". A sentiment echoed by Crichton who, in
1798, remarked somewhat dispairingly, that 'between clear and
unclouded reason, and absolute insanity, there are many shades of
greater or less deviation; to enumerate, or point out the distinctions
which exist between them is impossible". 13 This difficulty is aggrava-
ted by defining madness as a disorder of imagination, since all possess
the faculty and all are, to some extent, both beneficiaries and victims
of its power. Thus instead of imposing order upon the phenomenon of
madness this definition appears, at first sight, to accentuate the difficulty
of fixing the precise point at which sobriety of mind gives way to
delusion.
Closer examination of the literature does, however, reveal that in
order to avoid this outcome physicians apply two criteria by which to
judge a truly deranged imagination. According to the first, the hallmark
of derangement is an inability to control and regulate the expression of
ideas. This inability reveals itself most forcefully in language, for
when the imagination has usurped the place of reason, overthrown memory
and broken the correct association between ideas, it invariably happens
that "the discourses of the mad are irregular, and frequently break off by
incoherent starts". 14 Mania in particular must, according to William
Cullen, "be attended very constantly with that absurd and incorrect in-
coherent speech we call raving". 15 The second criterion concerns the
degree to which an individual believes in the images fashioned by
imagination and, more significantly, acts upon the mistaken assumption
that imaginative insights are true. Thus Battie, in an attempt to restrict
the compass of the term madness, concluded that, "that man and that
man alone is properly mad, who is fully and unnaturally persuaded of the
existence or of the appearance of any thing, which either does not exist
or does not actually appear to him and who behaves according to such
16
erroneous persuasions".
What is at issue therefore is the status accorded to the imagined
worlds and the consequence that this has for an individual's social conduct.
To take a concrete example; in the case of a patient who was, before
the onset of delusion, proud, ambitious, or haughty it is quite likely that
"upon the access of his lunacy he would imagine himself metamorphosed
into a king, a prince or a viceroy". 17 What would distinguish this man
from others is that he would proceed to act as if he were a prince, a
king, or a viceroy. In making public his private delusions and in transla-
ting these into public indiscretions such a man would, in the terms
used by the French philosopher Condillac, "create so visible a difference
between him and the rest of mankind". 18 The decisive difference
therefore between those for whom the imagination is a source of innocent
diversion and those for whom it becomes a rule of life turns on the notion,
expressed here by Condillac but evident also in much of the English work
on the topic, that the behaviour of those beguiled by imagination will be
such as visibly to differentiate them from others. Of course, this notion
begs a question to which it is supposed to provide an answer. At what
point does this visible difference emerge? Nonetheless it serves as a
valuable yardstick by which to judge an individual's state of mind—a
yardstick that is buttressed by the belief that those thoroughly possessed
by delusion will, in the way they form and communicate their ideas, be
unable to conceal the fact and, moreover, that an individual's general
demeanour and conduct will indicate the degree to which the insights
provided by the "faculty of fiction" are taken as true. As will be shown
in Chapter 6 the principle that all appearances, including that of sound
mind, can be contrived and sustained plays an important part in the way
that madness is generally conceived by the late eighteenth century. The
examination of the court cases that provide the focus for the final chapter
shows that madness is to some extent viewed by those untrained in its
investigation in terms of the delicate breach of social conventions and
of the principle that each should be discrete about the phantasies through
which his imagination tries to lead him into a "crooked way". Such an
interpretation implies that the various faculties from which mental dis-
order springs can be effectively controlled and the appearance—or
indeed the reality—of sound mind thereby sustained.
The second question raised by the definition of madness in terms of
an overactive imagination therefore concerns the degree to which the
apparently unruly and involuntary flights of fancy can be controlled. To
what extent is an individual able to clip the wings of imagination and thus
hold fast to the sure ground of perfectly recalled and reasonably associated
ideas? Thomas Arnold addressed his attention to this question. "When
the mind can regulate all its operations it is then in a sound, and rational
state; but in proportion as the reverse of this takes place, in such
proportion is it in a state of unsoundness and insanity". In the case of
the imagination, or what he calls the representative faculty, Arnold
advises,
tt that the wanderings of the imagination may be prevented, and
its too great ardour, and activity, controlled, the most exact
and unwearied attention should be paid to its operation; and the
man who is conscious of its propensity to ramble, or to become
too active, should ever be upon the watch, to check its first
deviation, and to recall its activity, to solemnity and steadiness.
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It should rarely, therefore, be suffered to move with impatient
or unthinking levity, from one object to another; for it should
be taught, with great care and pain, to fix its attention on what-
ever comes in view before it."
To this end Arnold recommends that "writers on subjects of imagination
should be carefully avoided". 19 Somewhat earlier Locke, who had been
equally confident that the excesses of imagination could be curbed, offered
rather more concrete advice when he advised anyone responsible for
dealing with lunatics to train their memories in the art of checking extra-
vagant flights of imagination. Where the memory can be trained in this
manner it will at least ensure the existence of correctly associated ideas
that conform to the real order of experience. It is for this reason that
Locke, as noted earlier, places such emphasis upon education as the
opportunity to lay a firm foundation of customary and reasonable
associations.
In general, however, it would be true to say that many who wrote of
the imagination, and its disturbing consequences when left unchecked,
displayed a somewhat ambivalent attitude towards the faculty, because
as well as precipitating a man into delusion, and erroneously persuading
him of his "noble status', the imagination also serves as a source of
many pleasures. As well as being "the natural ally of folly", as Arnold
calls it, the imagination also provides relief and pleasing diversion.
To many who associated imagination with madness the faculty is, to para-
phrase Condillac, the most bitter enemy capable at a stroke almost of
poisoning the very source of life and, in contrast, it is also the source
of so much joy. Thus there is at the heart of many discussions of the
faculty a deep ambivalence concerning its effects and, more importantly
perhaps, a recognition that an ideal such as Arnold's is somewhat
illusory.
In addition to an ambivalence concerning its effects physicians re-
cognise that the imagination is, more than any other faculty, involuntary
and that the Lockean faith in the counter-balancing influence of memory
may be somewhat ill founded. While physicians may subscribe therefore
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to the view that imagination should be controlled they nonetheless
recognise the difficulty of doing so. However, rather than abandon
altogether the principles of self-control and self-imposed restraint,
physicians propose that those suffering from the effects of an over-
active imagination should diligently attend to the principle of customary
associations, that they should endeavour to control appearances in
such a way as to diminish the visible effects of their predicament and,
finally, that efforts should be made to curb imagination's closest
ally: passion.
III. PASSION
In medical treatises on madness the term 'passion' encapsulates
the whole range of the 'emotions', but among these there are some that
play a particularly significant role in inducing madness: notably anger,
fear, grief and love. Writing about the relationship between the passions
and madness physicians sometimes analyse the problem at the level of
the passions in general while on other occasions they examine the impor-
tance of specific passions in causing or curing madness; fear, for
example, is seen as an important cause of this disorder as well as an
indispensable component of many therapeutic techniques. The following
discussion will deal primarily with the passions in general.
In the context of eighteenth century medical enquiry passion fulfills
a dual function. First, it lends intensity to the images formed in the
imagination and, by so doing, enhances their persuasive force; passion
shatters customary associations, itvivifies flights of the imagination and
it concentrates attention upon the object of desire. Secondly, passion
constitutes the medium through which mental processes are related
to physical processes and vice versa. The passions, according to
Nicholas Robinson in his New Theory of Physick and Disease (1725),
"are the mechanism that conjoins matter and thought". It follows from
this that "whatsoever therefore affects either the mind or the body, will
raise or depress the passions, just as the object is more or less
disagreeable". 1
 To the extent therefore that many medical treatises
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present mental states in terms of problems of bodily physics—for
example the role played by the motion of the blood in determining
emotion—passion occupies an important place. It serves both as the
medium through which occurrences at one level, for example physio-
logical processes, are translated into events at another level, for
example mental states. In addition to this, passion plays a particular
role in relation to the imagination.
To many who investigated the nature of the relationship between
passion and imagination the question of whether passion as it were
preceded imagination, or vice versa, could never be satisfactorily
resolved. Whether the imagination is, as Mayne believed, "never
slothful or backward to execute the orders of passion" or whether, as
Crichton believed, "the imagination makes the objects of passion appear
far greater than they are', it nonetheless remains the case that irrespective
of which faculty has precedence they both pose a profound threat to mental
wellbeing. 2
 In analysing the consequences of passion physicians treat
the question at two levels: that of the passions in general and of in-
dividual passions in particular. Thus both James in his Medical Dictionary
of 1745 and Arnold in his Observations on Madness of 1782, draw attention
to the way in which particular passions, and most notably that of anger,
often conclude in madness or convert the somewhat languid disorder of
melancholia into furious mania. The reason for this transition is that
a passion such as anger causes the blood "tube impetuously conveyed
from the inferior parts of the head". Although melancholic patients
are not naturally prone to anger it nonetheless happens that "once the
mind is ruffled by that passion, they rage so furiously that the disorder
is not easily allayed". 3 Fear too was regarded as the potential source
of prolonged distraction and "insanity of the worst and sometimes most
obstinate kind is a frequent consequent of great and excessive terror."
The reason being that extreme terror fixes a particular image in the mind,
from which the attention cannot be diverted, and related to this, it
generates "a sudden and extraordinary determination of blood to the brain".n".
It happens therefore that extremes of passion often conclude in madness
because, as Cheyne observed, "the long and constant habit of fixing one
thing onthe imagination, begets a ready disposition in the nerves to produce
again that same image, until the thought of it becomes spontaneous and
natural". 5 Conversely, when an individual is beset by contradictory or
conflicting passions the mind then becomes incapable of consistently
holding in view any one particular set of ideas and is, instead, confused
by an unfamiliar and rapidly changing set of associations. "In fine", wrote
Richard Mead, "madness rises to the greatest heights when the mind is
racked with contrary passions at the same time; as wrath and fear, joy
and grief, which, by drawing it different ways, at length quite overpower
it". 6 Physicians studying madness conclude therefore that passion,
acting alone or in alliance with the imagination, has the capacity to gener-
ate physiological changes—particularly in the blood—and to sunder the
ordinary association of ideas thereby creating "diseased associations";
passion therefore plays an important part in both preserving and destroying
mental wellbeing.
The association between madness and extremes of passion had been
established well before the eighteenth century but what distinguishes the
later version from that expressed by those writing in the early seventeenth
century is the belief that madness should not be seen as an expression of
divine retribution for overly indulged passions but rather that extremes
of passion directly cause madness. In other words eighteenth century
enquiry removes this topic from the realm of theological discussion in
much the same way as happened with the investigation of dreams. The
following comment by Thomas Tryon, although it occurred right at the
end of the seventeenth century, thus seems rather out of place and faintly
anachronistic in the context of the mechanistic principles underlying the
analyses of Pitcairne, Robinson or Whytt. "The truth", Tryon believed,
"is that madness and frenzy do generally proceed from various passions
and extreme inclinations". Under these passions "the soul is set at liberty
from the dark confinements of the grosser senses and reason, even as
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men in dreams". 7 To those writing in the middle of the eighteenth century
Tryon's general assessment of the importance of passion as a cause of
madness would have been quite acceptable, but his explanation of it would
not. In place of the two propositions that madness is a form of divine
retribution for extreme passion or that passion frees the soul from the
constraining influences of the senses one finds, in the eighteenth century,
a naturalistic account of the phenomenon which, having dispensed with.
theological presuppositions, proceeds by way of an analysis of the effects
that passions have upon both the mind and the body; effects which, when
carried to an extreme, are appropriately defined as madness.
A further point of differentiation between the seventeenth and eighteenth
century view of the passions is to be found first, in the value accorded
to them and, secondly, in the assessment of how best they may be controlled.
So far as the value of the passions is concerned it is noticeable that
although many eighteenth century treatises on insanity cite the passions
as a prime cause of mental distress this assessment is not translated
into hostility or antipathy towards them. On the contrary, many physicians
display the same ambivalence with regard to passion as they did with
respect to the imagination; an ambivalence not found in earlier accounts
of the phenomenon which presented the passions as enemies of well-being
and advocated, in the tradition of Stoicism, their virtual elimination.
Descartes' somewhat optimistic view that "even those who have the feeblest
souls can acquire very absolute dominion over all their passions" was
incompatible with the mid-eighteenth century view on at least two counts. 8
One, the belief that the passions could be completely quelled was no
longer accepted. Two, such a view implies—erroneously—that the passions
act only as sources of pain and distress. By contrast, physicians
concerned with the relationship between madness and passion concede,
as Robinson does, that the passions are "necessary beings" without which
a man would be no different from a piece of clockwork. Bayne too, in his
New Essay on the Nerves (1738), considers only the excess of passions
to be damaging for "they are rather beneficial when moderated, and more
in conformity with the health of the body". This assessment is shared by
Richard Mead who noted, in 1751, that the passions "are not only beneficial
to individuals on many occasions, but even necessary for keeping up society
and connections between mankind. "9
When the passions are not duly moderated, however, they will almost
invariably lead to madness. The point at which this occurs is aptly formula-
ted by Hobbes who in this as in so many of his comments on madness
anticipated the views which came to dominate a century after he had first
formulated them. In Hobbes's definition of insanity, as in that of physicians
such as Mead or Arnold, the decisive factor is not so much the mere
existence of passion but its visible effects. "To have stronger and more
vehement passions for anything, than is ordinarily seen, is that which
men call madness". And, as Hobbes' had earlier noted, "most sober
men, when they walk alone with care and employment of the mind, would
be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time
should be publicly seen". 10 Thus, the point at which passion tips over
into madness is identified as that point where disturbances of 'affect'
surpass what is ordinarily seen thereby creating, as Condillac had noted,
a visible difference between one individual and another. The disturbing
consequences of passion and imagination therefore assume much the
same form. In both cases the public exhibition of private feelings or
fantasies, at least beyond the level of what is ordinarily seen, serves
to differentiate the insane from the sane.
To say that those studying insanity in the eighteenth century exhibit a
certain ambivalence concerning the passions is not to say that these
same authors deny either the necessity or the possibility of curbing passion.
Thomas Arnold, for example, advised those susceptible to extremes of
passion to "do all in their power to avoid the occasions of passion". As
Arnold notes,
uhewho has learned to govern passion, to restrain the pre-
cipitancy of his imagination, and to fix or withdraw his attention,
as may be most expedient, has laid a good foundation whereon to
erect that firmness of mind, and soundness of judgement, that
are the very reverse of imbecility". 11
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However, the object of such restraint is not the elimination of passion
but rather the perfection of "the art of contentment"—an art that will
spare an individual from the distress caused by "too much appearing
passion". 12
In eighteenth century medical treatises on insanity the passions are,
therefore, regarded as necessary, and indeed as a source of many
pleasures, but the necessity of restraining their activity within reason-
able limits nonetheless receives considerable emphasis. Moreover,
physicians pay particular attention to the way in which the repeated
indulgence of either passion of imagination generates certain habits
that become increasingly difficult to eradicate. What must be attempted
therefore is mastery of the habit of self-restraint—a habit which is
consistent with sound mind. "It appears evident", writes Arnold, "that the
passions must be powerful causes of insanity, which is itself nothing more
than a disturbed state of mind become habitual and permanent". 13
In the context of eighteenth century medical enquiry the best way
to acquire the 'habit' of sound mind is to continually renew the effort to
divert attention or passion from the object of desire or, in the case of
mania, to regulate the shifts of attention and the fluctuation of the
passions. At the centre of late eighteenth century medical accounts of
madness one finds a fundamental axiom; that wherever the passions
are unguided, the imagination unrestrained or the association of ideas
purely arbitrary then the stability of the mind is profoundly endangered.
In the opinion of many physicians this stability consists entirely in
perfecting the art of self-regulation, of setting and observing appropri-
ate limits to the imagination or the passions. In sharp contrast to the
passion/reason antithesis, to be found in the work of Descartes and
Thomas Willis for example, authors such as Mead, Bayne, Robinson
or Whytt place their faith not in reason but in the authority of convention
and the internalisation of conventional norms of behaviour. It is, they
argue, only by attending to the lessons of custom or convention, and
by duly noting the boundaries set to acceptable expressions of passion
or imagination, that an individual will spare himself from madness. A
disorder that so closely resembles one activity with which each individual
is familiar and which exhibits no trace of self-control or restraint:
dreaming.
IV. DREAMING
In his Discourse on the Causes, Nature, and Cure of Phrensie, Madness 
or Distraction (1689) Thomas Tryon observed that there is "an affinity or
analogy between dreams and madness, so that the understanding of one will
somewhat illustrate the other; for madness seems to be a watching or
a waking dream". 1 Few would have disagreed with this view since dreams
provide a potent image of madness and in the majority of the medical
texts examined the image of the madman as a waking dreamer constitutes
one very effective way of visualising this disorder. Dreaming, which
many believed to be "a short continuance of delusion" 2 or a short lived
madness, provided physicians with an appropriate metaphor for madness
and the attempt to illustrate the nature of the disorder in terms of its
affinity with dreams is quite common.
The following analysis of the relationship between dreaming and
madness differs from the preceding sections in an important respect.
In most eighteenth century medical treatises on madness the phenomenon
of dreaming serves as a useful metaphor for madness and it is this
metaphorical relationship—rather than a causal relationship—that
receives the attention of physicians. Dreaming constitutes an important
component of the medical image of madness primarily because it serves
as a useful way of visualising or characterising this disease.
Having said this it should, however, be pointed out that certain
physicians postulated the existence of a causal relationship between dreaming
and insanity. In certain medical treatises dreaming is portrayed as being
closely analogous to madness and, in some instances, a precipitating
cause of mental breakdown. In other words there is a strand in medical
enquiry which consists of an attempt to show that certain types of dream
may cause insanity. Thus Thomas Beddoes wrote that he had 'frequently
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endeavoured to learn whether dreams are not sometimes continued
without a break into insanity, and whether they do not increase the
susceptibility to its exciting cause". 3 This comment echoes the earlier
conclusion of Sir Henry More who had, in his Enthusiasmus Triumphatus
(1622), noted that in a delirium the madman erroneously "takes his
dreams for true histories and transactions". 4
This proposed causal relationship between dreams and madness does,
however, play a somewhat secondary role in the discussion. Most usually,
when the dream analogy is invoked it is used as a way of dramatically
illustrating the special qualities of madness, and particularly of mania,
where the mind seems overwhelmed by an uncontrollable rush of ideas bearing
little relation to one another. To understand dreams therefore is, as
Tryon observed, helpful in understanding madness and it is noticeable
that variations in the accounts of what dreaming is are reflected in
accounts of what madness is. As the account of dreams changes so does
the account of madness and it is instructive to trace these shifts of
emphasis.
The interpretation of dreams that prevailed in the middle of the
seventeenth century is quite different from that of a hundred years later.
What occurs in this period is an attempt to remove the phenomenon of
dreaming from the plane of theological discussion and to provide instead
A strictly materialistic or naturalistic account of the phenomenon. The
relationship between dreams and life had, of course, been a subject of
interest for a long time and in the writings of the 'Ancients', for example,
one finds a variety of interpretations of the significance of dreaming.
Hippocrates had tried to gauge physical health from dreams; Zeno had
peen in dream images an index of spiritual purity and Lucretius, to
whom dreams were a mark of man's poignant longing for oblivion, had
tried to correlate particular dream images with unfulfilled hopes. 5 By
the middle of the seventeenth century, however, interest was focussed
upon the relationship between dreams and spirituality and, at least by
implication, between madness and the soul.
The most important conclusion to be drawn from the literature on
dreams in this period is that dreaming separates the soul from the body,
thereby enabling it to apprehend truths of a divine nature. In a dream
the soul takes wing, or, as Godwin remarked in his Mystery of Dreams
Historically Discoursed (1658), "dreams are the agitations, the egressions
or sallyings out of the soul in the thoughts of the mind". 6 Dreams are
thus seen as heaven sent truths and as such they initiate the dreamer into
the secrets of God. Freed from the fetters of the body the soul is able,
during a dream, to apprehend the truths of which the waking mind is quite
ignorant and it is for this reason that dreams "tell us intimately of
ourselves". 7 Indeed, so important are the lessons of dreaming that
Godwin believed that "the true knowledge of them to endeavour is man's
duty". Likewise Tryon, in his Treatise of Dreams and Visions (1684),
proposed that the "science of dreams'j as he called it, would prepare the
way for spiritual salvation. In support of this view Tryon argued that
"dreams are no other than certain forces and incorporeal flights of the
soul, loosed from the heavy fetters of the body". 8
But what light does this account of dreaming shed upon madness, the
phenomenon with which it is supposed to have such a close affinity?
Should madness be similarly interpreted in terms of the movement of
the soul? To these questions Tryon provides an answer. What occurs
in phrenzy or madness, "is a real turning inside of all the natural
properties and faculties of the soul outward". 9
 In madness the soul
stands, as it were, revealed, and what distinguishes the mad from the
sane is not so much the properties or faculties of the soul but the fact
that those possessed by delusion seem unable to restrict the outward
expression of their innermost thoughts. Just as in dreaming the soul
moves without hindrance so in madness there appears to be no restriction
placed upon its activity. What unites dreaming and madness, making
one an analogue for the other, is the demonstrable loss of self control
in both conditions; neither the dreamer nor the madman is able to restrain
or exert
	 control over the activities of the soul and thus it is that "in
mad people, all conceptions are promiscuously framed into words, as
they are generated, there being no judge nor counsellors to advise or
determine, whether they are fit to be divulged, and carried into language,
or stifled and suppressed. "10 It is in this respect therefore that madness
may be said to be a waking dream, for in madness as in dreaming the
mind has no control over the formation and expression of ideas, or over
the activity and movement of the soul. And both conditions "seemeth
to be a kind of extasy or trance and separation of the soul from this bodily
society". 11
 When applied to madness therefore this "theological" inter-
pretation of dreaming serves to emphasise the other-wordly, mysterious
and unfathomable quality of mental disorders.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, such an interpreta-
tion had lost ground to the view that dreams could be accounted for in
strictly materialistic terms. The explanation of dreams was removed
from the plane of theological discussion and became more firmly rooted
in everyday experience. This new interpretation, which is pre-figured
in the work of Hobbes, identifies dreams as being nothing but the residues
of sensations and ideas which the individual has already experienced.
"The dreams of the sleeping man are," according to Locke, "all made
up of the waking man's ideas, though for the most part oddly put
together". 12 Similarly Hartley in his Observations on Man (1759) iden-
tified the causes of dreams as being "first, the impressions and ideas
lately received, and particularly those of the preceding day. Secondly,
the state of the body, particularly of the stomach and brain. Thirdly,
13
association".
Dreaming is seen, therefore, as a form of recollection in which
already existing ideas and sensations are once again brought before the
mind. But since dreams occur in the silence of sense, when as Locke
noted "the outward senses are stopped", 14
 it is inevitable that in dreams
all ideas should be randomly or oddly associated and that the mind should
mistake these fictions for truths. Arbitrarily composed of old ideas every
dream is marked by confusion and a lack of sense. Pursuing this line of
thought it is natural to note, as Locke does, "how extravagant and inco-
herent dreams are, how little conformable to the perfection and order of
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a rational being". 15
 No longer seen as the harbingers of divine insight
dreams are, in the eighteenth century, regarded with a certain mistrust
since they are characterised by complete confusion. The very random-
ness of their organisation constitutes the perfect antithesis to the ordered
calm of everyday life, clear-headedness and wide awake thought. Where-
as the associations of everyday life reveal an inner coherence those of
a dream seem devoid of order and they are, to paraphrase Locke, in-
consistent with the perfection and order of a rational being. In the opinion
of Condillac, Locke r s disciple in France, anyone could therefore "notice a
disorder in dreams contrasted with the order of waking states, and judge
them to be illusions". 16
In contrast to authors such as Tryon and Godwin, for whom both madness
and dreams had something of a mystical and divine quality, authors such
as Locke, Pitcairne, Beddoes and others, employed the dream metaphor
as a way of drawing attention to the fact that madness, although it is
obviously mysterious, is nonetheless accountable for in terms of the
constituent elements of mental life. Just as the once extraordinary
phenomenon of dreaming can now be accounted for in fairly simple and
straightforward terms so too madness, in all its variety of forms, should
finally be explicable in terms of those events that are part of everyday life.
In accounting for madness or dreaming there should he no need to have
recourse, as Tryon and Godwin had done, to transcendent and undemons-
trable notions concerning the movement of the soul. Whatever the
problem it is important that it should be placed on the ground of experi-
ence and solved there, for any step beyond experience would signify a
mock solution. In the case of dreaming, for example, the simple
principle that nothing is in the mind that had not previously been in the
senses, provides the key to explaining the phenomenon without recourse
to metaphysical notions.
In the eighteenth century when the dream metaphor is employed to
express the nature of madness it is the incoherence and confusion of mental
disorder that is thereby highlighted. Thus Pitcairne defines delirium
as "the dreams of waking persons, wherein ideas are excited without
order or coherence", and Locke, who had so strongly emphasised the
disordered quality of dreams and delusion, noted that "where all is
but a dream, reasoning and argument are of no use, truth and knowledge
nothing". 17
 In addition to this the metaphor provides further evidence
of the proximity between madness and the condition of brute creation.
"For raging, or stark mad folks, not being at all conscious, must needs
have much like such a perception of their own beings or selves as one
that dreams has". 18 The basis for the comparison between dreaming
and madness is, in the opinion of Z. Mayne in his Two Discourses
Concerning Sense (1728), the fact that in neither instance is an individual
conscious of his existence nor of his self, just as "brutes, which are
unconscious, do not perceive when awake that they are awake; nor,
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coming out of the dream, that they have dreamed". 	 In Mayne's view,
therefore, these different phenomena—dreaming, madness, brute crea-
tion—all resemble each other inasmuch as the defining characteristic
of each is a lack of self-consciousness or awareness.
There is, however, one final aspect of this account that is relevant.
What further distinguishes the seventeenth century interpretation of
dreams from that which prevailed a century later is the profound mis-
trust of dreaming exhibited by Locke and his successors. To authors
such as Pitcairne, Cheyne and Whytt, dreams are a symbol of disorder,
of chaos, and they are—as Locke had noted—completely inconsistent
with the attributes of a rational being. They somehow seem anomalous
and stand in complete contradiction to the clear and rational ideas around
which life is organised. As such dreams should be suppressed or at
least kept private for, as Hobbes remarked,
"he that presumes to break the law upon his own or another's
dream leaveth the law of nature, which is a certain offence, and
followeth the imagery of his own, or another man's private
brain; which if every private man should have leave to do, as
they must by the law of nature, if anyone have it, there could
be no law be made to hold and so all the commonwealth would
dissolve". 20
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In the public expression of private dreams Hobbes forsees the common-
wealth dissolved. If every private man were to choose the guidance of
dreams this choice would render the law covenanted by others completely
useless. Although Hobbes's strictures were formulated at just the
same time as Godwin was elaborating his theological interpretation
of dreams and drawing attention to their divine insights, it was none-
theless this view of the subversive quality of dreaming that came to
prevail a century later. It is a view founded upon the belief, which was
to be made increasingly explicit, that the public expression of private
thoughts was not entirely consistent with the continued existence of
social life. If each was free to "order his affairs by dreams" the
consequence would be social chaos. When used as an analogy for mad-
ness this view of dreams thus emphasises the socially disruptive
consequences of publicising private delusions and, as will be shown
in the later chapters of this work, madness is increasingly seen in
terms of the failure to sustain the public appearance of mental well-
being.
Conclusion
Read chronologically, medical treatises on madness during the period
16 50-18 00 reveal gradual but marked shifts of emphasis which indicate
not so much the inexorable progress or advancement of medical enquiry
but rather a reorientation of the account of madness. At the risk of
over simplification these key changes of emphasis and of direction may
be formulated as a series of propositions. Clearly, certain of these
propositions will apply more to the work of one author than another but
taken together they should provide an accurate characterisation of the
major changes at issue.
First, by the end of the eighteenth century the subject of madness has
become firmly installed as a branch of medical enquiry, rather than as
a topic more appropriate to theological discourse. As part of a more
general process of secularisation of thought in the eighteenth century,
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madness and the dimensions along which it was investigated—for example
dreaming—are finally removed from the plane of theological enquiry
and placed firmly on the ground of experience. As a result of this
the account of madness sheds many of the earlier references to mys-
tical or semi-mystical experiences in which the mind was literally over-
whelmed and possessed by forces beyond human control. In place of
references to the mysterious movement of the soul in both dreams and
the analogous phenomenon of madness one finds, by the middle of the
eighteenth century, a thoroughgoing naturalistic account of this disorder
that seeks to explain it in terms of a disturbance in the every day activi-
ties of imagining, recalling, attending to or associating ideas.
By the end of the century madness was thus placed securely within
the orbit of medical enquiry. Medicine, which in so many respects
exemplified the principles and the optimism of eighteenth century philosophy,
was seen as an integral part of the scientific revolution and, even more
significantly, as an index of general improvement. In the work of authors
as different as Bacon, Descartes, Locke and Diderot, one finds a pro-
found belief that medical advance would erode the limitations that disease
imposed upon life. Moreover, the combination of the new philosophy of
enquiry with medical science—a combination symbolised in the writing
of authors as widely separated as Locke and Crichton—added further
credence to the view that medical enquiry, for so long associated with
alchemy and astronomy, could justifiably count itself a truly philosophical
science. Among the subjects amenable to this science one must, by the
middle of the eighteenth century, include mental disorder in all its forms.
What is so striking about the whole corpus of eighteenth century treatises
on insanity is the detectable change in tone and style. The confidence
with which physicians such as Arnold, Ferriar or Cox described insanity,
identified its cardinal features, noted its various species and accounted
for its onset, would have been inconceivable a hundred years earlier.
This confidence was born of the belief that madness, like other disorders,
was susceptible to rational analysis; that it could be accounted for in
terms of a disturbance or imbalance in the passions, the imagination,
or the circulation of the blood, and, most importantly, that its effects
could be controlled by means of rational therapeutic measures.
More specifically, the account of madness that came to prevail in the
latter half of the eighteenth century, rooted as it was in the common
experiences of every individual, emphasised what one might call the
voluntaristic character of the disease. In place of the earlier charac-
terisation of madness in terms of savagery or bestiality, two conditions
over which neither choice nor control could be exercised, an account
developed that portrayed madness in terms of the failure to curb the
excesses to which each faculty is prone. In the work of a physician such
as Arnold, writing in the 1780s, the key to sanity is to be found in perfecting
those habits of thought and action consistent with sound and acceptable
behaviour. Arnold, like many of his contemporaries, conceded that every
individual is, on occasion, the victim of minor mental disturbances, but
what prevents this condition from degenerating into madness is the habit
of self-control and self-restraint. Madness consists, in the opinion of
Arnold, "in a disturbed state of mind become habitual and permanent". 1
Although every individual is vulnerable to the extremes of passion or
uncontrolled flights of imagination, what is essential is that such temporary
aberrations should not become habitual,
The emergence of the notion of habit marks a decisive shift in the
interpretation of mental disorder. In sharp contrast to the somewhat de-
terministic account provided by an author such as Blackmore one encounters,
by the latter half of the century, the elaboration of a view that acknowledges
the considerable scope that each individual has for regulating and
directing his own behaviour. The goal of such regulation is the develop-
ment of appropriate habits that will eventually operate quite imperceptibly.
Thus Falconer, in his Dissertation on the Influence of the Passions upon
Disorders of the Body  (1788), noted that an "important law of the human
system depends on the effects of habit and custom, and consists in a
disposition to repeat actions, sensations or motions, in the same
manner, and at the same intervals, as they have before taken place".
Significantly Falconer emphasises that this law "holds full as strongly
in the animal and corporeal, as in the mental functions". 2 One implica-
tion of such a view is the belief that the habit of sound mind, like the
habits associated with physical activities, can be mastered. As will
be shown in Chapter Five this principle underpins many therapeutic
innovations and, more interestingly perhaps, it lends support to the
growing therapeutic optimism.
Although the argument that madness consists solely in a "distracted
state of mind become habitual" is not fully developed until well into the
eighteenth century it is nonetheless possible to see the early outlines of
this position in Locke's Essay, and more particularly in the Chapter on
the Association of Ideas which was added to the Essay after its first
edition. The significance of Locke's comments in this chapter is two-
fold. First, he emphasises the unreasonableness of men and forcefully
argues that no one is justified in believing himself to be immune to
those vagaries of thought or action that often conclude in madness.
Noting that each individual is quick to spot the oddity of extravagance
of other men's behaviour Locke points out that to condemn happily—in
the name of reason—the actions of another is rarely justified since the
man who criticises another's eccentricities is almost invariably
"guilty of much greater unreasonableness in his own tenets and conduct,
which he never perceives and will very hardly, if at all, be convinced
of". Pursuing this line of thought Locke concludes that,
"there is scarce a man so free from it [unreasonableness] that
he should always and on all occasions argue or do as in some
cases he constantly does, would not be thought fitter for Bedlam
than civil conversation. "3
In Locke's view the unreasonableness of men is so great that virtually
everyone is a potential Bedlamite. Rather than concede, however, that
the world is nothing but a 'great Bedlam 'as Tryon had rhetorically
described it—Locke goes on to argue that what prevents the complete
erosion of civil and reasonable society is the authority of custom and
the force of reasonable habits. Given the unreasonableness of mankind
Locke ascribes cardinal importance to the cure of minds and he equates
cure with the perfection of appropriate or acceptable habits of thought
and action. According to Locke, custom settles habits of thought as
well as of action and it is essential therefore that the element of
madness that exists in each individual should be contained by the
early inculcation and subsequent perfection of good habits. Hence
the importance attached to education and its capacity to socialise idiosyn-
cratic individuals.
However, what is missing in Locke's account is any firm indication
as to how far habit is a physical effect and, therefore, how far any
association of ideas is dependent upon a series of arbitrary physical
events—such as the movement of the anan1 spirits—that may owe more
to chance than to volition. In subsequent accounts, such as those of
Arnold or Ferriar, this equivocal stance is replaced by a rather less
deterministic view that accords to each individual far greater scope in
learning good habits and exercising self-control. Whereas Locke equi-
vocates on the important question of how far customary modes of thought
and behaviour can be changed and re-learned, physicians such as Arnold
or Cox show far less hesitation in portraying each individual as the
author of his own misfortunes. While physicians may question the degree
to which the imagination can be controlled or the passions subdued, the
general tenor of late eighteenth century treatises strongly suggests that
although complete control is an unrealisable as the ideal of an absolutely
normal person there nonetheless exists sufficient scope for ensuring
that one is never declared to be "fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation".
By the latter half of the century therefore it is assumed that each
individual's capacity for self-control or restraint is sufficient to preserve
a sound mind and prevent the disabling consequences of overly indulged
passion or uninhibited flights of imagination. To a physician such as
Cox the presence of madness is to be judged not by the oddities of a
man's disposition or the vagaries of his thought, but rather by his public
behaviour. "It is not", Cox writes, "the singularity of a man's mode
and bent for thinking that should condemn him for a maniac but the
acting on them. " 4 Cox thus develops a line of thought that is implicit
in Locke's work, namely, that when judging an individual's sanity atten-
tion should be given to his public behaviour and, more specifically, one
should consider how far his private vagaries have been translated into
public indiscretions. In other words, it is not the extravagance or
unreasonableness of a man's ideas or principles per se that marks him
out as unstable but rather it is his ability to contain these idiosyncracies
and to prevent them from influencing his public behaviour. Thus
William Dattie, in his Treatise on Madness (1758), having defined a
"deluded imagination" as the "indisputable and essential character of
madness" goes on to argue that "that man alone is properly mad who
believes in his delusions" and, most decisively of all, "who behaves
5
according to such erroneous persuasions".
As a general characterisation of the changes of emphasis in eighteenth
century accounts of madness, the second and third propositions can
therefore be formulated as follows. First, there develops during this
period an argument to the effect that the key to maintaining mental
stability is by exercising an appropriate degree of self-control and pre-
empting the development of bad habits. Moreover, it is argued that
man's capacity for self-regulation—although not sufficient to completely
quell the storms of passion or imagination—is nonetheless enough to
maintain the habit of sound mind. The implications of this argument,
particularly at the therapeutic level, will be analysed more fully in
Chapter Five. The second development concerns the emergence of an
important distinction between public and private life, between the
idiosyncratic eccentricities to which everyone is prone and the translation
of these into forms of behaviour that visibly differentiate an individual
from what Cox had called "the generality of mankind". This distinction
between the private and public realms, and its relevance in the interpre-
tation of insanity, is discussed in Chapter Six.
The fourth proposition follows on from this. The corollary to the
preceding two arguments is the conviction that since each is ultimately
responsible for sustaining the appearance of sound mind what is important
is that appropriate norms of social conduct should be fully internalised.
It is only internalising the norms of social conduct—norms that constitute
the basis for the continued existence of social life—which ensures that
an individual's behaviour does not depart too fax from the conventional
forms and that the soundness of his mind will remain beyond reproach.
Madness is thus defined in terms of the observance of custom. But the word
custom is used here in the widest sense. It refers not so much to those
habitual or customary actions to which Arnold and Locke drew attention,
rather it encompasses the whole range of accepted social norms and
conventions. The term thus has a dual significance in the discussion of
madness. It embraces both individual habits or customs and those wider
social norms which set limits to acceptable public behaviour. On
occasions where an individual transgresses these limits, and indulges in
behaviour to which people are unaccustomed, the verdict of madness is
likely to be valid. In the opinion of Cox,
"whenever an individual is observed to think and act very differently
from the generality of mankind, to indulge strange outre , incongru-
ous catenations of thought, calling them exhuberant fancies, or
original flights, setting up for what is called a genius, pestering a
neighbourhood with unusual garrulity, and pertinaciously maintain-
ing and defending his own opinions, he is only a remove from
insanity. Such characters I have known, and they are always to be
suspected". 6
To Cox therefore the presence of unsound mind is marked by the unusualness
of an individual's actions, by the observable difference between his behaviour
or opinions and those held in common by the generality of mankind. This
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definition of madness in terms of the violation of conventional social
norms signifies an important shift from earlier definitions; for
example, Willis's references to the soul "sinking down inwardly" in
melancholia, Blackmore's vivid account of the animal spirits being
driven into "vertiginous eddies and convulsive agitations", or Cheyne's
richly metaphorical formulation of that "lopping and pruning" of the
faculties associated with sanity.
What emerges by the middle and late eighteenth century is a definition
of madness that emphasises not so much its mysterious almost other-
worldly qualities, such as one associates with savagery, but rather
its antisocial nature. It is in terms of a breach in the fabric of ordinary
everyday social life that madness is portrayed; in place of references
to savagery or =finality one finds references to those who pester a
neighbourhood with unusual garrulity. Madness is seen therefore as a
social disorder, as a threat to harmonious social life in which norms
are unconsciously internalised and conventions observed. This disease,
which can be explained in terms of adisturbance in the imagination, the
passions or the association of ideas, is thus portrayed in terms of
social failure, of an inability to regulate behaviour within reasonable and
conventional limits. Indeed, reading medical treatises dating from the
latter half of the eighteenth century one is struck not so much by the
vivid metaphors redolent of an unfathomable mystery, but rather by
the somewhat moralising tone and the tendency on the part of physicians
to upbraid those afflicted by mental instability.
The series of general propositions may therefore be summarised as
follows. First, madness becomes firmly installed as a branch of medical
enquiry. Secondly, the disorder is increasingly seen as one over which
control can be exercised and indeed its onset pre-empted by appropriate
habits of self-restraint. Thirdly, the distinction between an individual's
private and public life assumes increasing importance. Fourthly,
observance of customary codes of conduct is seen as a guarantee against
the charge of madness. Finally, it is in terms of a social failure that
the disease is portrayed and, as a result, it is the disruptive social
consequences of madness that receive particular attention.
No longer subsumed under more general but ill-defined notions
concerning the nature of savagery or of bestiality madness is increasingly
regarded as a wholly intelligible phenomenon that can be both prevented
and cured, principally by means of the perfection of the habit of self-
discipline. This association of madness with a breakdown in the habit
of self-control serves to delineate sharply those who are mad from those
who are not. The distinctive failings by which insanity is known, for
instance the failure to break an erroneous association of ideas from
which the mind cannot be distracted, serves to set this category of
disorder apart from others. Madness is, as Aikin had noted in his
Thoughts on Hospitals  (1771), a profoundly social disorder and to those
of sound mind the mad are "multiplied objects of alarm". 7 The reason
for this, the reason why madness is seen as a threat to social life,
stems from the fact that it is by the time that Aikin writes, seen in terms
of an inability to internalise appropriate norms of conduct, to observe
the limits set to reasonable or customary behaviour, and to thereby nip
in the bud those private vagaries which, when they find expression in
public behaviour, serve to differentiate an individual from the generality
of his fellow beings. The account of madness in terms of a failure of
self discipline serve therefore to emphasise the distinctive qualities of
the disorder and to differentiate its sufferers from others who violated
the boundaries within which social life is conducted. This process of
differentiation will be analysed in some detail in Chapter Five. However,
before developing that enquiry it would be appropriate to widen the perspect-
ive somewhat and to examine how the problem posed by lunacy was dealt
with at a social level in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The
seclusion of the mentally disturbed in the asylum cannot be understood
without reference to the changing rationales of confinement during this period.
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CHAPTER 4
RATIONALES OF CONFINEMENT
Having devoted considerable attention to the question of how physicians
studied and characterised madness it is now time to shift the level of analysis
to take in the social dimension of the problem or what may be called the
social response to this disorder. This chapter will address itself to the
following questions. How were the insane controlled during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and how did the social response to insanity compare
with that of other categories of social deviant, such as vagrants, vagabonds
and criminals? What forms of social control developed to take account
of the various types of social 'deviants' and how were these developments
reflected in law? In what institutions were the insane confined and how
did the rationale of confinement change over time ? Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, to what extent were the insane as a group differentiated
from other categories of social deviant, such as vagrants or criminals?
It could be argued that this issue of differentiation—or lack of it—is central
to the whole question of why the insane were, by the latter half of the
eighteenth century, incarcerated in separate institutions.
To develop this enquiry it is necessary to widen slightly the historical
focus of the study to include both legislative and social developments
dating from the beginning of the seventeenth century. It will also be useful
to consider the findings of two Parliamentary Select Committees set up
to inquire into the condition of the insane in 1807 and 1815. The reasons
for widening the historical focus are as follows. First, the information
on the control of lunacy that can be gleened from local records is
extremely fragmentary, frustratingly incomplete, and widely scattered.
A narrow historical focus would, therefore, be able to call upon only
a very limited range of evidence. Secondly, seventeenth and eighteenth
century forms of social control make very little sense unless seen in
the light of the Elizabethan Vagrancy and Poor Laws. In addition, the
position of the insane under common law in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries sheds an interesting sidelight on the problems insanity posed
and particularly upon the role of families in treating or controlling their
distracted relatives. Thirdly, the enquiries of 1807 and 1815 represent
the first attempts at a systematic investigation of the conditions under
which the insane were treated, the institutions in which they were confined
and the problems that their incarceration raised. Although these
enquiries date from the beginning of the 19th century they nonetheless
shed light on the situation that prevailed during the latter half of the
eighteenth century and upon forms of institutional control that had changed
very little during the 100 years leading up to the formation of the
Select Committees.
When looking at the historical background to the establishment of
asylums in the second half of the eighteenth century it is important to
realize that there is nothing new in the idea of confinement itself. As
one might expect, the solution to the problem posed by the dangerous or
merely alarming lunatic had always lain in confinement of some kind.
Thus Andrew Boorde in his Compendius Regyment or a D ,yetry of Helth
(1542) advocates that "every man the whiche is madde, or lunatycke,
or frantycke, be kept in safe guard in some close house or chamber
where there is little light, and looked after by a keeper the whiche the
madde man do fear". 1 Just over 200 years later Sir George Paul,
the High Sheriff of Gloucestershire, informed the Select Committee of
1807 of his belief that,
"there is hardly a parish of considerable extent, in which there
may not be found some unfortunate lunatic, who, if his ill-
treatment had made him phrenetic, is chained in a cellar or
garret of a workhouse, fastened to the leg of a table, tied to a
post in an outhouse, or perhaps shut in an uninhabited ruin". 2
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On occasions where a lunatic's disorder was inoffensive Paul observed
that the sufferer is left to wander "naked and half starved through the
streets and highways teased by the scuff, and jest of all that is vulgar,
ignorant and unfeeling. " 3 Confronted by this appalling state of affairs
Paul advocated that all the insane should be confined but that this incarcera-
tion should be in specially built asylums. The thread that links the
proposals of Doorde and Paul is thus a firm belief in the necessity of
confinement, and investigation of the records reveals that in practice
the insane were, throughout this period, confined and that this confine-
ment assumed a variety of forms.
Domestic Confinement
One of the longest established and most widespread forms of custody
was domestic confinement. This took one of two forms. Either the
relatives of an insane individual kept him at home or someone outside
the family took responsibility for ensuring the lunatic's safe custody.
It is worth pointing out that as early as the third quarter of the fifteenth
century it was, under common law, lawful to beat and imprison any
lunatic who was liable to commit a criminal offence. Thus Dalton in the •
1618 edition of The Countrey Justice noted that,
"It is lawful for parents, kinsmen and other friends of a man
that is mad or frantic (who being at liberty attempteth to burn
a house, or to do some other mischief, or to hurt himself or
others) to take him and put him into an house, to bind or chain
him, and to beat him with rods, and to do any other forcible act
to reclaim him, or to keep him that he should do no hurt. "4
The extent to which relatives of the insane exercised this legal right is
obviously impossible to gauge, but surviving records do indicate that the
practice of confining was fairly widespread. After the passing of the Poor
Law Act (1601), which instituted the system of Overseers of the Poor and
provided for the administration of poor relief under the supervision of
the Justices of the Peace, there occur a number of cases in which the
relatives of an insane person petitioned for financial and other assistance
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in maintaining a distracted member of the family. Surviving petitions
show that domestic confinement was an important method of coping with
the insane and that in some cases an individual outside the family was
charged with looking after allunatic.
Thus in Lancashire in 1626 the Justices ordered that the churchwarden
and Overseers of the Poor should look after a mad woman who was
unable to support herself and whose family were similarly unable to
"mayntayne and keepe her". 5 On certain occasions the petitioner
was granted an allowance to hire someone to keep watch over a distracted
relative, as happened in 1681 when the Lancashire Justices granted a
man 12 pence a week since, "he can not leave his wyffe and go to his
worke unlesse he hire anable person to stay and looke to his wyffe for
feare shee distroy herselfe".
	
Sometimes the parish officers were
ordered to find someone to look after a lunatic such as the distracted
Lancashire woman who had pulled out both her eyes and was, in 1668,
now wandering about. On other occasions responsibility was placed in
the hands of several people, as happened in Somerset in 1612-1613 when
six people—some of them relatives of the lunatic concerned—were
ordered to look after the individual "in his own house if they can rule him
there, or otherwise they shall cause him to be sent unto the Bridewell". 6
A little later, in 1628, the Taunton court ordered that Henry Collard, who
was unruly and dangerous, should be placed in the custody of John
Appledore; 7 this practice of boarding out lunatics is probably an early
forerunner of the system of private madhouses which flourished in the
eighteenth century. Evidence that domestic custody was often supplemented
by further means of restraint is also available. Thus the Lancashire
records report the case of a man who, "Iyinge bound in cheanes and fetters",
could only be kept in awe and subordination by his natural father; the
same records tell of a woman who, in 1651, had to be chained and locked
to a post. 8
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Given the fragmentary nature of the evidence and the incompleteness
of the Quarter Sessions Records it is impossible to estimate how many
of the insane were confined either in their own houses or in those of
their appointed custodians. Nonetheless, evidence from the Sessions
records in Warwickshire, Buckinghamshire, and the North Riding,
although less complete than the Lancashire record, reveals considerable
similarity in the forms of domestic confinement and the additional
methods of forcible restraint. The evidence indicates that domestic
confinement was fairly widespread during the seventeenth century and
that it played a significant part in efforts at a local level to limit the
socially disruptive consequences of insanity. What the Act of 1601 did
was to institute a system whereby relatives could petition for financial
assistance or, in the case of particularly troublesome lunatics, request
that they be relieved of their custodial responsibilities. This form of
confinement was satisfactory as long as the lunatic was not actually
dangerous, and someone could be found to care for him. In cases where
the lunatic threatened the safety of his family and neighbours, or where
there was no alternative, the Justices ordered confinement in a more
secure establishment, such as houses of correction or workhouses.
Houses of correction 
After the Act of 1597 entitling private citimens to build t‘onses og.
correction, and the Act of James 1,1609, which provided for the establish-
ment of at least one such establishment in each county, houses of correction
became an integral element in the system of Poor Relief. Before 1597
such houses existed in Reading, York, Bristol, Winchester and Exeter and
they fulfilled, during the sixteenth century, a range of functions comprising
the provision of relief for the poor, of work for the idle, of industrial
training for the young, and of "the punishinge and correctinge of idle and
vagrant persons". 9 By the end of the first quarter of the seventeenth
century houses of correction existed in most counties, but following the
1609 Act they increasingly assumed the character of custodial establishments
rather than institutions intended to provide relief and work for the
deserving poor. In the Act of 1609 there is, aside from the new powers
of the search and apprehension given to the Justices, an important shift
of emphasis. Gone are the repeated Elizabethan references to the
"feeding, sustenation and relief of the poor, maimed, needy or impo-
tent people." In place of this the harsh tenor of the later act is established
by way of references to "rogues, vagabonds, wandering, idle and disorderly
persons", all of whom the Justices may seek out and apprehend. Those
apprehended are, moreover, "to be examined of their idle and wandering
life, to be punished or otherwise by warrant, to be conveyed to the said
House of Correction, to be set to labour and work". 10 The Act of 1609
thus grants wider powers to the Justices, it significantly broadens the
category of those who may be apprehended and ordered to provide a
"satisfactory account of their life" and, finally, it throws into sharper
relief the punitive functions of the house of correction. As a result
of this re-focussing of legislative concern, houses of correction increasingly
fulfilled the role of custodial institutions, suitable for the confinement of
all who came under the somewhat elastic and fairly broad categories of
the Act. In cases where public funds facilitated the construction of new
houses of correction their custodial function received marked emphasis,
with the result that, by the end of the Civil War, such houses were
virtually indistinguishable from common gaols. It was to such establish-
ments that the Justices despatched the more troublesome lunatics, and
those for whom no custodian could be found.
One need make no more than a cursory examination of County records
to discover frequent instances of lunatics being sent to houses of correction.
Following complaints made by the inhabitants of Eddington, in North
Yorkshire, one Alice Hawksworth was found by the Justices to have,
"Lately fallen lunatique and distracted in her wittes, being not
sensible to governe and rule herselfe, but rather subject to
commit many outrages and abuses, if she be permitted to stirre
abroad; the said Alice is to stand comitted unto the house of
correction of Wakefield, there to remain until it shall please
11God she recover that infirmity".
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Similarly in 1685 John Norton, a "frantique and distracted person" from
Burton-upon-Trent, was entrusted to the "care and custody of the Master
of the House of Correction in Ashbourne, Derbyshire". Lest Norton be
found "incapacitated to work for his maintenance" it was ordered that his
expenses be covered by the Ashbourne Overseers of the Poor.
In 1684 the Lancashire Justices were requested by the father of a
lunatic to send him to a house of correction since he "hath lately become
lunatic and so melancholick so that he can not rule him", and a few years
later, in 1702, again in Lancashire, a woman who had become "a daily
nuisance to her neighbours" was sent to a house of correction. 12 The
Court at Nottingham adopted the same policy when, on January 8th 1732
it ordered that Samuel Clay, "a dangerous lunatic distracted in his
senses", be confined in the local house of correction. 13 As late as 1815
the Parliamentary Committee learned of a man confined in the house of
correction in Kendal who, "has been placed in a cell which has been built
for persons under solitary confinement; he has been suffering this
dreadful punishment of solitary confinement for ten years". 14 In some
instances lunatics were placed in specially built cellars, such as those
at the house of correction at Preston; the records of this house give
details of expenditure on such items as "mending the prison beds in the
dungeon which were broken with a distracted man, and making four
boxes in the lower prison for securing of mad people with good planks". 15
It is impossible to tell from the records how many lunatics were
actually confined in gaol when they had been convicted of crimes, and
this form of confinement is not discussed here. There is, however, some
evidence to indicate that lunatics who had committed crimes may on
occasion have been sent to houses of correct& rather than prisons which
made no special provision for them. In 1689, the Ashbourne house of
correction received a lunatic originally confined in the common gaol of
the County. The gaoler had complained that Thomas Whyte, the said
lunatic, was "troublesome to the prisoners in the gaol, and that place very
unfit for the custody of such persons", and the Justices ordered that
he be transferred to the house of correction, "there to remain till further
order". 16 In the previous year, 1688, the Lancashire Justices had
ordered that a lunatic should be sent to the house of correction because,
"in his lunacy (he) broake of his chaines and went to a house and pulled
down the slates and spoyled the goods, and but for that neighbours
came in would have burnt the house, and is a person not fitt to go loose". 17
Somewhat earlier the Lancashire Justices had recomitted an insane
woman to the house of correction because she had "returned to her
former evill course, is agen distracted in her senses and hath done
severall abuses". 18
Taken together such records as do exist suggest that the secure
custody of a house of correction proved particularly valuable on occasions
where lunatics were likely to commit abuses, to threaten their neighbours
or break the chains with which their relatives had tried to restrain them.
Following the 1609 Act they would have been placed there along with a
considerable array of "rogues, vagabonds, wandering, idle and disorderly
persons". Thus the London Bridewell, upon which many houses of
correction were modelled, was—according to Strype's Survey of the 
Cities of London and Westminster (1720)—used as a custodial institution
for,
"All strumpets, night walkers, pick pockets, vagrants and idle
persons that are taken up for their ill lives and being so comitted
are forced to beat hemp in public view, with due correction for
whipping according to their offence". 19
These categories must frequently have overlapped and given that it is
likely that a wandering lunatic would be unable to provide a satisfactory
account of his life it is reasonable to conclude that many houses of correction
would have contained distracted vagrants. On certain occasions the lack of
clear definition and legal distinction between various categories of transgres-
sor caused considerable confusion, such as occurred in 1674 when the
Court of the London Bridewell was troubled with a woman "who seemed to
be mad" while also being an incorrigible rogue; the punishment for the
latter being whipping and the London receptacle for lunatics being
Bethlem, the Court resolved its uncertainties by first having the woman
whipped and then sent to Bethlem. 20
Workhouses 
During the 1630s workhouses existed in a few towns but it was not until
the early eighteenth century that they developed on any significant scale.
The idea of collecting all the able poor into one establishment—the
workhouse—and providing them with productive employment was embraced
with greater enthusiasm following the successful example of the Bristol
workhouse which had been established in 1696. In 1722 the significance
of the workhouse movement was marked by the passing of the so-called
Workhouse Test Act which gave parishes permission to combine together
to build a common workhouse if they wished and further empowered
Overseers of the Poor, in places where there was a workhouse, to
withold relief from those individuals who refused to enter it. Particularly
during the early eighteenth century the most enthusiastic advocates of
the workhouse system believed that the organised provision of productive
and profitable employment for the poor would eradicate the problem of
idleness, relive unemployment and contribute to national prosperity by
fully exploiting the country's labour potential. In this respect the work-
house differed somewhat from the house of correction which was
intended to fulfill the twin goals of providing work for the able-bodied
poor as well as "punishinge and correctinge" the more stubborn and
deliberate vagabonds, and others who were guilty of petty offences.
In certain houses of correction, such as the one at Bury, the punishment
for different categories of vagrancy was precisely specified and it would
appear that after the Civil War—when the number of genuine rogues and
unemployed poor had risen considerably—houses of correction in-
creasingly assumed the character of gaols in which the chief object was
detention and punishment, rather than the provision of work. In certain
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cases workhouses also doubled as houses of correction and although
the difference between them is not always clear cut the evidence avail-
able does suggest that, in the early eighteenth century at least, houses
of correction were used to confine those lunatics who had been found
committing criminal offences, such as arson or other acts of vandalism.
Such cases will be cited shortly but for the moment it is important to
emphasise that it was the workhouse, rather than the house of correction,
which came to play the central role in the confinement of lunatics,
certainly by the latter half of the eighteenth century. According to one
estimate, before 1789 between four and five thousand lunatics were in
workhouses and the heavy reliance upon this institution is amply borne
out by the Report of the Select Committee of 1807 which indicates that
of those lunatics who were confined by far the largest number were kept
in workhouses. 21
By the middle of the eighteenth century workhouses had become part
of the landscape in the larger—i. e. market town—communities and by
the end of the century 126 such establishments existed, some of which
had been purpose built. As already noted workhouses were originally
established in an attempt to relieve the burden of the poor and idle by
placing them in institutions in which, to paraphrase Locke, they would
learn the habit of labour, but in the course of the eighteenth century
this essentially mercantilist inspiration receded before the ever increasing
problem posed by mounting numbers of indolent poor, by an increase
in crime and, most importantly, by the strain imposed on an institution
that had become the repository of every type of social transgressor.
(This change in the nature of the workhouse will be examined in greater
detail in the second part of this chapter. ) By the end of the eighteenth
century,therefore, the workhouse occupied by definition an important place
in the confinement of the insane. As one moves from the seventeenth to
the eighteenth century it becomes increasingly clear that the workhouse
has begun to supersede the house of correction as a custodial institution
in which a whole range of social transgressors, the idle poor, and the blind
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or impotent could be contained. In order to get an idea of the scale of
confinement and the extent to which the insane were placed in workhouses
it is necessary to adopt the vantage point provided by the Select Commit-
tees of 1807 and 1815. The establishment of these Committees marked
the first attempt of a systematic study of the conditions of the insane
and the reports submitted to them shed an interesting light on eighteenth
century practices.
As already noted Sir George Paul informed the Select Committee of
1807 of his belief that in virtually every parish of "considerable extent"
one should expect to find lunatics "chained in the cellar or garret of a
workhouse" and in the same year it was reported from Suffolk that all
but 13 of the country's 47 known pauper lunatics were in workhouses;
in Norfolk, in the same year, one finds 51 lunatics in the Norwich
asylum, 20 in a separate asylum, 3 in gaol, 4 in houses of correction,
20 in workhouses and 14 nbt confined at all. 22l. 	 it would be a
mistake to give the impression that every workhouse at this time contained
insane inmates and indeed in 1815 Henry Alexander informed the Select
Committee that of the 47 workhouses he had visited throughout the
country in only nine did he find insane inmates—although in the Bristol
workhouse Alexander had counted "a very large number of the insane
poor", 23
Whether or not particular workhouses specialised, as it were, in the
confinement of lunatics is impossible to judge but the evidence clearly
suggests that this institution was used for this purpose. In trying to
determine the significance of the workhouse in this context the picture
is further complicated by conflicting contemporary views as to what
proportion of the insane were to be found in such establishments. Thus
against Alexander's findings that one fifth of workhouses contained a
lunatic one should set the assessment of Sir George Paul or that of
Samuel Tuke who, in a letter to the Philanthropist on the State of the
Insane Poor (1811), observed that, "whoever will take the pains to enquire,
I apprehend will find, that a very great proportion of the insane poor
are placed under the care of the master of a parish workhouse". 24 In
support of this contention Tuke describes his visit to a workhouse in
the south of England in which he found, in a small courtyard a little way
from the main building, four adjacent cells each containing female
lunatics, none of whom were clothed. Tuke concludes his description
of the desperge condition of these lunatics by advising the reader not
to take this instance as a solitary one, since "too many parallels may
be found to it in different parts of the land". 25 Again any attempt to
determine the scale of this practice is thwarted by lack of evidence—a
problem which beset the members of both Select Committees. Having
cited the figures for Norfolk and Suffolk the Committee of 1807 added
the rider that the deficiencies of the data were so great that a "very
large addition" would have to be made in order to arrive at a more
accurate assessment of the total. 26
The picture that emerges is, therefore, of a variety of institutional
and non-institutional measures used to control the potentially disturbing
social consequences of insanity and to contain any serious physical
threat. During the eighteenth century these measures were backed up
by legislation which probably—though it is difficult to estimate—resulted
in proportionately more lunatics being confined in institutions than
before. In order to understand this development it is necessary to turn
from the discussion about how lunatics were confined to why they were
confined.
At the most immediate and superficial level it is clear that relatives
petitioned for the incarceration of their lunatic kinsmen because they felt
threatened and endangered by them. Among the principal reasons for
petitioning Justices is the fear of insanity and, more specifically, the
concern that unless lunatics are restrained, they will commit abuses,
attack strangers and terrify their neighbours. As we have already seen
it is in response to the terror generated by this disease that some lunatics
were despatched to houses of correction or placed in safe custody and
it is possible to find numerous further examples to illustrate this point.
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where he doth remayne bound up in iron chaynes". 27 But, in addition
to the immediate terror evoked by madness pauper lunatics were
often associated with another phenomenon capable of engendering
alarm and anxiety, which was vagrancy.
Professor W. K. Jordan, in his study of Philanthropy in England:
1480-1660, has drawn attention to the widespread fear and hatred of
vagrancy that prevailed during the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries. 28 This fear and dislike finds public expression in a range
of proposals designed to clear the streets and highways of beggars and
of the wandering poor. Moreover, there emerges during the sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries an association between wandering
lunatics and vagabonds, many of whom "having sound and perfect limbs
can yet notwithstanding counterfeit all sorts of diseases". Among
this group of counterfeiters Halsworth, in his Description of England
(1543), includes so-called "Abrams or Abram men" whom he describes
as idle vagabonds. 29 The meaning of 'Abrams' is literally "naked
men" and contemporary evidence points to a strong association between
so called Abram men and those who feigned madness. Thus in 1561
John Awdeley referred to an Abram man as "he that walketh bare
armed, and bare legged, and feigns himself mad". 30 Just over 200
years later, in Grosse's Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue  (1785)
the accepted meaning of a 'mad torn' is given as "an Abram man, or
rogue that counterfeits madness". 31 What such definitions reveal is
that madness, whether counterfeited or genuine, is unavoidably associated
with the quasi-criminal activity of begging, under false pretences. The
association between madmen, vagrants and vagabonds, is further confirmed
with the passing of a number of laws that subsumed lunacy under more
general categories of vagrancy. The Vagrancy Act of 1714 empowered
Justices of the Peace to order the confinement of "persons of little or
no estate who, by lunacy, or otherwise are curiously mad, and dangerous
to be committed to go abroad". 32 The law gave Justices the authority
to order such lunatics to be kept safely locked up, to be chained if
In ordering 24 men of the parish to take care of a distracted man, the
Lancashire Justices took note of the report, in 1641, that, "every of
the neighbours (is) fearfull to come neare into him in his fitts often
befallinge him both night and day in most fearfull terible shrikes and
shoutinge". A few years later in 1668 the Justices heard of the case
of the woman who, having pulled out one of her eyes, "now offers
violence to her owne children". Aside from these tangible dangers
one finds reference to the alarm caused by lunacy, as for example
occurs in the case of a woman who, in 1653, "hath for a long tyme beene
suffered in that distracted condition to wander and begg to the great
terror of the people of this commonwealth". In 1661 a man informed
the Lancashire Justices that his sister had been capable of work
untilshe became afflicted by a "violent lunacy", as the result of which
"she bath continued pulling herself and her apparell in pieces to the
great danger not only of spoyling herself by some sudden death but to
the danger of her neighbours". Finally, in Somerset in 1613 the
Justices sent an insane women to the house of correction after she had
set fire to a house and they ordered that, "she ought to be kept there as
the law requires for such dangerous and disorderly persons". In each
of these cases some form of compulsory confinement was ordered to
contain the dangerous consequences of lunacy and to spare villagers
the terror and apprehension generated by this disorder. From the
petitions to the Justices there is evidence that the presence of a lunatic
in the family imposed considerable financial burdens and, in some
cases, endangered the wellbeing of other members of the family. Thus
when a lunatic who had been forcibly confined at home "broke off his
chains and went to a house and pulled down the slates", it was quite
understandable that more drastic and secure measures should be
requested and granted. Similarly, an unexpected encounter with a
terrifying lunatic was liable to provoke a seemingly savage response,
such as occurred in Lancashire in 1671 when a woman asked that her mad
husband be cared for since he had fallen into an "extreame lunacy" and
wandered off only to be "grievously beaten and wounded and turnd home,
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necessary, and, where they did not belong to the parish in which they
were apprehended, to be sent to their last place of settlement. The
Justices had of course been able to do this before but the significance of
this Act is that it is the first to deal with problems posed by extreme
or 'furious' forms of madness as distinct from other forms of trans-
gression and to make special provision for those of the insane who
directly threatened the social order. Those detained under this act,
and the subsequent Act of 1744, were—as the Select Committee found—
sent to workhouses, houses of correction or gaols.
The absence of a distinction in law until 1714 between genuine lunatics
and those vagrants who passed themselves off as "mad Toms" accounts
in large part for the fact that well into the eighteenth century the situation
of lunatics was, as Sir George Paul observes, "no otherwise treated
than together with rogues and vagabonds". 33 When one looks closely
at the vagrancy statutes it becomes apparent that successive pieces
of legislation served to broaden the category of those coming within the
provision of the law and, more significantly, that this extension is
accompanied by an increase in the punitive powers of the Justices and
a growing emphasis upon the criminal aspect of vagrancy and idleness.
Given the breadth of the terms used in the relevant Statutes—particularly
those of 1571, 1597, and 1601—it is not surprising to find lunatics
apprehended and confined as part of a wider effort to control the movement
of vagrants. Even with the passing of the 1714 Act, this association
between vagrancy and lunacy persisted, and an important aspect of this
association was the assumed connection between madmen and those who
feign diseases or indulge in activities that were, by the seventeenth
centUry, defined as criminal.
An important component of the legislative measures intended to control
vagrancy and associated disorders was the conviction that the migratory
tendency of the indigent and labouring poor must be curtailed and that
poverty must, as it were, be sealed off within parishes. The Act of 1601
expressly forbids any person to "go wandering abroad and beg in any
place whatsoever, by licence or without, upon pain to be taken and
punished as a rogue" and just over 60 years later, with the passing of
the Law of Settlement (1662)', this restriction upon the population's
mobility was given further weight. 34 As early as the middle of the
fourteenth century one finds an attempt to control the movement of
the population but it was not until the mid-seventeenth century that this
thrust of policy comes to fruition and with the passing of the 1662 Act
the previously implicit association between social stability and a non-
migratory population is finally formalised.
Although the anti-migratory policy underpinning much of the vagrancy
legislation is not specifically designed to cope with the problems posed by
wandering lunatics it is inevitable that those "distracted vagrants" who
had wandered from their own parish should be dealt with under more
general provisions for controlling mobility, to ensure that the precarious
finances of each parish were not placed under even greater strain by
being deployed to support and maintain wandering, lunatic strangers.
Thus one reads in the records of lunatics being "grievously beaten
wounded and turned home", of others who are "wandering about" or of
the distracted girl in Warwickshire who "goes peddling up and down dis-
turbing the peace and is abusive and troublesome". 35 Incidental evidence
concerning the effect of these laws, particularly so far as 'Mad Toms'
are concerned, is provided by John Aubrey, in his Natural History of
Wiltshire, written in the mid-seventeenth century, in which he observes
that "until the breaking out of the civil warres Toms o'Bedlam did
travell about the countrey; since the warres I do not remember to have
seen any of one of them". A marginal note to this observation, written
in another hand, reads "I have seen them in Warwickshire within these
thirty years, 1756. 36
From the earliest legislative attempts to restrict the population's
mobility until well into the eighteenth century it is quite clear that for
purposes of framing social policy the insane are to be regarded as
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"disorderly persons" whose way of life closely resembles that of other
vagrants, beggars, rogues and vagabonds. What is perhaps most
interesting about successive pieces of legislation during this period is
the gradual enunciation of the principle that it is the State's responsibility
to control social processes, such as migration, in such a way as to
ensure the stability of society. In trying to understand the treatment of
the insane in this period, it is necessary therefore to place this question
in the wider context of vagrancy and attempts by the state to deal with
this phenomenon.
At the local level it has been shown that the response to lunacy was
determined, in large part, by the fear aroused by disordered vagrants
and the assumed association between madmen and various forms of
petty crime. So far, therefore, the confinement of the mad has been
explained in terms of the direct threat posed by some lunatics, the more
general fear and hatred of vagrants and, finally, the attempts—on a
broader scale—to restrict social mobility. Such an account is, however,
rather partial since it is restricted to the most apparent and obvious
reasons for confinement and does not make any serious attempt at
analysing the more deeply rooted but rarely articulated processes at
work. Attention has so far been limited to what may be called the
surface phenomena, to the most obvious and easily discernible rationales
of confinement. It could be argued however, that other rationales were
at work, and that there were other underlying considerations that led,
for example, to the establishment of the workhouse and the incarcera-
tion in these institutions of multifarious social transgressors. It is the
contention of this thesis that the explanation of this widespread process
of confinement, in which the insane were included, is to be found in a
broader context; and that the response to the insane is inextricably
bound up with more general notions concerning crime, idleness, the
role of labour and the duty to work. It is with these issues that the
remainder of this chapter will be concerned.
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During the period 1600-1800 both the considerations governing the
confinement of the insane and the institutions in which they were confined
changed significantly. Of course the progress of these developments
is slow and often uneven but looking at the period as a whole it is quite
evident by the middle of the eighteenth century that the predominant rationale
of confinement differed markedly from that prevailing one hundred years
earlier. Similarly the role of the institutions to which the lunatics were
confined changed in important ways. At the most general level the
changes can be expressed in terms of two related hypotheses. First,
that up until the first quarter of the eighteenth century one of the major
reasons for incarceration of lunatics was that they were idle; like
other rogues and vagrants the insane were regarded as an economic
burden upon the community, but one which could be alleviated if they
were apprehended and placed in institutions in which they could be "set
to work". From about 1720 onwards considerations of idleness give
way to a new preoccupation: crime. Throughout much of the eighteenth
century the insane are confined principally because it is assumed they are
liable to commit criminal acts; this is particularly true after the
enactment of the Act of 1714, which made special provision for the con-
finement of "the furiously mad". In place of the seventeenth century
concern with idleness and its economic consequences one finds, in the
eighteenth century, a preoccupation with increasing crime and, related
to this, the assumption that the insane are to be confined so as to prevent
them engaging in criminal activities.
The second hypothesis follows on from this. During the same period
the workhouses to which the insane are sent change from being institutions
in which the poor could be engaged in profitable employment to more
explicitly custodial establishments, the chief function of which is to
discipline and punish the poor rather than to employ them. At the ins-
titutional level therefore the change in the rationale of confinement, the
shift from a concern with idleness to a preoccupation with crime, is
mirrored in the gradual transformation of workhouses into custodial
institutions where discipline—not productive employment—is the desired
goal. In the early proposals for establishing workhouses, however,
the operation of essentially mercantalist principles is quite evident and
it is clear that the principal function of the workhouse is the provision
of productive and a profitable employment for the idle poor.
In his Discourse of the Rise and Power of Parliament (1677) T.
Sheridan proposed that the most effective way of stemming the economic
decline of the country would be to force the "idle and unwilling to the
necessity of working and by giving the poor that want it full employment ". 37
In order to accomplish this Sheridan suggests that "workhouses be erected
in several parts of the kingdom, and all persons forced unto them, who
cannot give a satisfactory account of their way of living". 38 Throughout
the latter half of the seventeenth century one encounters this firm
conviction that idleness is the greatest social evil and that its eradication
must be accorded absolute priority. Underlying Sheridan's proposal
are a series of related assumptions that acquired considerable currency
during the late seventeenth century. First, the belief that the wealth
of the nation will be determined by the amount of labour that can be
called upon. Secondly, that the more populous a country is the more
wealthy it should be, at least in principle. Thirdly, that the economic
cost of idleness is so great that every effort must be made to employ
fully the population and to ensure that all wen—whose "bodies are the
most valuable treasure of the country"—are engaged upon productive
labour. According to Davenant providing employment is the only way to
make "the whole body of the people useful to the public". 39 Finally, it
was assumed that the establishment of a system of workhouses, rather
than the enactment of new laws, was the most effective way of ensuring
that the potential of the nation's labour force was fully realised. In the
words of John Cary, a committed mercantilist, Governor of the South
Sea Company and prime mover behind the Bristol workhouse, "success
may not always accompany private mens' labour, yet the public gets
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thereby". Unless the reader qualifies this optimism With the thought that
not every man is capable of productive labour Cary forthrightly observes
that there is "scarce anyone who is not capable of doing something towards
his own maintenance". What is required therefore is that employment
be provided, that the slothful should, as Cary noted, "come by use to be
in love with labour, so 'twill be strange to see an idle person". 40 This
conviction is reiterated in the work of all the major mercantilist authors,
including Davenant, Sheridan, Petty, Child, Mun, Mandeville, Bellers
and Brewster. All these authors emphasise the necessity of employment,
the moral shortcomings of idleness and the economic viability of self-
supporting workhouses.
Taken as a whole the body of seventeenth and early eighteenth century
treatises on the subject thus reveals the ascendancy of the idea that labour
is the key to national prosperity;41 that the age is one of "idleness and
luxury" and, as Locke noted, that the increasing number of idle poor is
attributable to "nothing else but the relaxation of discipline and the
corruption of madness". 42 It was felt that by disciplining and enforcing
idle and vagrant beggars to work one would exploit a vast reservoir of
untapped wealth. Indeed, Mandeville argued that national prosperity must
be founded upon a "multitude of laborious poor" and that so long as the
poor were allowed to be idle they would, in the words of Davenant,
"eat out the heart" of the kingdom and "like drones live upon the labour
of others". 43 As many historians have observed the condemnation of
idleness and the related exhortation to labour acquires, during the late
seventeenth century, an almost axiomatic status. At the centre of
seventeenth century mercantilist thought is the belief that certain activities
are beneficial to the country while others are detrimental—particular
to its prosperity—and that it is the duty of the state to distinguish between
and separate each type of activity. Thus the proposals for establishing
workhouses should be seen not so much as an attempt to punish and
brutalise the population but rather as part of a more concerted effort to
discourage all activities that brought no profit to the nation. To those,
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such as Cary and Child, in whom mercantilist principles combine
with ideals of social reform, one finds a firm belief that the problems
of poverty and of the mass of the unemployed poor could be and
should be treated directly.
Up until the second quarter of the eighteenth century therefore an
important function of the workhouse was to enrich the nation by exploiting
the labour of the people. On the whole the disciplinary character of
the workhouse receives only incidental attention, although certain re-
formers attached more importance to this than others. Locke, for
example, had forcefully argued in his report on the poor (1697), that
the essential requirements of any policy designed to deal with pauperism
was that it should promote habits of industry and labour. The problem,
as Locke saw it, was to get the poor to work and to ensure that in the
establishments to which they were sent they should be "mended by the
discipline of the place" and only dismissed after "manifest proof of
amendment" had been given. If this policy was followed the upshot
would, Locke hoped, be a situation in which "there would not be many
who have the pretence that they want to work". 44 In general, however,
those workhouses that were set up during the last two decades of the
seventeenth century had, as their principal goal, the creation of
employment and the practical implementation of an axiomatic belief
in the value of labour. According to one advocate of the workhouse
system, "the wealth of the nation will be increased, manufacturies
advanced, and everybody put into a capacity of earning his own bread". 45
This belief, which subsumes individual interest wider the all-embracing
national interest, finds clear expression in a project championed by
John Cary: the Bristol Workhouse.
In Cary's opinion the increase in idleness and debauchery could be
attributed to the "want of workhouses to set them [the poor} to work and
of sufficient authority to compel them to labour". 46 In Bristol, however,
following an act of Parliament of 1695—the so-called Bristol Poor Act—the
local parishes combined to provide for the poor and the Corporation of
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the Poor purchased the premises of the redundant Bristol Mint in 1698. It
was in these premises that the Mint Workhouse, later renamed St. Peter's
Hospital, was established. In his account of the project Cary defined the
undertaking as "being nothing less, than to put to work a great number
of people, many of which had been habited to the lazy trade of beggary".
"In all things", writes Cary, "there was a regard, as much as could be,
to put people on living by their own labour". 47 Recalling Cary's argu-
ment that "scarce anyone is not capable of doing something towards his
maintenance", it is perhaps not surprising to discover that among those
dispatched to the workhouse some were lunatics. Indeed, as early as
1707 the Court Books refer to a lunatic housed in the Mint and from this
date onwards there was always a number of such inmates. By the early
nineteenth century, when the establishment fell awkwardly between two
stools of being a hospital—as its name implied—and a workhouse, its
"proper and legitimate use" was deemed to be that it should be "the
general lunatic asylum of Bristol". However as late as 1820, when 97
of the 446 inmates were classified as insane, one of its governors
thought that the title of 'hospital' was somewhat misleading since the
establishment was principally a workhouse. Rather earlier , in 1768,
two physicians had been "desired to visit (once a week at least) the
frenzied objects and report the state of their health", and in the previous
year a separate ward had been built for the insane. 48 In the present
context what is interesting about the Bristol workhouse is the evidence
that, from the outset, it served as an institution in which insane paupers
could be confined and yet its principal function, as described by Cary,
was that it should provide profitable employment for the poor, in whom
the habits of industry were to be instilled. The project was so successful
that by 1700 Cary could write,"the face of Our city is so changed already"
and, as the records show, the insane were among those who had been
removed from the streets. 49 As will be shown later their presence in
such establishments caused a number of difficulties but for the moment
it is important to emphasise that during the second half of the seventeenth
century the insane were incarcerated along with others who led idle,
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wandering lives and who subsisted on what Cary called the "lazy trade
of beggary".
Apprehended by reason of their idle and wandering lives, perhaps
unable to give an account of how they lawfully get their living, and
almost certainly unable to prove that they have been engaged in "some
honest labour and so continuing three days" the insane would have been
despatched to workhouses for the express purpose of being set to
labour and work. In many cases it is perhaps not so much their mental
disability as their idleness that brings them to the attention of Justices
of the Peace and in ordering the confinement of lunatic paupers the
Justices make it clear that it is assumed that they will be set to work.
Of course, in some instances, the Justices recognised that the
individual may be unable to work as for example happened in 1685
when John Norton, a lunatic from Burton on Trent, was confined in
order to be set to work; but, the Justices added, "in case the said John
Norton be incapacitatedto work for his maintainance the overseers of
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the poor are to provide for him". 	 However, such explicit exceptions
are rarely found in the records and it is reasonable to conclude that
the insane were assumed to have at least a minimum capacity for
productive employment.
The hypothesis formulated above proposed that during a period from
about 1650 to 1720 the confinement of the insane could, 	 paxt,
understood in terms of a more general effort to eliminate idleness and
place the poorin productive employment. At the institutional level this
development is reflected in the establishment of workhouses intended
primarily as self-supporting establishments and, indeed, profitable
units of production. Both these arguments have been advanced largely
on the basis of inference, since it is impossible to find cases in which
idleness is explicitly invoked as the major reason for confinement.
Nonetheless the function of workhouses during this early period is
unambiguously formulated by many advocates of the system and, in
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addition, close analysis of the relevant statutes, the most influential
economic treatises, and the history of poor relief does lend credence
to the view that the insane are unlikely to have been exempted from
a policy of social control that had as its chief object the eradication
of idleness and the removal of idle, wandering vagrants. Such cases
that have been cited indicate that the insane were sometimes charged
with vagrancy, with leading idle lives and being unable to satisfactorily
account for themselves or prove that they were gainfully employed.
Moreover, given the absence—in law—of a precise differentiation between
lunacy and vagrancy, given the parallel lack of a distinction on the part
of social reformers between those capable of work and those who, because
of their mental disability, are unable to work and, thirdly, given the
concern of Justices to implement all laws against vagrants, vagabonds
and indolent strangers it seems reasonable to conclude that in the
general effort to provide employment for the poor some of the insane
are very likely to have been included.
By the third quarter of the eighteenth century, however, a change
has taken place both in the rationale of confinement and the function of
the workhouse. By the middle of the eighteenth century one of the most
important reasons for confining pauper lunatics is that they are regarded
as potential criminals and, more importantly, it is believed that in the
attempt to curb a seemingly inexorable increase in crime it is necessary
to confine all who are liable to break the law. This is not to suggest
that the insane are, by this time, deemed	 to be criminals. What
is more likely is that they would not have been excluded from a policy
designed primarily to stem the tide of criminal activity that appeared
to be sweeping the country. Moreover, from 1714 onwards the law
explicitly recognises that among the population of pauper lunatics there
are some who are "dangerous to be permitted to go abroad", and after
the Act of 1744 Justices are empowered to apprehend potentially dangerous
lunatics who are to be "kept safely locked up or chained". In legal
terms the new imperative is custody, not labour, and in the workhouses
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of the period this imperative finds clear expression. By the middle of
the eighteenth century the workhouse had developed into a custodial
establishment in which the mercantilist hope of economic gain had given
way to a new concern with the maintainance of discipline and the preserva-
tion of order. In economic terms the imperative is much the same.
"It is a regulation of the poor that is wanted in England, not a setting them
to work", so argued Defoe in his pamphlet Giving Alms no Charity and 
Employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation [1704]; 51 (Defoe's pamphlet
marks the earliest formulation of a view that gained ascendancy during
the next fifty years). In order to understand this re-focussing of legisla-
tive and economic concern it is important to appreciate the growing
concern with crime. The reason for this is intimately bound up with the
belief, common at the time although now the subject of historical debate,
that a crime wave of epidemic proportions was sweeping the country.
Although the problem of idleness had not disappeared it was now subsumed
under the concern with crime; for idleness quickly became identified as
a principal cause of crime.
In Henry Fielding's Enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of
Robbers (1751) the locus classicus of the view that crime was increasing,
a bleak view of personal safety and security of property is painted. In
this portrait crime is, like an incoming tide, on the very point of sweeping
all before it. "In fact, I make no doubt, that the streets of the town,
[London], and the roads leading to it, will shortly be impassable without
the utmost hazard". 52 Even as things stand in 1751 the "notorious increase
of late years" has exposed the profound vulnerability of both property
and person; and unless this tide is stemmed it would, as Fielding
vigorously argued, endanger the public, undermine the authority of the
law and make a mockery of the principle that the first duty of the state
is to protect the property of its subjects. But Fielding was by no means
alone in his belief that at every point crime threatened. Throughout the
pages of the Gentleman's Magazine, for example, one finds an almost
endless catalogue of abuses, the number of which seems to increase daily.
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By 1731 London, once a remarkably safe place, had become "notorious
for the danger persons are exposed to who walk the streets after 10 at
night". By 1749 robberies had become so frequent "that several parishes
make voluntary subscriptions for maintaining extraordinary guards for
the roads"; by the following year the "little prisons are quite full", and
in 1751 the London streets were "more than usually infested with a desper-
ate bloody gang of villains, and with numbers of artful thieves, sharpers
and gamblers, who are daily practicing new contrivances to take advantage
of the ignorant and unwary". In brief, "the papers are filled with robberies
and breaking of houses, and with recitals of the cruelties done by the
robbers, greater than ever were before known". 53
All of this was happening despite legislative attempts to protect every
conceivable sort of property, including the property of the poor. Despite
the fact that every year saw new additions to the list of capital offences,
notably 1723 the year in which the Black Act was passed, crimes against
property—most of which were punishable by death—continued to increase.
To quote E. P. Thompson. "What was now to be punished was not an
offence between men, but an offence against property". 54 It was property,
more than anything else, which it was the State's task to protect for as
many writers argued, following Locke, the end of government is "that
men might have and secure their properties". If, as Locke argued, men
have an unlimited right to expropriate property and if, moreover, a
man without property may be said to have abdicated "all proprietorship
of his own person" then it is natural to conclude that the state should
.	 55legislate in the interest of the propertied. 	 As E. P. Thompson had
tried to show this is precisely what it did. Legislation confirmed the
supreme status that Locke had granted to property; a status which
crime violates.
If crime was increasing and property everywhere in danger the cause
was comparatively easy to locate. To Fielding, drunkenness, luxury,
debauchery, indolence and cheap gin were all-important causes while to
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others all of these causes could be subsumed under a single heading:
idleness. Thus Sam- Johnston in a sermon preached at Beverley on
October 10th 1725, declared that an indolent man must "by an almost
unavoidable necessity, either starve or subsist by villainy". Further-
more, "the crimes, which are the consequence of sloth, are of such
kind as to injure the public" and should, on that account, be harshly
punished and the law thereby rendered "what it is designed to be, a
terror to evil doers". Unless the judiciary adopted a policy of exemplary
punishment the tendency of the slothful to lapse into "a wicked course
for the supply of their wants" would, Johnston believed, never be
checked. 56 That idleness made an imperative of crime was recognised
by many, including Lawrence Braddon whose proposals for a Bill of
Employment (1717) were tinged with sympathy for the unemployed. "It
is both our duty and interest that no poor Briton should be forced to beg
or steal, or take any other vile course for bread". 57 Nonetheless it
was widely felt that the poor contrived to 'take a vile course' whether to
supply the minimum wants of subsistence or to fleece the rich. Of
course this was not an entirely unprecedented development. As early
as 1620 in England's Treasure by Foreign Trade Thomas Mun had noted
that, "great multitudes of our people (through lewd idleness) cheat, rob,
roar, hang, beg, cant, pine and perish", while in 1695 Josiah Child
simply chose to be more precise than Mun. Those who incur idle habits
in their youth are, Child believed, "rendered for ever after indisposed
to labour, and serve only to stock the kingdom with thieves and beggars". 58
Although seventeenth century observers such as Child and Mun
associated idleness with crime—particularly theft—their chief concern was
to compute the economic cost of sloth and tap the economic potential of
the unemployed in the service of increasing national prosperity. Their
successors, by contrast, combined a growing scepticism of mercantilist
doctrine with a strengthening conviction that idleness merited punishment,
rather than the remedy of labour. Moreover, since their establishment
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in the late seventeenth century workhouses had not proved to be viable
economic enterprises and this failure lent further support to the view
that discipline was more important than the pursuit of an elusive profit.
As a result workhouses had become, by the 1720s, an integral part of
the general scheme to discipline the poor and to pre-empt their criminal
activities. As envisaged by the anonymous author of An Account of
Several Workhouses (1733), "workhouses seem to be the most likely
means to prevent or remove the mischiefs arising from numbers of
unemployed poor; as also the villanies that are committed by idle,
beggarly vagrants". 59 By providing safe custody for a heterogeneous
group of vagrants, vagabonds, idle, poor and unemployed persons, the
workhouse plays a crucial role in deterring potential criminals and,
more directly, in eliminating petty 'mischiefs' and preventing more
serious 'villainies'.
On the basis of the evidence concerning the incidence of crime and
the attempt to account for this in terms of the growing population of the
unemployed poor it would be plausible to suggest that many of the insane,
by reason of their idleness and poverty, would have been associated
with that class of people most likely to commit criminal acts. Just as
large numbers of the poor were confined in an attempt to forestall
criminal activities so too certain of the insane would have been confined
for exactly the same reason. Underlying much of the chaos and seemingly
wanton brutality of eighteenth century poor law is the frustration, failure
and occasional panic of a generation faced by a problem that seemed
beyond its power to control and one that appears to have got worse as the
population began to expand after 1740, partly as a result of a fall in the
death rate. One attempted solution was to confine, in both workhouses and
houses of correction, all those who seemed to threaten public order and
to remove the troublesome poor from the streets. Thus in Edinburgh in
1774 the contributors to the correction house fund added this qualification
to their donations. "That it should be the last, if the grievance of an
intolerable number of vagrants and common beggars, who daily infest
the streets, was not removed". 60
The pre-emptive nature of the measures used against the poor would
support the view that pauper lunatics were liable to suffer arbitrary
incarceration. Moreover, given the breadth of the categories adopted by
advocates of the system it seems highly unlikely that a significant
proportion of the insane would have avoided confinement. In the Account 
of Several Workhouses (1733) the author proposes that all 'constables'
and other 'officers' should be obliged,
,
"under severe penalties, to search into all publick houses, and
lodging houses, and to compel all vagabonds and vagrants and
other idle persons, who have no visible means of living, and who
do not betake themselves to some lawful employment, and all, and
every person or persons, who shall be found within their respec-
tive parishes begging or seeking relief, and who do not belong
thereto, to go and dwell in the County Workhouse". 61
When one takes into consideration the changing role of the workhouse, the
breadth of the categories used in vagrancy legislation and the problems of
crime and idleness that were—at least by the 1750s—accentuated by an
expansion in the population, it seems reasonable to suggest that the insane
were hardly likely to have been exempted from the process of workhouse
confinement. But there is, aside from this plausible inference, rather
more tangible evidence available. Indeed, the records dating from the
second quarter of the eighteenth century clearly reveal a new process at
work. The insane are confined because they are found comitting criminal
acts. As the law of 1714 points out certain lunatics constitute a danger
to the public and as the evidence shows this danger often took the form of
crime.
In January 1765 Edward Little, an insane vagrant who had been found in
a stable in Barnby in the Willows, "therein making a fire to the great
danger of burning the stable and barn adjoining with a large quantity of un-
threshed corn in it" was ordered by the Court at Newark to be confined.
Similarly, at East Retford on October 5 1770, a lunatic by the name of
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John Rogerson who had been "committed to the house of correction for
threatening to set fire to Mr. Sellers's house at Touxford" was re-
committed until such time as a surety for his good behaviour could be
found. Again at Newark on April 19 1732 Elisabeth Willow, "a lunatic
or mad woman", who, "has committed great disorders in the said town
of Cromwell particularly in breaking the windows of the church and chancel
there and that she very much terrified the inhabitants", was ordered to
be confined "in a secure place". On the same day the Newark Court
confined Elizabeth Smith of Normanton on Trent "so that she may not
damage or hurt any persons or their goods". Confinement was not always
the favoured method as is revealed by the case of Richard Wilson who,
in 1773, had been found wandering and begging in Staythorpe, Nottingham-
shire, and was then "ordered to be sent to the borders of Scotland, he
appearing at particular times to be insane". 62
Of course it is rather hazardous to generalise on the basis of such
isolated cases but these later records do reveal a shift in concern and the
recognition that the insane are liable to commit crimes. As pointed out
much earlier in the chapter the insane were, throughout the seventeenth
century, confined because they seemed to endanger or threaten the well-
being of their relatives and neighbours. This preoccupation persists
throughout the eighteenth century but in addition one comes across rather
more detailed accounts of the crimes committed by the insane and a
clearer statement of the view that many are, in the words of the law,
"dangerous to be permitted to go abroad". Moreover, it is significant
that the select committee of 1807 found that many of the insane inmates
of workhouses, poor houses and houses of correction, had been detained
under the Act of 1744 which empowered justices to keep potentially danger-
ous lunatics securely locked up. There is therefore a certain amount of
tangible evidence to support the argument that in many instances in the
eighteenth century lunatics were incarcerated in an attempt to control
crime and maintain public order. This rationale is quite distinct from
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the preoccupation with idleness and the economi benefits of employing
the poor that had prevailed earlier.
There are therefore two issues involved in this discussion. First,
the development which makes of idleness not so much an economic burden
as an obstacle to law and order. It is at the level of public order and
security that the debate about idleness is now pitched, not—as was previously
the case—at the level of economic policy. Secondly, the insane are
increasingly confined in response to recognised acts of violence or arson
and, inasmuch as they are identified with the indolent poor, their incarcera-
tion may be seen as a precautionary or preventive measure. What is at
issue is the possibility that lunatics will commit crimes; a possibility
confirmed both by specific cases and by the more widespread association
of insanity with indolence. As Johnston had argued, "the indolent must
by an almost unavoidable necessity either starve or subsist by villainy". 63
If the insane continued to be removed because they lacked gainful employ-
ment this is due in part to the recognition that such a situation is neces-
arily productive of crime. Given, moreover, the political and legislative
premium accorded to property and its protection it is reasonable to
conclude that measures to preserve the rights of property would be adopted;
principal amongst these measures was a process of fairly indiscriminate
confinement.
At the institutional level this re-focussing of concern and the assumed
connection between idleness and crime had important repercussions. By
the middle of the eighteenth century authors who turn their attention to the
problems of the poor and of increasing unemployment argue that enough
had already been done to provide employment and that what is now required
is a system of enforced discipline that would compell the poor to labour.
Enforced labour was no longer seen as a foundation of national prosperity,
rather it is, as Fielding observed, "a true and proper punishment of
idleness, for the same reason as the excellent Dr. Swift gives why death
is the proper punishment of cowardice". 64 Accompanying this new
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emphasis upon the necessity for discipline and the punitive aspect of
work there is a definite change in the ethos of confinement; a change
which transforms workhouses from the profitable manufactory dreamed
of by Cary into the harsh custodial institutions advocated by Defoe and
Fielding. 'Regulation' rather than 'employment' thus becomes the
corner-stone of social reform. 65
The reason for this development is, in part, attributable to the growing
belief that idleness is deliberately incurred and that the majority of the
indolent poor merely "pretend to want work". Reading eighteenth century
treatises on the subject it becomes clear that idleness is increasingly
regarded as a matter of choice, or, as Johnston remarked in his sermon
in 1725, "many choose rather to be idle, than to labour in vain". 66 Simi-
larly Defoe vigorously argued that the "general taint of sloth upon the poor"
should arouse not sympathy but outrage. "For the reason that so many pre-
tend to want work is, that they can live so well with the pretence of wanting
it, they would be mad to leave it and work in earnest". 67 Indeed, it is
generally argued by the 1750s that there are very few who are genuinely
unable to work. "The number of such cases would", Fielding believed,
"on a just inspection be found so trifling that two of the hospitals in London
might contain them. "68 Those who do not work, and in this group the
insane should be included, can therefore be held responsible for their
condition. The function of the workhouse in such a situation is consequently
quite clear. It is instituted for the "preservation and removal of great
mischiefs arising from great numbers of the unemployed poor". 69
Reviewing the period as a whole it is apparent therefore that the
considerations governing the confinement of the insane are numerous and
often overlapping. Throughout the period confinement is ordered as a
direct response to the fear and terror generated by the presence of lunatics,
particularly those who are 'furiDusly' mad. In addition to this it is clear
that lunatic siblings imposed a considerable financial burden upon families
and surviving seventeenth century petitions to the Justices make it clear
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that requests that lunatics be locked up are often prompted by financial
considerations and an inability on the part of the family to pay for a full-
time keeper. Close analysis of the relevant statutes further indicates
that by the middle of the seventeenth century a central thrust of social
policy consisted in the attempt to maintain a geographically stable popula-
tion and to prevent unlicenced movement of the indolent poor from one
parish to the next. Thus great efforts were made to stem the migratory
tendencies of the poor, to seal poverty off within the parish and to maintain
social order by restricting mobility. In the implementation of this anti-
migratory policy it is inevitable that the Justices, who were granted wider
powers of search and apprehension during the early seventeenth century,
should have ordered the confinement of a number of wandering lunatics.
Underlying this process of confinement one discovers, in the late
seventeenth century, a profound concern with idleness and its economic
consequences. Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century it is crime
rather than idleness that threatens the social order and it is towards the
containment of crime that effort is directed.
However, it is important to emphasise that whatever the prevailing
rationale of confinement the insane are, for the most part, treated as
part of a rather heterogeneous population of social transgressors. This
is not to say that the insane were regarded simply as vagrants and that
no distinction was drawn between insanity and other forms of social
disability. The Lancashire records, for example, clearly demonstrate
that such distinctions were made and the range of terms used by peti-
tioners—such as mad, melancholic, lunatic, frantic, raving, furious,
frensic, crazed, hunted, non compos mentis—reveals an awareness of
the many forms that madness takes. But, given the latitude of legal
categories it is inevitable that the insane should be apprehended and con-
fined along with a whole range of social transgressors who led "idle and
disorderly" lives. The situation of the insane was, to reiterate the
observation of Sir George Paul, "no otherwise treated than together with
rogues and vagabonds, and in a way showing that the security of the
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public was more in view than the care and relief of these objects". 70 It
was therefore in an attempt to maintain social order that the insane were
dispatched to workhouses and houses of correction. But their presence
in such establishments causes considerable difficulties and for a number
of other reasons it became increasingly clear that they could not be
classed with other transgressors in this fashion. Having examined the
reasons for confinement of the insane it would now be appropriate to
consider the effects, at the institutional level, of this fairly indiscrimin-
ate confinement. In doing so, it will be possible to show why the insane
were finally separated from other groups of social deviant and placed in
separate institutions where the interests and care and custody were
united: the asylum.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ASYLUM
Before 1750 there were two hospitals in England devoted exclusively
to the care and custody of the insane. By far the oldest, and best known,
was Bethlem in London, founded in 1377; the other was Bethel in
Norwich, opened in 1713. During the latter half of the eighteenth century
Bethlem contained upwards of 200 beds, while the capacity of Bethel
was just over 50. There may also have been an asylum at Box in Wilt-
shire dating from the mid-sixteenth century. In addition to this, Guy's
Hospital had, from 1728, a separate "lunatic house" for 20 incurable lunatics
and during the 1730s the French Protestant Hospital in Landon made similar
provision for 42 such patients.
During the second half of the eighteenth century however the scale of
hospital provision increased considerably with the establishment of
hospitals for lunatics in London) St. Luke's 1751, Manchester 1766,
Newcastle 1767, York 1777, Liverpool 1790, Montrose 1781, The Retreat
(York) 1792 and Leicester 1794. In Ireland two asylums were opened,
the first in Dublin in 1757—St. Patrick's—and the second in Cork in 1789.
In some cases the establishment of these lunatic hospitals was closely
associated with physicians whose work has already been discussed. Thus
William Battie was instrumental in founding St. Luke's; Thomas Arnold,
owner of a large private madhouse in Leicester—Belgrove Asylum—
instigated the Leicester Asylum and became its first physician; John
Ferriar was closely involved with the Manchester Asylum and his observa-
tions on lunacy, contained in his volume of Medical Histories and Reilec-
tons (1795) are drawn largely from his experience there. It is also possible
to find examples of institutions being founded by putative patients.
Mrs. Mary Chapman, endowed and maintained Bethel hospital both as a
mark of gratitude for her continued sanity and out of compassion for
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wretched pauper lunatics. St. Patrick's in Dublin was endowed by a
man who was, according to Dr. Johnson, always afraid of going mad;
he was the Dean of St. Patrick's—Johnathan Swift. It should also be
noted that the first book in which lunatic hospitals were discussed, John
Aikin's Thoughts on Hospitals, appeared in 1771 and in the account of
the establishment of the Manchester Hospital—which Aikin in 1771 described
as being 'lately published'—there occurs one of the earliest uses of the
word "asylum" for lunatic hospital. 1
It is with the emergence of the lunatic hospital and the establishment
of the asylum that the present chapter will be concerned. More speci-
fically, the chapter will address two central questions. First, why were
lunatic asylums set up in the late eighteenth century and why was an
attempt made, albeit on a fairly modest scale, to provide separate insti-
titutions for the insane? Secondly, how were the insane treated in these
asylums and how do prevailing therapeutic principles relate to the medical
accounts of insanity examined in Chapter 3. ?Having examined the range
of Poor Law Institutions used to confine the insane throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, and having discussed the changing rationales of
confinement, it is time now to look more closely at the institution which
will assume, in the nineteenth century, the central role in the care and
custody of lunatics: the asylum. What is so interesting about the latter
half of the eighteenth century is that it marks the first attempt to formulate
a coherent rationale of confinement which takes account of care, custody
and rehabilitation. Although the number of asylums established during
this period is relatively small, they mark the start of a process of
differentiation and seclusion that will come to fruition in the great nine-
teenth century asylums where the insane are treated as a quite distinct
group, with particular therapeutic and custodial requirements. Moreover,
the treatment accorded to the insane in the asylums established after
1750 marks a significant departure from that which prevailed at the
beginning of the eighteenth century. The principles underlying this
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treatment are informed by a medical interpretation of the disease that
places much greater emphasis upon the ability of each individual to
control or regulate his own conduct and to do so in such a way that the
debilitating consequences of insanity are avoided.
Before considering the reasons for these developments, however, an
important qualification must be entered. It has already been mentioned
that the establishment of the asylums referred to represents a relatively
modest increase in the scale of hospital provision. More importantly,
the evidence suggests that until well into the nineteenth century a large
number of the insane poor were still to be found in the workhouses and
the other forms of confinement already examined. Even with the passing
of the Asylums Act of 1808, which gave counties new powers to build
asylums at the expense of county rates, asylum construction progressed
very slowly and although the establishment of asylums in the late eighteenth
century to some extent set the pattern for the county asylum system of
the nineteenth century it is nonetheless evident that the movement did
gather much momentum before 1808. By 1824 only 9 counties had
established lunatic hospitals, with a further 6 following suit by 1844,
and it was not until 1845, when the problem posed by insane paupers had
exceeded the scope of private efforts, that counties were charged with
the erection of asylums. Financial stringency combined with the some-
what permissive recommendations of the 1808 Act no doubt impeded
progress. However, the repercussions of this have an important bearing
on the present discussion. First, it was precisely the absence of ade-
quate provision that necessitated the continued use of workhouses as
custodial institutions for the pauper insane and, secondly, the slow rate
of progress promoted the expansion of the private madhouse system.
The origin of the private madhouse can be traced back to the seventeenth
century practice of boarding out lunatics with individuals nominated by
Overseers of the Poor, but the system as a whole flourished during the
eighteenth century and first half of the nineteenth century. 2 The private
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madhouse system consisted of a number of privately owned houses used
for the confinement and treatment of the insane. These houses were run
for profit, often by inexperienced and wholly untrained "mad doctors"
whose therapeutic and custodial practices brought the system into consid-
erable disrepute. Legislative attempts—in 1774, 1779 and 1786—to curb
the manifest abuses of the system were somewhat ill-conceived and their
effect was minimal. In the following discussion, however, the private
madhouse system will not be considered in any detail and the focus of the
chapter will be limited therefore to the type of provision made for only a
minority of the insane population: those confined in asylums built during
the second half of the eighteenth century. This apparentlynarrow focus
can be defended on the grounds that the developments examined are of
lasting significance. Moreover, it is important to understand the reasons
for this development in order to complete the picture of how the insane
were treated during this period. The first step in completing the picture
is to consider why the asylums were built, thereby facilitating a separa-
tion—which would eventually become definitive—of insanity from other
forms of social disorder.
Why then, did asylums start to be established after 1750? In account-
ing for this development a number of alternative strategies present them-
selves. First, it could be explained in terms of a reform fostered by
medical advance and by the gradually widening horizons of medical science
in the course of which the somewhat intractable disorder of insanity
became more fully understood. Thus the asylum could be portrayed as a
product of a medical breakthrough and the therapeutic principles upon
which it is organised could be directly tied to a particular medical inter-
pretation of the disease. The difficulties with this strategy are consider-
able. It ignores the social dimensions of the problem posed by madness
and fails to take account of the fact that physicians—such as Battle and
Arnold—in advocating the construction of asylums were endeavouring to
overcome both a medical and a social problem. It is also essential that
the emergence of the asylum should be seen in the context of the develop-
ment of other institutions, such as the workhouse, that had been designed
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to contain the problems of idleness, crime and poverty. In accounting
for the separation of the insane into separate institutions reference
must be made to the particular institutional pressures underlying this
development and the institutional developments that made specific
establishments, notably the workhouse, increasingly unsuitable for the
reception and the custody of lunatics. To identify medical advance as
the motor of change is to ignore other, extra-medical considerations that
played a significant part in the development.
The problems with this particular strategy apply with equal force to
the argument that asylum construction marks the triumph of the medical
profession in its battle to gain an absolute and undisputed right to both
study and treat madness. To portray the establishment of asylums in
terms of the attempt, on the part of the medical profession, to acquire a
monopoly over this disorder is to ignore the fact that physicians had for
a long time taken a keen interest in insanity and as the earlier chapters
have shown medical accounts of this disorder are available throughout
the period being examined. Granted, the number of medical works
detoted to the subject significantly increases during the course of the
eighteenth century but it seems unreasonable to infer from this that
the subject had only recently come within the orbit of medical enquiry
and that physicians, having belatedly asserted their interest in the area,
then embarked on a campaign designed to wrest the subject from any other
professional group. As pointed out in Chapter Three madness is, by
the end of the eighteenth century, firmly installed as a branch of medical
enquiry, but this is not to say that previously physicians had displayed
scant interest in the subject. It was also noted in the Introduction that
the interpretation offered by Andrew Scull, in which particular attention
is devoted to the role of physicians as a professional group and to the
monopolising tendencies of such groups, may well be a valid characterisa-
tion of developments in the nineteenth century. But in the period being
examined in this chapter there is less evidence of this process and a
rather different account of the emergence of the asylum will be developed.
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A third and final alternative—as outlined by Michel Foucault—is to
see in the asylum the visible expression of the ascendancy of reason, of
its final triumph over and subjugation of unreason. In the asylum, so
this argument runs, reason reigns in a pure, unfettered state, and madness,
which had hitherto been part of the landscape, is finally contained, hidden
from view and subjected to the dispassionate rule of reason. The latter
is seen as a force that acts independently, while the asylum—in one sense
at least—seems to fulfill purely intellectual goals. In the elaboration of
this argument recourse is necessarily had to rather rigid categories and
there is a danger of explaining historical developments entirely in terms
of ideas and their evolution.
In accounting for the emergence of the asylum and the treatment of
lunatics as a quite distinct group it would be a mistake to rely too heavily
upon any one of these alternative explanations. Here, an attempt will be
made to account for this development in terms of three groups of factors.
First, the unsuitability of existing poor law institutions as places of
confinement for the pauper insane. In part at least the asylum develops
in response to the problems created when the insane are incarcerated in
workhouses or houses of correction. Secondly, the problems of order
and discipline created by the presence of the insane in workhouses were
aggravated by two factors. One, the seemingly inexorable rise in the
number of lunatics, which will be examined shortly. Two, the continued
increase in the number of vagrants, vagabonds, criminals and other
social transgressors for whom confinement in the workhouse was deemed
necessary. In part this increase can be attributed to the expansion in the
population after 1740, but one should also bear in mind the pre-emptive
nature of many of the measures of social control and the expressed concern
that the streets should be cleared of those liable to commit petty mischiefs
or engage in criminal activities. Removal of theinsane from the workhouse
was seen therefore as one way of easing the problem of overcrowding. The
third group of factors is slightly less tangible. As argued in Chapter Three
the medical interpretation of madness undergoes important changes during
the course of the eighteenth century and a major corollary of these changes
is the belief, widely held by physicians in the latter half of the century, that
madness was a disease that could be cured. As will be shown later in this
chapter some of the 'therapeutic' measures used in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries are compatible with the system of discipline
and punishment adopted in the workhouse. But by the end of this period it
is widely argued that random confinement of lunatics with criminals and
other social deviants is incompatible with treatment designed to rehabilitate
lunatics and restore them to society. Rehabilitation rather than punishment
therefore becomes an important goal of the asylum and this decisively sets
this institution apart from the late eighteenth century workhouse in which
enforced labour was seen as suitable punishment for idleness. In such an
establishment the presence of the insane was almost bound to hinder the
maintenance of peace and order.
In his review of The State of Prisons in England and Wales (1780) John
Howard found "in some few gaols are confined idiots and lunatics. These
serve as sport to idle visitants at Assizes and other times as general
resort. The insane, where they are not kept separate, disturb and terrify
other prisoners". 3 Evidence that the insane terrified and disturbed their
fellow workhouse or correction house inmates is available throughout this
period. It has already been noted in Chapter Four that in 1689 at the
Easter Session of the Derbyshire Quarter Sessions Thomas Whyte, a
lunatic from Great Langton who had been kept in "the common goal of the
county" was removed to the house of correction on the basis of a complaint
lodged by the prison governor to the effect that Whyte "was troublesome to
the prisoners in the goal and that place was very unfit for the custody of
such persons". In the previous year the same court heard a petition
from the governor and the prisoners in which it was alleged that one of the
prisoners, Richard Johnson, "is lunatic and very quarrelsome and that
they were in danger of their lives of him". 4 Rather later, in evidence to
the Select Committee of 1807, Edward Wakefield argued that "in workhouses
the rooms in which the insane are kept are ill-adapted to the confinement
of such persons; lunatics in workhouses are an extreme annoyance to
other inhabitants of these houses". 5 Elsewhere Wakefield drew attention
to "the very great inconvenience" caused by the confinement of the
insane in workhouses and by the time that the Select Committee of 1815
took evidence the position seemed much the same as it had been 150 years
earlier. 6 Thus Henry Alexander informed the 1815 Committee that in
many workhouses the insane "were extremely troublesome, very noisy;
they were kept with the other poor, constantly walking about and
making great noise". 7 The Report, dating as it does from the early nine-
teenth century, nonetheless shed light on a situation that had prevailed for
a considerable period of time. Again the incompleteness of the evidence
frustrates any attempt to produce a detailed account. The picture which
does emerge points to a situation in which the insane seriously disturbed
and disrupted the life of workhouses, correction houses or prisons. Their
behaviour terrified others, they appeared to have been noisy, no doubt
unpredictable and given to outbursts that alarmed and exasperated work-
house superintendants. In short their confinement seemed wholly in-
compatible with the goals of the workhouse and in response many workhouses
made special provision and constructed cells or outhouses in which the
lunatics could be kept and the disturbance they provoked thereby minimised.
In Edinburgh, for example, a committee was appointed in 1675 "to
visit the correction house to try out for some fit room for keeping the dis-
tracted people that are sent to the house of correction". Following the
Committee's Report, the Edinburgh Council, on October 27 1675, "ordains
the Town Treasurer to build some little houses for keeping mad people
on the south side of the correction house". 8 Again evidence of separate
provision within the workhouse is available throughout the period. In an
anonymous Account of Several Workhouses, published in 1733, the author
cites the case of a workhouse in Westminster in which,
"a lunatic that had been discharged out of Bedlam, as an incurable,
had a brick cell built on purpose for him, and such as may hereafter
in the like circumstances need it".9
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Rather later, in 1787, the physician William Perfect recounted the case
of a manaical patient confined in a Frindsbury workhouse whom he was
asked to examine. The maniac, who had committed "many acts of outrage
and violence", was kept in a separate room—occasionally used as a
kitchen—and here he was fastened to the floor by means of a staple and an
iron ring. Through the bars on the windows "continual visitors were
observing, pointing at, ridiculing, and irritating" the maniac. Perfect's
advice was simple. "To have a small hovel built for his solitary
residence, in the most remote part of the premises at a distance from
the workhouse". 10 This separate confinement, combined with the prohibi-
tion of curious spectators and close attention to the maniac's diet, led
to a complete recovery.
Further evidence of separate provision is available in the Select Committee
Reports in the first of which (1807) Sir George Paul noted that when sent to
workhouses the insane "are generally confined in some outhouse or cell,
or other place in which their noise gives least disturbance and trouble
to the keepers of these houses". 11 Such evidence thus indicates that
although the insane were sent to workhouses along with a diverse array
of other social transgressors they were, on many occasions, separated
from other inmates and confined in rooms, cells or outhouses specifically
adapted to ensure their safe custody and to prevent them from under-
mining order. But such a solution to the problem had obvious short-
comings and the records further suggest that separate provision could
not always be made.
Changes in the rationale of confinement and associated shifts of emphasis
in the function of the workhouse have already been examined, but it is
important to note that, so far as the insane are concerned, the upshot of
these changes was to accentuate the problem created by their confinement
in workhouses. When viewed as economically self-supporting and potentially
profitable manufactories, workhouses—as envisaged by Cary or Child—
were unsuitable establishments in which to confine the insane for the simple
reason that lunatics were unlikely to have been capable of sustained and
productive labour. Although Cary optimistically believed that virtually
anyone would be capable of making some contribution to his maintenance
there are isolated instances in the records that suggest that this may
not always have been the case. We have already seen, for example,
that in Derbyshire in 1685 the Justices made special provision for a
lunatic by the name of John Norton whom they had sent to the local house
of correction. It was ordered "that in case the said John Norton bee
incapacitated to work for his maintenance the Overseers of the poore in
Ashborne are to provide for him during such his imprisonment according
to Lawe". 12 In addition to this the evidence concerning the disruptive
effects of confining the insane in workhouses strongly suggests that
workhouse superintendants rarely found them amenable to the discipline
of work and it seems reasonable to suggest that many lunatics, particularly
those afflicted by violent mania, were probably not quick in learning "to
be in love with labour". In the context of a broadly mercantilist view
of the workhouse, the chief function of which is to exploit the labour
of the unemployed poor, the presence of indolent and ungovernable
lunatics therefore constituted something of an anomaly.
As the workhouse assumes an increasingly custodial role, and as
the question of discipline receives more than incidental attention, the
anomalous position of lunatics is likely to have become even more acute.
In the workhouse of the late eighteenth century the presence of noisy,
troublesome, insane inmates, who often wander about terrifying other
inmates, is wholly incompatible with the principle of order and discipline
upon which such establishments are expected to run. Until such time as
the workhouse is purged of this group, it is unlikely that goals of order
and discipline could be realised or, as a contributor to the Liverpool
Advertiser pointed out, "when the poor house shall be relieved of the
insane the respectable magistrates will then find it easier to extirpate
vice, disorder and guilty idleness, from this great family of the lowest
and most ignorant class of society". 13
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In the face of such problems the construction of separate cells or
rooms for lunatics constitutes only a partial solution and to those who
devoted their attention to the question it became increasingly apparent
that the twin goals of maintaining a disciplined workhouse and keeping the
insane in safe custody were completely irreconcilable. What was needed
was not an expansion of the system, which would mitigate the problem of
overcrowding caused by the insane, but rather the establishment of
separate institutions fulfilling quite different objectives. By the middle
of the eighteenth century one finds, for the first time, an explicit
recognition and acknowledgement of the unsuitability of workhouses as
custodial institutions for the insane. Among the reasons given for the
building of St. Luke's Hospital in London it was noted that "the common
parish workhouse is no ways proper for their [lunatics] reception, either
in point of accommodation, attendance, or physical assistance". 14 This
argument underpins all the proposals for the construction of asylums.
One such formulation is provided by Dr. Andrew Duncan, prime mover
of the Edinburgh asylum. In an Address to the Public (1792) on this
matter Duncan, having commended the managers of the local charity
workhouse for their efforts at improving the parlous conditions in which
the insane were confined, proceeds to argue that such efforts will never
eradicate the evils complained of,
"for, in the first place, the objects of the charity workhouse,
and a proper lunatic asylum, being by no means analogous,
the accomplishment of both of them cannot easily, and with equal
advantage to each, be carried forward under the same system of
discipline and administration". 15
What was required, in the opinion of Duncan and many of his contemporaries,
such as Aikin, Arnold, Perfect and Ferriar, was a separate system of
discipline and administration geared specifically to the needs of the insane.
As envisaged by these physicians the objectives of an asylum and a work-
house were mutually exclusive and the methods appropriate to disciplining
lunatics were quite different from those used against the idle or criminal.
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But there was a further reason that made the removal of the insane
from the workhouse more urgent. The continuing increase in their
number was compounding the strain already imposed upon the institution.
Again it is John Howard who draws attention to this problem. In a
footnote to the passage quoted earlier Howard adds that "many of the
Bridewells are crowded and offensive, because the rooms which are
designed for prisoners are occupied by inatics". 16 Unfortunately it is
impossible, as the Select Committee of 1815 discovered, to ascertain
accurate figures for the number of lunatics during the eighteenth century
but in the opinion of many who wrote on the subject the disease was in-
contestably becoming more prevalent and, in consequence, the pressure
on existing Poor Law institutions was becoming much greater. At the
close of the seventeenth century when Thomas Tryon declares the world
to be a "great Bedlam" he is simply satirising the state of man and yet
a few years later when George Cheyne was writing his Essay on Health
and Long Life (1724), the world did indeed seem to be approaching Bedlam.
"Scarce anyone", observes Cheyne, "especially those of the better sort,
but becomes crazy and suffers under some chronical distemper or other,
before they arrive at old age". 17 An assessment concerned by Cheyne's
own poor health. By 1742 in his Treatise on the Natural Method of Curing
the Diseases and Disorders of the Mind Depending on the Body Cheyne in-
forms his reader that he "has lately been told, that a late worthy and
learned physician, that had examined into the numbers confined by lunacy
and madness, upon the strictest examination, found they reached to a
number I dare not name". 18
By the time that William Battie writes his Treatise on Madness (1758)
insanity is accepted as a "very frequent calamity" and in William Perfect's
Annals of Insanity it is reported that "instances of insanity are at this day
more numerous in this kingdom than at any other former period". 19 Others,
such as Faulkner, found the progress of insanity "truly astonishing" and
Thomas Arnold, owner of the third largest private madhouse in England,
observed that "insanity sometimes appears to be epidemic". 20 Whether
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or not the high incidence was peculiar to England was a subject of consid-
erable debate but many believed insanity to be "more common here than in
other countries" and foreigners were often "struck by the frequency of our
recurrence to the idea of lunacy, and by the stress we lay on it as the last
of human calamities". 21 Perhaps, as the London physician John Reid
observed in 1808 "madness, strides like a Colossus in the country", but
there are no reliable figures to substantiate such an alarming conclusion. 22
However, by 1807 when the Select Committee met it was generally
accepted that madness was on the increase.
Contemporary reasons put forward for this increase are of interest and
they have a direct bearing both upon the emergence of the asylum and the
view of insanity prevailing among those foremost in the asylum movement.
To Cheyne the cause was to be found in "gluttony and intemperence in
fermented liquors, and unguardedleachery; ennervating habits which had
been given an enormous boost by the discovery of new worlds and the
excursions of navigators who had, "ransacked all the parts of the globe, to
bring together its whole stock of materials for riot, luxury and to
provoke excess". 23 This assessment effectively set the tone for much
of what followed for in the work of physicians such as Mead, Arnold, and
Cox, the increasing incidence of madness could be attributed, in large
part, to the multiplying opportunities for over indulgence, drunkenness,
debauchery and avarice. Habits which endanger the soundness of a man's
mind. Mead, for example, recounts the story told by Dr. Hale—physician
to Bethlem—to the effect that in 1729, the year of the "iniquitous South
Sea scheme" he had received more patients "whose heads were turned by
the immense riches which fortune had suddenly thrown in their way, than
of those who had been completely ruined by that abominable bubble". And
as Mead concludes, "such is the force of avarice in destroying the rational
faculties". 24 But this specific instance can be generalised and it is to
the great increase in luxury, of every description, that blame is frequently
attributed.
Thus Arnold can find no other way of accounting for melancholia and its
influence, "than by attributing it to the present universal diffusion of wealth
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and luxury to almost every part of the island". What Arnold refers to as
the "pernicious influence of ermervating indulgence" in singled out as the
most important cause of some of the worst types of insanity and this
association between indulgence, particularly in drink, and insanity is
frequently confirmed. 25 Hallaran, for example, the first physician to the
lunatic asylum in Cork, ascribed the increase in insanity almost entirely
to drunkenness and he advocated that the sale of alcohol should be strictly
limited. Similarly Cox, who ran a large private madhouse and had the
distinction of being the first man to study medicine in order to specialise
in mental disorders, identified "early dissipation, unrestrained licentious-
ness, habitual luxury, inordinate taste for speculation, defective systems
of education and laxity of morals", as important causes of lunacy. 26 But
the assessment that captures the late eighteenth century mood most
accurately is provided by John Ferriar, physician to Manchester Infirmary,
lunatic hospital, and recovery house, who observed—in his Medical 
Histories and Reflections  (1795)—that,
"the most general causes of insanity which I have had occasion to
notice are, hard drinking, accompanied with watching; pride;
disappointment; the anguish arising from calumny; sudden terror;
false opinions respecting religion; and anxiety in trade. These
operate chiefly on men". 27
But, it may be asked, what is the relationship between such experiences
and insanity?
To physicians such as Ferriar, Cox, Arnold or Percival—all of whom
were closely involved in the day-to-day business of running an asylum—the
least equivocal signs of madness included an inability to regulate attention,
to shatter an erroneous association of ideas, to sustain a balance between
the passions or to clip the wings of an overbearing imagination; in brief,
madness was most often marked by an individual's difficulty in maintaining
the fine balance between his private and idiosyncratic habits of mind and
his public behaviour. More precisely, where an individual's idiosyncratic
views—for example on religious matters—interfered with his daily life and
shaped his behaviour then madness could not be ruled out. According to
Percival, for instance, madness "has its commencement" once a set of
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false ideas are mistaken for truth and this association,
"gives rise to a train of subordinate wrong associations, producing
incongruity of the behaviour, incapacity for the common duties of
life, or unconscious deviations from morality and religion". 28
In other words, it is not an individual's habits of mind per se that indicate
lunacy but the effect that these have upon his social conduct. What is impor-
tant about the explanations provided for the increase in insanity is the
assumed link between particular social experiences—such as excessive
venery or drunkenness—and those habits of mind which, becoming fixed and
permanent, amount to madness. Take the example of drink or extreme
licentiousness. According to many physicians repeated indulgence in either
of these activities not only causes an ungovernable rush of blood to the head
but it also sets in train a whole series of ideas or emotions which gradually
assume a firm hold over the mind. Venery, in particular, which generates
the "very worst and most formidable kinds of insanity", does so by virtue
of its effect on the brain and, according to Arnold, "its tendency to produce
debility, regret, disappointment, anxiety and remorse". 29 The habit
disturbs the mind, it accentuates particular passions or lends intensity
to certain ideas) and as it becomes more firmly established so it is likely
to lead to madness which consists "in a disturbed state of mind become
habitual and permanent". 30
Many late eighteenth century treatises on insanity exhibit therefore a
keen awareness of the power of habit and the likelihood that certain habits,
if over indulged, will inevitably conclude in madness. Cox, for instance,
believed that "we are such slaves to habit that when it is strengthened by
frequent repetition its domain remains even in the absence of the causes
that originally occasioned it". 31 It is striking how frequently the
explanation for the higher incidence of insanity invokes this idea and seeks
to correlate certain types of disorder with particularly pernicious social
habits. In the work of physicians, such as Cox or Arnold, who placed
great emphasis upon this aspect of the disease the intention is twofold.
First, to demonstrate that certain activities, such as hard drinking,
bring about harmful physiological changes incompatible with peace of
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mind. Secondly, to argue that such indulgence is morally reprehensible.
By the late eighteenth century a striking feature of many medical treatises
is their moralising tone and the implicit assumption that continued
membership of what Cox called the 'generality of mankind' requires ad-
herence to the conventional moral code.
At the superficial level this interpretation of madness is similar to the
account that is given for the increase in the number of vagrants, vagabonds
and criminals. In both cases attention is focussed upon the deleterious
consequence of certain social habits and particular ways of life. Thus
those who are poor have most usually got themselves into this state by "a
loose and disorderly way of living" and their habits of idleness and sloth
are to be viewed as "immoralities as well as publick nuisances". 32
 In
many respects the social habits productive of poverty and vagrancy are
identical with those that lead to madness; intemperance, licentiousness,
venery, drunkenness and a range of 'immoral' acts for which the poor
are assumed to have a peculiar proclivity. But this apparent affinity
belies an essential distinction, and one that is drawn with increasing
frequency as the century progresses. Whereas the idle poor are to be
pubished and subjected to the harsh discipline of the workhouse the insane
are to be weaned off their former bad habits and instructed in the art of
self-discipline. Although madness, poverty and criminality may well be
the upshort of a 'disorderly way of living' many physicians nonetheless
distinguish between those who are to be punished for their irresponsible
behaviour, i. e. criminals and paupers, and those who are to be 'cured'
and rehabilitated, i. e. the mad.
In the work of certain physicians writing during the latter half of the
eighteenth century one finds therefore an acute sensitivity to non-medical
factors in causing madness and a sense of peril in relation to the social world
in which individuals seem beset on all sides by those opportunities for over-
indulgence that so often conclude in distraction. It is almost as if the
progress of society, and the associated increase in luxury and wealth,
carries in its wake a disorder that is 'so subversive to the dignity of the
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human character". 33 Ironically, by the time that madness is firmly installed
as a branch of medical enquiry and its treatment comes within the orbit of
medical practice the disease itself seems almost more attributable to "social"
factors rather than strictly defined medical causes; thus financial embarrass-
ment, the loss of property, religious anxiety, overarching ambition or un-
certainty in business all play an important part. It would be dangerous how-
ever to suggest that during the late eighteenth century madness is accounted
for purely in terms of a variety of social, economic, political or religious
factors. Such an explanation fits somewhat uneasily with the general tenor
of the arguments put forward by, for example, Ferriar, Arnold and Percival.
But it would nonetheless be true to say that in the work of such authors
there is a marked appreciation of the relationship between madness and the
continuing pressures of everyday life; and this appreciation finds tangible
expression in certain asylums in which an attempt is made to eliminate
systematically both the social pressures and those opportunities for indul-
gence to which much of the increase in insanity could be attributed. Although
it would be an exaggeration to say that physicians working in the newly
established asylums correlated madness with a group of factors that today
would be labeled "social and environmental", this should not detract from
the profound awareness shown by many physicians of the relationship
between madness and its social context. Indeed the disease, so Arnold
believed, "takes its peculiar turn from the prevailing notions, and fashion-
able prejudices, of the times and the places, in which it occurs". 34
At one level asylum development can be understood in terms of the
institutional problems created by the confinement of the insane in workhouses;
problems that were compounded by the rising incidence of poverty, crime,
and finally, it appears, insanity itself. It is the explanation of this increase
that gives a further clue to the asylum movement. The corollary of the
view that madness was caused by certain habits of mind, and other
psychological factors that were often aggravated by the pressures of social
life, is the belief that these habits can be broken, the disease cured and
its sufferers restored to society. At the heart of many arguments in
support of the asylum, and the separation of the insane for therapeutic
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purposes, there is an optimistic assumption that insanity is curable.
Much of the late eighteenth century work on the subject contains a strong
vein of therapeutic optimism and a conviction that special provision for
the insane will facilitate recovery and rehabilitation. By isolating the
insane from those social pressures that precipitated breakdown and by
creating an atmosphere in which false associations and detrimental habits
can be broken, it should be possible—in the opinion of Cox, Battle, Arnold,
Ferriar or Percival—to restore an individual's mental wellbeing. In an
asylum purged of any opportunity for intemperance, licentiousness and
alcoholic indulgence the habits of self-control and regulation may be
slowly nurtured and finally mastered. By the late eighteenth century
the prognosis for madness has brightened considerably. In sharp contrast
to the deterministic account provided by physicians such as Willis or
Blackmore the late eighteenth century emphasis upon the voluntaristic
character of lunacy, and the related argument that the disease can be
prevented by the elimination of bad habits, justifies a therapeutic
strategy aimed at cure and rehabilitation.
In the prisons visited by John Howard y no care is taken of them [lunatics],
although it is probable that by proper medicines, and proper regimen, some
of them might be restored to their senses, and to usefulness in life". 35
This is a sentiment with which William Battle would have agreed, for it
was his form belief that,
"madness is, contrary to the opinion of some unthinking persons,
as managable as many other distempers, which are equally dreadful
and obstinate, and yet are not looked upon as incurable; and that
such objects ought by no means to be abandoned, much less shut
up in loathsome prisons as criminals or nuisances to society". 26
Instead of confining lunatics in prisons, where they will be punished rather
than treated, they should—so Battle believed—be placed in purpose-built
asylums such as St. Luke's; and the chief advantage of this system is that
it would reduce the number of "useful members who have been lost to
society" because of the difficulty experienced in obtaining treatment for
their disorder before it became "beyond the reach of physick". 37  This
belief in the possibility of cure and rehabilitation is central to the
emergence of the asylum. In the past, as Dr. Andrew Duncan pointed
out, the relatives of an insane individual frequently thought that they
had done all they could when they had "placed him not in an asylum for
cure, but in a prison house for detention", but by the end of the eighteenth
century the ethic of cure and rehabilitation has superseded detention.
According to Duncan,
"it is now [1792] incontestibly established by experience, that,
in a large proportion of cases, skilful practice, in an appropriate
institution will either totally remove this complaint, or, to a
desirable degree, will soften its violence. Thus restoring to
mental health, to comfort, and to usefulness many valuable
citizens, who would otherwise have been lost to themselves, to
their friends, and to the world ". 38
The goals of the eighteenth century asylum are therefore clear. By separa-
ting the insane from other groups of social deviant and by placing them
in a setting systematically purged of pernicious social influences, the
asylum should remedy bad habits and rehabilitate the patient. But the
key to this process involves a separation, at two levels. First, the
removal of the insane from workhouses. Secondly, their removal—albeit
temporarily—from the world of everyday social encounters.
As madness is seen as a disorder over which individual control can be
exercised, and as the goals of treatment become defined in terms of order,
rationality and self-restraint, so the gulf between the workhouse and the
asylum widens. In the harsh custodial workhouses of the late eighteenth
century externally imposed punishment and discipline are the central
principles. But in the lunatic asylums encouraged by Battie, Ferriax or
Duncan punishment is to be resorted to only occasionally and inmates are
to be schooled in the habit of self-control and restraint. In sharp contrast
to criminals, who should be punished and disciplined, lunatics—although
they may be locked up on the grounds that they may commit criminal
acts—should nonetheless be treated and, ideally, restored to usefulness
in society. By the late eighteenth century therefore lunatics may be
confined in workhouses for much the same reason as the idle, the
poor and the unemployed but it is now argued—particularly by physicians-
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that such indiscriminate confinement and punishment will not solve this
particular social problem. Seclusion becomes a pre-requisite of cure.
Repeated experience had convinced William Battle "that confinement
alone is oftentimes sufficient, but always so necessary that without it
every method hitherto devised for the cure of madness would be ineffec-
39tual".	 This assessment was endorsed by Ferriar who believed that
while lunatics
"remain with their friends, the disease seems to acquire additional
strength, from the concern and exclusive detention of which they
are the objects; among strangers, they find it necessary to exert
their faculties, and the first tendency to regular thinking becomes
the beginning of recovery". 40
Both William Cullen and J. M. Cox likewise advocated seclusion and in the
early nineteenth century William Stark, in presenting his architectural
plans for the Glasgow lunatic asylum, observed "it is certain that the cure
of insanity is no way so difficult, as where the patient is confined in his
own house". In Stark's opinion the great merit of the asylum is that it
sets up a "new order of things for the patient and the usual train of his
ideas and associations is suddenly and violently broken". 41 Indeed,
exceptions to this general proposition are rare and a search through the
literature has yielded only one outright rejection of the need for seclusion. 42
In the emergence of the asylum a number of factors therefore converge.
Most notably, the need to alleviate the problem of overcrowded workhouses,
in which peace and order was shattered by the presence of the insane; and,
changes in the medical interpretation of this disease that promoted a belief
in its curability. The latter development has important implications for
the way in which the insane were treated and it would	 now be appropriate
to take up the second set of questions to which this chapter is addressed.
How were the insane treated in asylums, how did this treatment change,
and how do therapeutic principles relate to particular accounts of the
disorder ?
During the period 1650-1800 the various physical and medical methods
used to treat madness are refined, elaborated and, in one or two cases,
abandoned. At the same time new therapeutic principles and techniques
are formulated and it would be fair to argue that by the end of the eighteenth
century the considerations governing the treatment of the insane are
rather different from those that prevailed 100 years earlier. This is not
to say that forms of treatment change out of all recognition or that a
sea-change occurs in therapeutic practice during this period. On the
contrary, one is again dealing with gradual shifts of emphasis, with
developments that are often contradictory and overlapping, and with
therapeutic innovations that may have been more widely publicized than
rigorously implemented at the day-to-day level of asylum care.
Rather schematically these developments may be expressed as two
related propositions, First, many late seventeenth and early eighteenth
century forms of treatment exhibit a reliance on externally applied
physical restraint,upon medicinal compounds designed to subdue the
patient, and upon other physical remedies—such as blood-letting or cold-
bathing—intended to restore regularity to the circulation of the blood or
the animal spirits and to cool and over-heated brain. In general, it was
believed that the range of measures appropriate to the disease was
limited, that one or two general remedies were the most effective, and,
finally, that certain of the apparently harsh remedies were entirely
justified by the medical explanation of the disorder. Secondly, there
develops during the course of the eighteenth century, and particularly
during the latter half of it , a marked concern with what may be called
the psychological aspects of madness. At the therapeutic level this
interest shows itself in the development of various methods of manage-
ment and the institution of a therapeutic regimen characterised by
'mildness and conciliation' rather than the severe physical remedies
favoured earlier. This is not to say that the 'traditional' methods are
abandoned, but what one does find is a fairly concerted attempt to formulate
reasonable justifications for the continued use of these methods, which are
to be applied with greater discrimination than was previously the case.
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By the end of the eighteenth century therefore the picture that emerges
is one of a slightly uneasy alliance between 'moral' and 'medical' means,
of the continued but rationalised use of established techniques and, not
surprisingly perhaps, of the argument that in the treatment of this dis-
order no one general method, or group of methods, will ensure success.
Before examining these changes two qualifications must be made.
First, the development of milder forms of management, such as those
proposed by Ferriar in the 1780s-1790s, must be seen in the context of
the continued use of rather brutal methods, particularly at Bethlem and
the York asylum. In the second decade of the nineteenth century both
places were found to be riven with abuses and cruelties of every descrip-
tion and yet, at the same time, an energetic reformer such as Sir George
Paul continued to hold the view that a combination of chains and the
judicious excitement of terror in the patient were aptly suited to his
condition; the deleterious consequences of such a view were fully exposed
by the committees of which Sir George Paul was a member. Secondly,
in many of the private madhouses to which the insane were dispatched the
evidence strongly points to a situation of comparable squalor and it is
apparent that forcible, violent restraint remained an integral part of the
therapeutic armoury at this level.
In addition to this it should be borne in mind that throughout the
eighteenth century, and indeed during the first half of the nineteenth century,
one encounters scattered examples of rather more esoteric, primitive
methods of dealing with lunacy. Principal among these was the practice of
plunging lunatics into certain wells which were thought to have particular
curative properties. For instance, approximately 200 lunatics were
plunged into the well at Strath Milan, in Scotland, each year at least as
late as 1723. 43 Similarly, in 1727 it was reported that St. Maine's Well
in Cornwall was regularly used for the same purpose. 44 A rather more
extreme form of this practice is to be found in Scotland in the nineteenth
century where it was widely believed that lunatics could not be made to
sink on account of the fact that the defining characteristic of their disease
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was popularly believed to be a ruptured gall bladder. This belief perhaps
explains an incident that occurred in the Western Isles when a furious
lunatic by the name of 'Wild Murdoch' was repeatedly towed through the
sea to the rocky crags of Melista or Grenian where he was abandoned.
Despite enthusiastic efforts to sink Wild Murdoch, particularly on the
part of his relatives who "tried to press him down in the water" and
forced him to swim with "a stone fastened to him", the wretched man
survived only to slaughter his sister and be removed to an asylum in
the south where he finally died; or as the local legend has it, "he died
in the cell of a gloomy prison, under which the sea wave came and went
for ever". 45
These traditional methods apart, late seventeenth and early eighteenth
century records reveal a variety of therapeutic endeavour in which re-
course was had to blood-letting, vomiting, cold bathing, castration, blood
transfusion, sedative medicines and a range of physical restraints. The
extent to which two of the more dramatic remedies—blood transfusion
and castration—were used is impossible to judge, but the available
evidence would suggest that adoption of both methods was probably
limited. An instance of the former occurred on November 23rd, 1667,
when a lunatic by the name of Arthur Coga received the blood of a sheep
and although the outcome of the experiment is unclear it would appear
that Coga survived and was rather more fortunate than the man who had
died in Paris in the previous year following a similar operation. 46
 So
far as castration is concerned the least equivocal recommendation of
this method is to be found in an innocuous sounding book entitled The
Poor Man's Physician, published at the end of the seventeenth century
by J. Moncrieff who intended that his work should serve as a manual
of domestic medicine. Moncrieff's prescriptions were succinct. "For
madness: geld the patient. For melancholy: rub the body all over with
nettles". 47 Again one has no idea as to how widespread such practices
were but it is worth pointing out in passing that the Edinburgh physician
Al exander Pitcairne noted, in 1718, that "by castration of a patient,
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some have boasted they have restored maniacs to a (shameful) health". 48
Such bizarre practices seem, however, rather marginal to the main
body of therapeutic effort at this time.
Turning to the work of Thomas Willis (1621-1675), one finds one of
the clearest illustrations of the range of measures employed in the late
seventeenth century. As noted in an earlier chapter Willis had accounted
for madness in terms of a disorder in the animal spirits, which in turn
affected the brain ) and his proposals for curing raving madness—as
distinct from melancholy—reveal that custody and physical punishment
were regarded as an indispensable part of general treatment. According
to Willis the l curatory' part of medicine,
"requires threatnings, bonds or strokes, as well as physick.
For the mad man being placed in a house for the business, must
be so handled both by the physician, and also by the servants
that are prudent, that he may be in some manner kept in, either
by warnings, chiding, or punishments inflicted on him, to his
duty, or his behaviour or marmers. "
But such methods are to be used in conjunction with a "course of physick,
which may suppress or cast down elation of the corporeal soul. Wherefore
in this disease, bloodletting, vomits, or very strong purges, and boldly
and rashly given, are most often convenient". Finally, in the more in-
tractable cases, or what Willis refers to as 'inveterate and habitual
madness', it is recommended that the victims,
"being placed in Bedlam, or an hospital for mad people, by the
ordinary discipline of the place, either at length return to them-
selves, or else they are kept from doing hurt, either to themselves,
or to others".49
Willis's suggestion that spontaneous remission may result from strict
confinement and enforced discipline brings to mind Locke's proposal that
the problem posed by idle vagabonds could be best tackled by placing them
in strictly run houses of correction in which they would "be mended by the
discipline of the place". At a time when madness and idleness were often
confused and lunatics confined with idle vagabonds, one finds—in Willis's
work—a system of treating madness that could be applied, with some
modification, to the problems of idleness with which Locke had been so deeply
concerned in the last year of his life. Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest
that the houses of correction championed by Locke would have met many
of the requirements formulated by Willis regarding the treatment of
lunatics and one suspects that Willis would have conceded that the
objectives of this institution and the anonymous 'house' in which lunatics
were to be confined were quite compatible.
The curative effect of harsh discipline, particularly when such
'severe and rigid handling' is combined with 'depleting' medicines, is
quite consistent with Willis's portrayal of raving madness in terms of
the wild agitations of the animal spirits and the associated 'storm of
impetuous thoughts' that absorb the maniac's attention and over which he
seems incapable of exerting any influence. 50 The logic underlying such
measures is simple: to the powerful and uncontrollable forces that
overwhelm the mind of the maniac, and usurp the place of reason, the
physician must oppose a force of at least comparable strength in an
effort to subdue the patient and quell the 'audaciousness and fury' that
most usually accompanies this disorder. To the seemingly ungovern-
able force of madness a physician such as Willis opposes the force of
harsh restraint; the 'severe government and discipline' he advocates
should be equal to—or stronger than—the strength and fury of maniacal
behaviour. Given Willis's strongly deterministic account of madness,
an account formulated in terms of vivid metaphors redolent of ungovern-
able and violent forces, it is hardly surprising that the measures he
proposes should be premised on the need to subdue the patient, to restrict
his movements and to so deplete his constitution that the restless animal
spirits are finally immobilised.
Much the same logic underpins the repeated advocacy, by a number
of physicians, of cold bathing, vomiting, bloodletting or the use of seda-
tive medicines. Thus Sir William Blackmore (1653-1729) recommended
the use of opium in cases of madness, primarily because it "calms and
sooths the disorders and perturbations of the animal spirits; which when
lulled and charmed by this soporiferous drug cease their tumults, and
settle into a state of tranquillity". 51 Recalling Blackmore's dramatic
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descriptions of the animal spirits darting restlessly and chaotically
through the nerves one can see why he readily endorsed the use of a
strong ipacifick medicine' that could 'remove and abate' the worst
symptoms of madness. As with Willis, Blackmore's intention is to bring
madness under control, to contain its severest effects and to prevent
the transition of what he called 'hypochondriack and hysterick' disorders
into 'melancholy, lunacy and phrenzr. The great merit of opium
therefore is that it subdues—or disciplines—the otherwise impetuous
movement of the animal spirits.
Given the close association between the state of the animal spirits
and the condition of the blood any attempt to impose order upon the former
necessarily requires some alteration to the latter. Most usually this
could be achieved by bloodletting and Thomas Sydenhara, for example,
believed that a judicious combination of bleeding, purging and 'strengthen-
ing the blood' was the most effective of means of 'assisting nature' in
its battle against hysteric diseases. 52 Much the same view was held by
Gideon Harvey, Archibald Pitcairne, George Cheyne, Nicolas Robinson
and other physicians writing on insanity between 1650 and 1740. During
this period the only voice raised against the great vogue of violent physical
remedies was that of Thomas Tryon, who was a 'student of physick' and
as such something of an amateur student of insanity. 53 Despite Tryon's
criticisms, and his attempt to divert medical attention to the psychological
aspects of mental disorder, the use of blocdletting, i stupefactive medicines'
and similar measures continued and in the hands of certain physicians
their employment became rather more refined. Robinson, for instance,
who believed that madness really consisted in a disorder of the brain,
proposed that the use of such methods should be "proportioned to the
greatness of the causes' of the disease and he therefore recommended that
in the most chronic or severe cases "the most violent vomits, the
strongest purging medicines, and large bleeding are to be often repeated". 54
In addition such methods should be supplemented by cold bathing and,
more drastically, by plunging the patient "from a considerable height into
the water". 55
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This particular technique underwent something of a revival in the
late seventeenth century and according to one observer it had been "so
much revived" by 1707 that many believed it "would be as much in
vogue among us, as heretofore among the Ancients". 56 One person who
devoted considerable attention to this method was an Aberdeen trained
physician by the name of Patrick Blair who favoured 'a cataractick
way of cold bathing' over the more traditional method of ducking the
patients in the water; the latter procedure often led to drowning and
although Blair's technique avoided this danger it must have been equally
alarming. Blair's description of the procedure, as applied to a violent
raving lunatic, is striking.
"I plunged him ex proviso into a great vessel of cold water and
at the same time throwing with great violence 10 or 12 pails
full of cold water on his head: but that not succeeding, the
next day, having the conveniency of a waterfall, about a mile
off, I caused him to be placed in a cart, and stripped from
his clothes; and, being blindfolded, that the surprise might be
greater, there was let fall on a sudden a great fall or rush of
water, about 200 feet high, under which he was continued so
long as his strength would well permit. This succeeded so well,
that after his return home, he fell into a deep sleep for the
space of 29 hours, and awakened in as quiet and serene a
state of mind as ever, and so continues to this day, it being
now about 12 months since. "57
In explaining the effectiveness of this technique Blair cites the following
factors: the surprise of being blindfolded, the shock of the fall of water,
the pressure of the falling water (which can also be measured), and, on
subsequent duckings, the terror and horror occasioned by the recollection
of the previous experience. Quite simply, Blair believed that the great
virtue of this method lay in the fact that the physician could accurately
determine the amount of water to be dropped—and the appropriate
height of the fall—in accordance with the tenacity of the symptoms. As
with the techniques favoured by Willis or Blackmore, Blair's 'cataractick'
method of cold ducking subdued an otherwise raving lunatic and literally
shocked him into a more sober and manageable state.
The thread linking all these methods is an almost exclusive concern
with the physical aspects of the treatment (and their refinement) combined
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with only a passing interest in the patient's mind or those psychological
aspects of mental disorder to which Tryon had tried to draw attention.
The fundamental premise of all these methods is the belief that "there is
no surer - or more general maxim in physick than that disease are
cured by the contrary or opposite methods to that which produced them". 58
(Cheyne) Against the violent agitations of the animal spirits, or the
disorder of an overheated brain, the physician must set the tranquillising
effect of opiates or the cooling and frightening effects of a cold ducking.
To say that such methods are indicative of a coherent therapeutic
logic would be to put the case too strongly but it is quite possible to see
how the methods favoured during the early eighteenth century are consistent
with the prevailing interpretation of madness. To portray the practice
of Blair, for example, as being simply arbitrary and callous would be to
take a rather short sighted view for such methods are informed by a
particular interpretation of madness which draws attention to its animal-
like qualities, to the capacity of the insane to withstand extremes of heat
or cold and the apparent affinity between the behaviour of the mad and
those loosely described as 'savages'. In many of the early eighteenth
century medical treatises there is an implicit—and sometimes explicit—
belief that madness somehow strips a man of his humanity, that it subverts
those faculties that distinguish man from animals or savages. By the
late eighteenth century such a belief is still encountered—in the work of
Cox for instance—but in a rather muted form, and there is not quite the
same sense of the awesome strength or violence of insanity.
Blackmore's image of madness as "a wild uncultivated region, an
intellectual Africa, that abounds with an endless variety of monsters
and irregular minds" simply gives dramatic expression to a view held
by many physicians in the early eighteenth century, although they may
have expressed it in rather milder terms. 59 Nicolas Robinson, for
instance, believed that when a man acted quite instinctively and indulged
his 'sensual appetites'—as seemed to happen in insanity—this would
inevitably,
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"bear down the understanding)reason, and whatever else is sacred
in the animal economy, and, from the noblest of all creatures,
reduce him upon a level, or rather beneath the condition)of a mere
brute". 6°
Unlike many of his successors Robinson took a grim view of the degree to
which an individual was able to so regulate his passions that he would not
slip from his place in the great chain of creation. Rather more dramatically
a private madhouse keeper by the name of William Salmon observed in his
System Medicinale (1686) that "those that are taken with this disease [insanity]
seem to be as mad as wild beasts, nor do they differ much from them".
Among the chief symptoms of madness Salmon cited "a prodigous Herculean
strength", an ability to "endure also the greatest hunger, cold and stripes
without any sensible harm" and a dangerous unpredictability. "Those that
are mad are as desirous to bite as mad dogs, or ravenous wolves". 61
 In
the slightly more measured tones of Andrew Snape, preacher of the
Spital Sermon in 1717, the insane "now had nothing but their natural shape
to distinguish them from creatures below them". 62
 The reason for this
judgement is that in fits of insanity man's distinctive faculty—reason—is
overthrown and the mad are consequently "bereft of the dearest light,
the light of reason". 63
As we saw in Chapter Three, by the latter half of the eighteenth century
the agreed yardstick by which a man's conduct is to be measured—and his
sanity judged— is provided by 'custom', rather than reason; but in the
early part of the century madness is defined in terms of the overthrow
of reason. This overthrow being accomplished by forces, such as a
disturbance in the animal spirits, the ascendancy of 'phancy' or the
incblgence of sensual appetites, over which an individual can exert
negligible control. 'This process is most aptly expressed in Willis's
description of "reason becoming brutal" and it is the manifestly brutal
or animal-like qualities of madness that justify recourse to 'threatnings,
bonds or strokes' as well as tpacifick' medicines, t sleepyfying things',
bloodletting, cold bathing or vomiting. Looking back on this period
William Ferriar was able to write, in 1795, that "it was formerly supposed
that lunatics could only be worked upon by terror; shackles and whips
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therefore became part of the medical apparatus". 64 The validity of his
verdict is borne out both by the recommendations of physicians and the
conditions described by those who visited Bethlem at this time. During
his visit in 1657 John Evelyn "saw several miserable creatures in
chains" and by the time that Ned Ward visited the hospital in 1703 the
scene was one of,
"such rattling of chains, drumming of doors, ranting, holloaing,
singing, and rattling, that I could think of nothing else but Don
Quevado's vision where the damned broke loose and put hell in
an uproar".65
More than a century later when Edward Wakefield visited the hospital,
in 1814, he found the insane confined in conditions that seemed to have
changed very little during the intervening period. Patients were chained
to the walls of their cells, many were naked or scantily clad and Monro,
the appointed physician, was rarely in attendance. Similar conditions
had been revealed at the York asylum and taken together these two cases
would suggest that the treatment of the insane had scarcely progressed
since the time of Thomas Willis. In certain instances such a conclusion
is obviously justified but it does not represent a valid characterisation
of treatment as a whole during the fifty years or so leading up to the
formation of the second Select Committee in 1815. On the contrary,
changes had taken place and, more significantly, certain physicians
had attempted to push the treatment of insanity in new directions. One
direction consisted in the attempt to provide a reasoned justification for
the continued use of violent remedies and to insure that physical restraint
was more sparingly applied. The other important innovation was the
development of the principle of 'management' and the emergence of the
belief that a system of firm but judicious management was the most
effective way of restoring sanity. Of course, so-called 'moral management'
was by no means universally applied and the evidence suggests that even
where it was used it often formed an uneasy alliance with established
medical means or other forms of physical coercion. The development
is, however, significant and the remainder of the chapter will be devoted
to it.
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Dr. Andrew Duncan's argument that the goals of an asylum and those
of a workhouse are mutually exclusive is premised on the assumption
that insanity is curable and that a system of skilful practice, specifically
adapted to the needs of individual patients, will finally restore the patient
to society. To a physician such as Duncan insanity constitutes a special
type of disorder and one that is not amenable to the methods of control and
discipline employed against those who were idle, unemployed, poor or
criminal. Moreover, the treatment of the insane must be conducted in special
asylums and supervised by skilled physicians with wide experience of the
various forms that madness assumes. Whereas the therapeutic measures
proposed by Willis could be carried out both by a physician and by
"servants that are prudent" the same cannot be said of late eighteenth
century methods of management which accord an absolutely central role
to the physician. In the opinion of Cox, for instance, a physician's
success will be determined by two sets of factors: his 'natural endowments'
and the breadth of his experience. The latter is to be broadened and
deepened by direct contact with the insane, by diligent attention to the
writings of other physicians on the subject and by close observation of
the operatiions of the physician's own mind.
By the end of the eighteenth century the twin principles that had been
invoked as the basis of medical enquiry, namely experience and observation,
are seen as the bedrock of effective medical practice. Of course, this
is not an entirely new development but what distinguishes many late
eighteenth century treatises on insanity from those written 100 years earlier,
is the belief that therapeutic methods must be based not on general
conclusions concerning the nature of the disease but on detailed case his-
tories. In the work of Arnold, Cox, Ferriar, Perfect and Pargeter,
full accounts of individual cases are presented and in 1810 John Haslam's
Illustrations of Madness is the first medical book devoted to a single case
of insanity. In a similar vein Thomas Percival, physician to Manchester
(Royal) Infirmary recommended that in asylums a "regular journal should
be kept of every aspect of the malady which occurs" and this reliance
upon carefully recorded cases is a distinctive feature of the later medical
literature. 66
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It is also interesting to note the autobiographical twist given to certain
discourses on the subject. We saw earlier the use to which authors such as
Mandeville and Cheyne put their own experience of mental breakdown but
by the end of the eighteenth century the autobiographical dimension of
medical enquiry assumes a very specific form. Perhaps the best illustra-
tion of this is provided by Sir Alexander Crichton who observed, in his
Enquiry into the Nature and Origin of Mental Derangement (1798), that his
method of enquiry had consisted of "analysis", specifically self-analysis.
This method, which had originally been proposed by the Scottish philosopher
Thomas Reid in 1764, required that the physician should begin by becoming
familiar with the workings of his own mind and should be capable, as
Crichton noted, "of abstracting his own mind from himself, and placing
it before him, as it were, so as to examine it with the freedom, and with
the impartiality of a natural historian". 67 The basis for therapeutic insight
and innovation is provided by the physician's own experience and this
applies particularly to the management of lunacy. In the opinion of William
Pargeter, a physician who specialised in treating insanity, "the chief
reliance in the cure of insanity must be rather on management than
medicine. The government of maniacs is an art, not to be acquired
without long experience, and frequent and attentive observation". 68
When transposed to the level of treatment this sensitivity to the idio-
syncracies of mental activity, combined with the recognition that
ostensibly similar cases are likely to differ in important respects, has
an important implication. It demonstrates the necessity of adapting
any form of treatment to the special requirements of every individual
and, rather less tangibly, it paves the way for a therapeutic system
in which the relationship between the physician and his patient holds
the key to recovery. Whereas Robinson, Blackmore or Willis concen-
trated their attention on those measures that would bring about a physio-
logical change and remove the symptoms of disease, physicians such
as Cox, Ferriar, Arnold, or Pargeter attend closely to the way in which
the physician should conduct himself in front of his patients and the
degree to which he should exercise authority over them. To those who
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expounded the virtues of a rational system of management in the treatment
of lunacy, rather than the indiscriminate use of bleeding, vomiting or
cold bathing, madness seemed to consist more in the ascendancy of
erroneous 'habits' of thought and action than in the atrophying of those
characteristics that set man apart from animals. Thus it was argued
that the lunatic should not be treated as an animal but as a rational crea-
ture susceptible to the authority and benevolence of the physician.
According to Benjamin Faulkner, who ran a small private madhouse
during the last three decades of the eighteenth century,
"it will not be wondered at that, treated as a rational creature,
with attention and humanity, amused and managed with art, the
patient should regain his rational faculties, recur to his former
habits, and gradually become himself again".69
To some extent Faulkner may have been exaggerating the humanity of his
methods in the hope of attracting more patients but his views are echoed
by those with a less obvious commercial interest.
In describing his methods John Ferriar noted that, "the management
of hope and apprehension in the patient, forms the most useful part of
the discipline. Small favours, the show of confidence, and apparent dis-
tinction, accelerate recovery". In cases where the patient proves
particularly awkward, indifferent to small kindnesses, or furious, Ferriar
either punishes or tries to reason with him. A mischievous and unruly
patient is likely therefore to be "shut in his cell, the ,window darkened
and [allowed] no food but water, gruel and dry bread, till he shows
tokens of repentance; which are never long delayed upon this plan".
Alternatively Ferriar finds it "useful to remonstrate, for lunatics have
frequently a high sense of honour, and are sooner brought to reflection
by the appearance of indignity, than by actual violence against which they
harden themselves". 70
Other authors attached particular importance to the physician's
authority. The tough minded Cox, for instance, recommended that the
physician should "issue his orders and see them obeyed; never threaten,
without executing; should be firm yet tender, and never permit himself
to be alarmed, agitated, or ruffled" •
 71 In much the same spirit the
195
famous Edinburgh practitioner William Cullen remarked that in dealing
with the insane,
"it will generally be sufficient to acquire some awe over them,
that may be employed, and sometimes even be so necessary, to
check the rambling of their imagination, and incoherency of their
judgment".72
Likewise Percival proposed that the tenderness shown to the patient should
be "compatible with steady and effectual government" and rather more
dramatically William Pargeter believed that on first meeting the physician
should immediately fix the patient in his gaze and, by slight changes in
his countenance, impress his authority. 73 Thus it was reported that when
Pargeter first met his patients the usually smiling and friendly physician
"suddenly became a different figure commanding respect even of maniacs.
His piercing eye seem to read their hearts and divine their thoughts as
they formed. In this way he gained control over them which he used as
means of cure". In Pargeter's own account of his method great importance
is attached to gaining an ascendancy over the patients and where necessary
the physician must "employ every moment of his time by mildness and
menaces to gain dominance". 74 Here the physician is portrayed as a
master strategist, capable at one moment of extreme kindness and at
another of anger and stern authority.
The physician's time should not be spent in devising ingenious refine-
ments to the techniques of cold bathing—such as Patrick Blair had done—
rather all his efforts should be concentrated upon the relationship with
his patient, upon improving his understanding of how the patient's mind
works and endeavouring to inculcate 'healthy' habits of thought and action.
Whereas the therapeutic efforts of Blair or Robinson made the study of
the patient's mind superfluous,the methods of management proposed by
Ferriar or Pargeter place an absolute premium upon the physician's
understanding of the psychological changes that occur in madness and
upon his ability to arrest these changes, substituting in their place habits
consistent with sanity. Thus Thomas Percival argued that the physician
should combine his knowledge of the 'animal economy' with an
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"intimate acquaintance of the laws of association, the control of
fancy over judgment, the force of habit, the direction and com-
parative strength of opposite passions, and the reciprocal
dependencies and relations of the moral and intellectual powers
of man". 75
These requirements are entirely compatible with an account of madness
that emphasised not so much its irrational, animal-like qualities but its
close association with the everyday experiences of imagination, attention,
recollection or passion. To define madness in terms of these psychological
processes is to clear the way for a system of treatment designed to restore
order and regularity to the operations of the mind, rather than to the
circulation of the 'fluids', or the movement of the blood and the animal
spirits. Once the cause of insanity is located in "some specific alterations
in the essential operations and movements of the mind" (Harper) and not
some physiological alteration, then it is inevitable that treatment of the
disease should focus upon these disturbed mental activities. 76 More
specifically, the goal of treatment is to shatter those alterations that have
become habitual: for example, extreme fluctuations of the passions,
prolonged despondency, grief or anxiety. And the most direct way of
breaking such habits is by instructing the patient in the art of self-discipline
and restraint. As John Ferriar observed,
"creating the habit of self restraint is the first salutary operation
in the mind of lunatics. For in the cure of diseases of this nature
the patient must minister unto himself". 77
In learning to do this the patient is to be assisted by the physician whose
task is to break any false association of ideas that produces what Percival
aptly described as "incongruity of behaviour and an incapacity for the common
duties of life". 78	In the opinion of John Gregory, who was professor
of the practice of physick in Edinburgh during the 1760s, the skill of the
physician consists of "the art of breaking false associations of ideas, or
inducing counter associations and employing one passion against another". 79
In brief, the mind of the lunatic is to be "irmured by degrees to a new way
of thinking" (Mead), and the physician must discipline his patient to
"break the force and effects of vicious mental habits, which
frequently have very extensive influence in the animal economy,
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producing many of those periodical and irregular effects
commonly imputed to other causes." [Cox]
In pursuing this ambitious therapeutic goal there exists a variety of
suitable methods. Having first established his authority over the patient
the physician may then institute a therapeutic regimen based on physical
labour, selective punishment, use of the cold bath, humiliation of the
patient, musical entertainment, travel or rapid rotation in a chair suspended
a few feet above the ground. The great advantage of labour, for instance,
is that "during their term of employment at moderate labotr [the patients]
never fail to enjoy the happiest oblivion from their real or imaginary
grievances". 81 As many authors observed, continuous labour diverts
the mind from a particular train of thought, and according to Thomas
Beddoes in 1803 it "dissipates sadness and prevents the reveries, pre-
liminary to derangement". 82 Labour gives the patient something else to
think about, it withdraws his attention from a particularly obsessive
train of thought and it is instituted not as a form of punishment—as it was
in the workhouse—but as a rational and humane way of restoring order and
serenity.
On occasions where an individual patient proves intractable and un-
willing to work suitable punishment should be threatened and fear
excited. According to Ferriar the patient should at all times be "sensible
of restraint" while Cox, who took a rather more hawkish line on such
matters, believed that fear was an integral part of treatment and that
those most susceptible to it "and with whom this passion can be medically
employed, most frequently recover". 83 Naturally the degree of coercion
used should be in proportion to the strength of the disease and, ideally,
the patient should be brought to the realisation that it is up to him whether
or not violent physical restraint is resorted to. Where he regulates his
behaviour in an acceptable way such measures will be unnecessary but
on occasions when he is violent, furious or disobedient then punishment
is wholly justified. Restraint, according to William Cullen, is to be
considered a 'remedy' and "fear being a passion that diminishes excitement
may therefore be opposed to the excess of it; and particularly to the
angry and irascible excitement of maniacs". 84
Physical restraint and punishment are employed therefore partly as a
way of controlling the patient—as had always been the case—but, more
significantly, such methods are now seen as an integral part of a more
general attempt to make the patient aware of the degree to which he can
regulate his conduct so as to avoid such measures. At the centre the
therapeutic strategy outlined by Cullen, Cox or Ferriar is the belief that
the patient must not be cowed into docile obedience but he must instead
achieve mastery over his conduct. Physical restraint serves therefore
as a deterrent, it encourages the patient in his efforts at complete self-
discipline. Thus 'cure' is to be achieved by the patient himself, not by
the dextrous use of 'pacifick medicines' and other 'sleepyfying things'.
In the patient's mind outbursts of anger, violence or disobedience should
be indissolubly associated with punishment and the dread of public
degradation. "Lunatics", according to Ferriar, "axe sooner brought to
reflection by the appearance of indignity, than by actual violence, against
which they harden themselves". 85 A few years later Sir Alexander
Crichton in his Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Mental Derangement 
(1798) echoed Ferriar.
"If the terror of public shame and punishment be associated in
the mind with the excess of anger, then one will not arise
without the other, the poison and the antidote will be inseparable". 86
The principle of the association of ideas, which had first been devel-
oped in some detail by Locke, thus has important implications for treat-
ment. Moreover, it justifies the use of remedies that seem, at first
sight, arbitrary in their effects and incompatible with the atmosphere of
'mildness and conciliation' advocated by Ferriar. To take one example.
The success of Cox's swinging chair—in which patients would be bound
and rapidly rotated thereby inducing vomiting, vertigo, and, in some cases,
unconsciousness—could be explained in terms of its "tendency decidedly
to correct erroneous ideas, destroy the links of morbid association,
and break the force and effects of vicious mental habits". 87 Once again
the emphasis is upon breaking those habits that are incompatible with
sound mind and one suspects that on many occasions Cox's swinging
chair was used as a deterrent and that patients who behaved outrageously
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may have been threatened with a few minutes rapid rotation. This is
speculation but it is consistent with Cox's stated belief that the physician's
"grand object is to procure the confidence of the patient or excite fear",
and one can well imagine that the prospect of the swinging chair engendered
alarm. 88 Moreover, recourse to such threats and deceptions is wholly
justified when, as in the case of lunatics, the physician has to deal with
a class of patient noted for its guile and cunning. In many late eighteenth
century treatises on madness one reads not about the bestial and instinc-
tual behaviour of lunatics but about their seemingly boundless capacity
for the "most refined deception". 89 According to Arnold,
ftno person, indeed, can be more cunning, more consistent,
more acute, or more connected, than maniacs, not only
according to my definition, but according to the definitions,
and acknowledgements of others, are not only sometimes, but
often, found to be ". 90
This characterisation of the insane contrasts sharply with early eighteenth
century interpretations that emphasised the irrational and unreasonable
qualities of lunatics, and it is indicative of a major shift in the understanding
of madness. No longer seen as the hapless victims of forces beyond their
control the insane are, by the close of the century, represented as
rational creatures whose incongruous and often morally reprehensible
behaviour has temporarily separated from them from the 'generality of
mankind' in whom the norms of appropriate, conventional behaviour
have been fully internalised. Given this interpretation of madness the
goal of treatment is to rehabilitate the lunatic, to dissolve and totally
eradicate habits incompatible with mental stability and, it might be added,
with social order: for example, venery, licentiousness, drunkenness,
intemperance.
In the ideal asylum the patient should not be brutalised and subjected
to arbitrary physical restraint, instead he is to be resocialised. But the
array of measures available to the physician will be of no avail unless
the atmosphere in which they are employed contributes to this process.
It is for this reason that attempts were made to establish in the asylum
a social ambience that in many ways reflected the social world from
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which the patient had come and to which he would finally be restored.
Indeed in an institution such as The Retreat in York it would appear
that social pressures within the asylum played a key role in treatment
and situations were set up in which patients learned to conduct themselves
with appropriate decorum and restraint. As early as 1751 Richard
Mead had drawn attention to the "power of example whereby we invariably
learn to give ear to reason and govern our passions", and it is evident
that certain forms of treatment played upon an individual's fear of
public embarrassment. 91 By the early nineteenth century this principle
had been developed more fully and the ideal asylum came to be viewed as
one which accurately mirrored the social structure. William Stark,
for example, based his design for the Glasgow Asylum on this principle
and the building was designed in such a way that the social divisions
within society would be accurately reproduced within the asylum. Thus
Stark proposed that patients should be separated on the basis of the severity
of their illness, their social origin and their sex; such an arrangement
was obviously complex but its great virtue, in Stark's opinion, was
that,
"individuals who are inclined to mischief and disorder, will be
controlled by the fear of exclusion, or of temporary exile from
their own proper class, and of being transferred to one in which
they will have many deprivations of comfort to undergo •92
The whole rationale of Stark's ingenious design is consistent with the pre-
vailing therapeutic ethos; namely "that the patient, during good behaviour,
shall be master of his own actions, insofar at least, as the state of his
disease can permit". 93 Where particular patients prove incapable of
regulating their own conduct the layout of the asylum—the distribution
of enclosures, rooms, galleries and so on—enables the superintendant
to keep a watch over a large number of patients at any one time. As a
result "those inclined to disorder, will be aware, that an unseen eye is
constantly following them, and watching their conduct". 94
Although the date of Stark's architectural design falls slightly outside
our period (1810) the plans are nonetheless relevant inasmuch as they
crystallise a number of therapeutic ideas and principles that had been
developing gradually during the preceding 50 years. By the late eighteenth
century the goal of therapy is clearly defined in terms of mastering the
discipline of self-control and of so regulating one's public behaviour that
it seems entirely consistent with the prevailing norms and conventions.
Where physical restraint is used the intention is not to punish the patient
but to create "an uneasy sensation" that will "recall the patient's attention
to a regular train of ideas". [Cox] 95 One useful way of doing this is by
creating a social world in which the patient can learn from the example of
others and so master the art of acceptable social conduct. It is striking
that the metaphor most often used to describe the ideal asylum is that of
the family, the tight-knit social group in which individual socialisation
imperceptibly occurs. Through the resocialisation provided by the asylum
the individual should learn to manage his public demeanour in such a way
that he will never again be vulnerable to the charge of madness.
In the asylum the insane are finally separated from other types of
social deviant and their disorder decisively sets them apart from criminals,
vagrants and vagabonds with whom they had been confined through most of
this period. But in examining this development the argument has been
entirely based upon the relevant medical treatises, workhouse records
and so on. No consideration has been given to the question, how was
insanity experienced at the level of ordinary everyday life and what light
does this experience shed upon the historical study of this disorder ? In
the subsequent and final chapter an attempt will be made to fill this gap
and to show how ordinary people, who had no particular expertise in
dealing with the insane, understood madness and how they reacted to the
intrusion of this disease into their daily lives.
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CHAPTER 6
MADNESS AND THE COMMUNITY:
A CASE STUDY
The medical treatises and other historical records upon which the pre-
ceding chapters have drawn have enabled us to build up quite a detailed
picture of how eighteenth century physicians in England and Scotland charac-
terised madness, how they treated the disorder, the range of institutions
in which the insane were confined and the considerations governing their
confinement at any particular time. What such material does not do (the
Lancashire Quarter Sessions Records notwithstanding), is to give us much
idea of the repercussions of insanity within the family. It does not show
us how members of families coped with an insane relative, how they recog-
nised and described the most salient symptoms of madness and what types
of behaviour they singled out as the least equivocal signs of disorder. For
the most part, the material upon which the historian or sociologist can draw
does not provide answers to such questions and any attempt to answer them
will inevitably be somewhat speculative. There are records, however, that
go some way towards filling the gap and the discussion in this chapter is
based upon them.
The relevant records consist of a series of depositions made by witnesses
in court cases where an individual's sanity came under scrutiny. The cases
examined relate only to Scottish law and all the records dealt with in the follow-
ing discussion are taken from the Sheriff Court records of Glasgow and
Edinburgh; these records are in particularly good condition and although
similar cases were heard at other Sheriff Courts in Scotland,so far it has
proved extremely difficult to trace the evidence. During the period 1735-
1800 a total of 37 inquests were held, in Glasgow and Edinburgh, and the
records of all of these have been looked at. 1
Under Scottish law the nearest relative of an individual who was thought to be
mad, and incapable of managing his own affairs, was entitled to lodge a petition
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requesting that he be appointed as a "Tutor in Law" to his insane relative;
the Tutor would be granted responsibility for administering all the affairs
of his afflicted relative, although he was not entitled to assume ownership—
or proprietorship—of his relative's goods or estate. Once the claimant, or
"urger" as he was sometimes called, had filed his petition—known as a
Brieve of Furiosity—an inquest was held to determine whether or not the
person named in the Brieve was "an idiot or furious", i.e. mad. At the
inquest, witnesses were called and their evidence was considered by a jury
of fifteen. Both the Brieve of Furiosity and the inquest itself had to consider
three questions. First, "Whether the person be in compos mentis, fatuous
or a natural idiot, and that there is ground to fear that he may alienate his
lands or goods"; second, "How long he has been under this capacity" ?
Third, "Who is the parties nearest agnate [i.e. relative] of lawful age and
if he be fit to administer the affairs of another, and able to find caution?"2
In other words, the nearest relative, who must be aged twenty-five or over,
had to be of proven "caution" and capable of taking responsibility for the
affairs of another.
The first of these three questions relates to a principle of proof derived
from Roman law: proof of prodigality. This provided for the appointment
of a 'Tutor' if it could be established that "a man by notorious prodigality
was in danger of wasting his estate". In this respect Scottish law differed
from English law, for under the latter if an individual was found to be non
compos mentis then responsibility for his property passed to the Crown.
As in Scotland a jury would be called to assess the state of mind of the
alleged lunatic and if he was found to be insane he could, by law, be commit-
ted to the care of someone, to whom an allowance would be paid for his
maintenance. But the decisive difference between Scottish and English law
was that the latter did not transfer to the person appointed to look after the
lunatic any responsibility for, or right to, the lunatic's property. As
already noted Scottish law provided for the appointment of a 'Tutor' who
was empowered to administer the affairs, financial and otherwise, of a
lunatic.
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English authors, such as Blackstone, questioned the efficacy of the
Scottish practice arguing that it did not seem "calculated for the genius of
a free nation, who claim and exercise the liberty of using their own property
as they pleased". 3 Nonetheless the principle of prodigality remained an
important feature of the law in Scotland. In at least one of the cases to be
examined in this chapter there are very strong grounds for believing that
this principle of proof may have encouraged certain "sinister practices"
to which Blackstone drew attention. More specifically, the law was open to
abuse by those who wished to obtain custody of an individual's estate, (or to
prevent him from inheriting an estate), and who chose to try and prove that
the person concerned was mad and incapable of managing his affairs. In
certain of the cases examined the evidence would suggest the operation
of these abuses. What makes such cases particularly interesting are the
assumptions made by witnesses, and by the claimant, regarding the type
of evidence that would be most likely to substantiate the charge of lunacy.
It would appear that once the Brieve of Furiosity had been read out in
Court witnesses were called to substantiate the claims made in the Brieve.
On certain occasions members of the jury were also called as witnesses;
throughout the records a witness is referred to as "the deponent". Some-
times the alleged lunatic was present at the inquest and questions were put
to him or her by members of the jury and by the judge. Both the testimony
of witnesses and any remarks made by the defendant were written down by
a clerk, and the length of these recorded depositions varies from a few lines
to as many as ten or twelve folio pages. The number of witnesses called
in these thirty-nine cases varies from two to ten,and the records of the
individual inquests vary greatly; some are very brief and rather perfunc-
tory while others run to thirty or more pages and contain detailed deposi-
tions. To some extent the evidence given by witnesses was governed by
the three questions to which the jury had to attend and there are also
occasions in which the transcripts are couched in a series of fairly standard
legal forms. However, not all of the transcripts examined follow a set
pattern and it would be wrong to give the impression that standard legal
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formulations entirely shape and give substance to the records. On the contrary,
the depositions are often vivid, dramatic and full of anecdotal evidence.
Instances of ostensibly mad behaviour are cited, the antics and temperamental
changes of the alleged lunatic are chronicled in considerable detail and,
taken as a whole, the recorded evidence provides a unique perspective upon
ordinary everyday encounters with madness. These records provide glimpses
into the repercussions of madness at the level of everyday life and reveal how
sometimes apparently insignificant breaches of social decorum, of the web of
implicit rules governing social life, may be later interpreted as signs of
derangement. Without setting undue store by these records it is nonetheless
possible to begin to build up a fuller picture of what ordinary people, such
as the shopkeepers, merchants, servants, watchmakers, goldsmiths, mad-
house keepers, farmers and farm labourers, brewers and many others who
appeared in the Sheriff's Courts, understood by the words madness, insanity
or furiosity. At the outset two rather different cases will be considered,
the first of which concerns an Edinburgh shopkeeper called William Kelty,
who appeared in the Sheriff's Court in Edinburgh on 27th May 1765.
Towards the end of 1764 William Kelty employed a woman by the name
of Mrs. Barbara Forrester to help him in his shop. 71-year-old Mrs.
Forrester, who had known Kelty since his infancy, reported that she had
worked in the shop and assisted Kelty for about six weeks and that during
this period "he himself assisted in doing business in the shop". During this
period Mrs. Forrester found the shopkeeper "very much raised and disordered
in his mind" but she attributed this to Kelty's anxiety regarding a recent
"settlement of his affairs". Although Kelty informed Mrs. Forrester that
he had left all his money to his sister and his brother Alexander—the
claimant in the case—Mrs. Forrester had heard from other sources that
her employer had also left "certain sums of money to other persons". She
concluded that this settlement was causing Kelty considerable anxiety. Apart
from this Mrs. Forrester had also observed the shopkeeper "to be silly",
a judgement formed before she began working in the shop. Others who
visited Kelty in his shop during this period (the last few months of 1764),
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included fellow merchant Patrick Todd who saw Kelty frequently. According
to Todd Kelty	 not do any business" in his shop, he appeared to be "in
low spirits and commonly declined to answer questions" although when he did
so his "answers were proper enough". Todd also reported that a few months
earlier Kelty "had complained of a bodily disorder but did not seem disordered
in his mind". Another visitor to the shop was a customs collector by the
name of John Wild, who had known Kelty for thirty years. Wild remarked
that the shopkeeper "sometimes went through his shop striking his hands
or knocking upon anything that was next to him", but apart from this odd
behaviour he "sometimes spoke very sensibly". Similarly, when the
tobacconist John Stark visited Kelty in the shop in November 1764 he found
him "walking backwards and forwards, pensive.... when he was done with
walking he declined his head, struck upon his breast and said it was now all
over with him". Stark also reported that Kelty "sometimes refused to
take his dinner in due time".
Shortly before Christmas 1764 Kelty was removed from his shop and
taken home. A chairbearer called William Nairn was employed for this
task, by one William Smith, a merchant. Having taken Kelty home Nairn
looked after him for 13 days.
"During that time he was very furious.... he once struck the
deponent and at several other times tried to strike him.... he
talked like a person disordered in his mind and said he would be
damned and that there was no redemption for his soul...he told
the deponent to take care of himself for he was professedly a
devil and that there were a thousand devils raging in the room....
he said he had done as much ills as would damn a thousand. That
he would take no meat because he said he deserved to be dashed
against the wall".
Others who saw Kelty at home found him in much the same state as reported
by Nairn. Thus Barbara Forrester, who stayed with Kelty for three months,
found him "sometimes high and sometimes low" although he "did not speak
anything out of the way". Patrick Todd, who accompanied Alexander Kelty
during a visit to his brother's house, was astonished to see William Kelty
salute them on entering the room; although he answered questions "properly
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enough" he seemed reluctant to talk and "appeared low spirited and dis-
contented". Hugh Rose, another chairbearer who had taken over from
William Nairn in looking after Kelty, reported that the ex-shopkeeper
"often attempted to bite and scratch him" and although "he has been some
better these two months past" (i. e. March-May 1765), Rose "did not
think him sound in his mind". James Stark, who visited Kelty twice at
home, reported that on the first occasion he declared himself to be "the
devil's volunteer" but said that he was "neither sick nor sore", while on
the second visit Kelty refused to answer questions but simply "hummed
and haaed". He had previously told Stark, an old friend, not to come and
see him. The final piece of evidence came from William Chambers, an
Edinburgh surgeon, who was indisposed at the time of the inquest and
had to be visited at home where his evidence was taken down by the Sheriff's
Substitute and two members of the jury. Chambers reported that when he
and a Dr. Austine visited Kelty at his house the latter "did not seem in
the least surprised", he sometimes refused to answer questions, or else
he simply answered "Yes or no and in a manner so low and indistinct that
he could hardly be understood that these answers seem to be sometimes
proper and sometimes not. That he very often sighed and seemed to mutter
to himself". In Chambers's opinion Kelty's state of mind was "not owing
to any bodily distemper".
In examining these cases the intention is not to answer questions con-
cerning the adequacy of the evidence of whether the instances of mad
behaviour really amounted to proof of lunacy. However, in the Kelty case
it is difficult to resist the temptation of trying to account for the shop-
leeper's odd behaviour, his low spirits, obvious guilt and sense of his
own worthlessness. In this case the evidence contains clues that might
explain such unusual behaviour and shed some light on William Kelty's
gradual deterioration. For instance, one learns from David Smith that in
the summer and early September of 1764 he had spent a great deal of time
in Kelty's shop because the shopkeeper was at that time thinking of getting
married and frequently took Smith's advice on the matter. In the end,
Kelty decided against the marriage and, according to Smith,
"the reason of his doing so was that he found he was in low spirits.
He appeared to be uneasy at giving up marriage and said he had done
a piece of injustice in so doing and that he complained of bodily
distress but the deponent was not sensible of any disorder in his mind".
Kelty's decision was taken a month before he was removed from the shop and
it would appear that at about the same time he made the settlement of his
affairs that was, according to Mrs. Forrester, causing him so much anxiety
that he seemed "raised and disordered in his mind". Although Kelty claimed
to have settled all he had on his brother and sister he may have been con-
cealing the fact that he had made some allowance for the woman he was think-
ing of marrying. This is pure speculation but Kelty's low spirits and evident
discontent, which got progressively worse after All Hallow's Day 1764,
may in part be attributable to his last minute change of heart. Likewise,
his low estimation of himself and his repeated declaration that he had be-
haved like the devil and had "done a piece of injustice" make more sense in
the light of this decision. The jury, which consisted of an advocate, two
Edinburgh merchants, a printer and bookseller, a goldsmith and ten Writers
to the Signet, considered the evidence, asked Kelty a number of questions
and concluded that since about the beginning of November 1764 the shop-
keeper "has been of unsound mind and sometimes furious and that he continues
to be of unsound mind and incapable to manage his affairs". Alexander
Kelty, William Kelty's brother, was described by most witnesses as "a very
sensible man" and was appointed Tutor. One member of the jury, James
Reoch, who was one of the Writers to the Signet, dissented from the verdict;
in all the cases examined the Kelty case is the only one in which there is not
a unanimous decision in favour of the claimant.
In this case therefore the picture that emerges is of a man subject to
marked changes in mood—"sometimes high, sometimes low"—able to
conduct his business, at least until a few months before the case, prone per-
haps to slightly unusual behaviour such as not eating regularly, violent on
occasions, sometimes taciturn and unwilling to answer questions but
nonetheless quite capable of holding a rational conversation. While some
witnesses are convinced that the shopkeeper is, by Christmas 1764, no
longer able to manage his own affairs others, such as David Smith, found
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him to be "sensible in his mind", and quite coherent although obviously
disturbed by his decision not to marry. The belief that he is losing his
grip seems to have dawned gradually on the witnesses and there are no
particular occurrences that settle the question for all concerned. Taken
alone, isolated incidences of behaviour such as his pacing up and down in
the shop rubbing his hands, would perhaps not amount to much. Placed
in the context of the reports of others, however, these small details
gradually accumulate and acquire greater significance. In some respects
the Kelty case is typical of at least a handful of those examined, but contrasts
sharply with others in which attention is focussed upon one or two isolated
incidents of manifestly mad behaviour and upon an individual's sudden
loss of self-control. Such a case is that involving John Cochran who
appeared in the Edinburgh Sheriff's Court on 14th July 1789.
One Thursday, towards the end of May 1788, John Cochran's father—
also named John—met with an unspecified but fatal disaster on account of
which he subsequently died on 16th June 1788. This fact is important
because the two key witnesses in the case pay particular attention to the
question of whether or not John Cochran's mental instability first became
apparent before or after his father's death. In this instance the medical
evidence consists of a report prepared by an Edinburgh physician and a
surgeon, but the contents of this report are not recorded. The first subs-
tantial deposition is that of Jean Maude, sister-in-law of the deceased
John Cochran, who had lived with the Cochran family for four years and
reported that ten days before her brother-in-law had his fatal accident
she observed "an alteration in the behaviour and manners"of her nephew
and, more specifically, that his conversation had become indistinct and
incoherent. Shortly before the day of the accident John Cochran had,
during tea, "thrown a dish of tea in the face of his father". Jean Maude
regarded this as a joke and John apologised. Four days later however, on
28th May, he is reported to have "shaken" his father. In Jean Maude's
opinion Cochran had been "disordered in his senses" during the six days
preceding the cup-throwing incident and the four days after it, i. e. from
18-28th May.
The next witness was William Robertson who had worked as a servant
for the elder John Cochran. Robertson had heard reports that the young
Cochran had struck his father towards the end of May, but he also re-
counted a strange incident that had occurred ten days before the reported
"shaking". On about the 18th or 19th of May, when Robertson was out
ploughing, John Cochran came up to him with a gun and said that he was
going to shoot crows. He then asked Robertson "if he knew how to spell
God". Before he could reply Cochran said,
"that the way to do it was OIL. That he repeated this frequently
to the deponent and desired him to remember it. That he told the
deponent he could whistle for God and whistled accordingly".
Apart from this behaviour Cochran's general demeanour suggested to
Robertson that he "was not guided by his reason". Confirmation of this
came a few days later when Cochran told Robertson that he believed
himself to be damned and again whistled for God in the fields. The Monday
after this incident, which had occurred on a Thursday, Cochran was found
in the house of a Mr. Fisher where he was "looking at the pictures".
Upon seeing Robertson enter the house Cochran informed him that the
elder Cochran had killed Miss Fisher, that his father was now dead (in
fact it seems he was in bed following his accident), and that Robertson
has come to kill him. Robertson tried to disabuse him of this notion and
finally prevailed upon Cochran to accompany him to the house of a Mr.
Nicholson, where he was given a small amount of beer. "But before John
the son would take any of it he repeated ten or twelve Psalms entirely
by rote". When they finally returned home Cochran"behaved outrageously",
struck the hapless Robertson and "did run to the window with great
violence in order to get out". The jury, having heard one of their number
affirm that the claimant, Archibald Cochran, was "provident and careful of
his own affairs" unanimously agreed that John Cochran had been in compos 
mentis since 18th May 1788 (i. e. shortly before his father's accident),
and "still continues so".
The contrast between the Kelty and Cochran cases is sharp. Eight witnesses
appeared in the former, the case had to be adjourned for the weekend, at
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least one witness did not think Kelty disordered in his mind, and the verdict
was not unanimous. In the Cochran case the jury reached the unanimous
verdict on the basis of the physician's report and two depositions recounting
events during a ten-day period. In contrast to William Kelly's rather
gradual demise John Cochran, who had no previous history of instability,
seemed suddenly possessed of odd ideas, behaved in an insulting and
violent manner, and appeared to Robertson to be "entirely out of his reason".
Had it been possible to locate the onset of Cochran's disorder at the time
of the death of his father, the implication is that the grief occasioned by
this bereavement could have temporarily deprived him of his reason. As
the evidence shows, however, this was not the case and both Robertson
and Jean Maude make it clear that the date of onset was prior to the fatal
accident. A further point of difference is that, although Kelty believed he
was the devil's volunteer, he behaved oddly but neither outrageously nor
blasphemously, whereas Cochran seemed completely under the influence
of his prevailing delusions and was allegedly quite incapable of controlling
himself. What is quite apparent however is that the outcome of this case
would have prevented John Cochran from inheriting his father's estate.
William Kelty, on the other hand, seemed to some witnesses to be quite
in control of himself, although by Christmas his low spirits were evident
to all. The hint of uncertainty apparent in this case is completely absent
in that of Cochran and there seems to be absolutely no doubt in the minds
of the witnesses, and presumably the jury also, that he had suddenly and
quite inexplicably lost his senses. While there is some hint that Kelty
may eventually regain his former peace of mind, witnesses testifying against
John Cochran appear to hold out no such hope.
Taken as a whole all the cases examined cover to varying degrees much
the same ground as these two rather contrasting cases. There is often
considerable overlap between each of the cases in terms of the symptoms
identified by witnesses, the type of behaviour to which they draw attention
and the criteria implicitly invoked in judging the soundness of a man's mind.
What makes these cases particularly interesting is that they throw into
sharp relief the ordinary, unquestioned, commonsense assumptions which
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enabled individuals to decide whether or not one of their relatives, friends
or neighbours had lost the guidance of his reason. Reading through these
depositions one gets a strong sense that witnesses know what madness is,
and that they rarely find it difficult to decide about an individual's sanity.
But in forming their opinion they repeatedly draw the jury's attention to
specific signs of madness, to those particular breaches of everyday social
decorum that set a man apart from his friends and neighbours. Thus in
most cases there are references to an individual's ability to hold a coherent
conversation, write intelligible letters, control violent behaviour, use his
memory, avoid drinking too much, entertain reasonable ideas regarding his
own importance and maintain a sense of proportion in relation to his
passions, such as grief, or his fantasies, such as his relationship with
God.
As we saw in Chapter Four many petitions to the Justices of the Peace,
requesting that a lunatic be placed in safe custody, sprang from the fear
of lunatics and the conviction that they are unusually violent. Similarly,
in the cases examined here uncontrolled violence is singled out as the
least equivocal sign of lunacy and in certain cases the bulk of the proof
consists in showing that the alleged lunatic was unable to control his
violent behaviour and that his continued liberty constituted a danger to the
public and, in some cases, to himself. Although William Kelty was
accused of violence his behaviour seems quite mild in comparison to others
who appeared in the Sheriff's Courts.
Against Robert Wilson, for instance, it was alleged—on 29th November
1775—that he had been deprived of his reason for twenty years and that
"if he be permitted to go abroad by himself he would knock down the first
person he saw". The witness, a vintner by the name of George Mackie,
added that he had known Wilson "do such things before". The only other
witness in this case was John Orr Baxter, a wig maker, who informed the
Court that he had known Wilson since he was a boy and that on one occasion
when he "went to take the measure of his head in order to make a wig for
him he rose up in a passion and attempted to kick the deponent". This
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incident had occurred at least twelve years earlier but Baxter had seen
Wilson more recently when he "muttered something to himself incoherent
and unintelligible".
Another who behaved violently was Agnes Wright who was confined in a
private madhouse at Libberton, near Edinburgh, and against whom it was
alledged—in August 1795—that she would "throw stones at persons, and
threaten her mother and sister when they came out to see her and shaked
her fist at them". During the six weeks leading up to the inquest Agnes
Wright, who used to "make uncommon noises and sing at night", had
been confined to her room and her movements had been restricted by a
strait waistcoat. Apparently she spent most of her time in bed and on one
occasion, when she was visited by Andrew Wood an Edinburgh surgeon, "she
refused to allow her clothes to be put on and refused to get up".
The difficulty experienced by private madhouse keepers in controlling their
more violent charges is often reported. In January 1763 for instance John Mc-
Viccar told the Edinburgh Sheriff's Court that he was responsible for looking
after John Rutherford, who was confined "in a room belonging to the poor
house appointed for the confinement of mad people", but that when Rutherford
was "seized with fits of violent madness he durst not come near him unless
Robert Lauder keeper of the house had been alongst with him". Lauder,
who looked after 40 lunatics in the Bedlam adjacent to the poor house,
pointed out that he could command all of his charges except Rutherford.
Others accused of violence included Janet Stevenson, also an inmate in the
Edinburgh Bedlam, who was in the habit of hitting her doctor and pulling
his hair, apparently without provocation. She had, however, told one
witness that the doctor "had beat her when he had no occasion", and another
witness had heard her call her doctor a murderer. On other occasions
lunatics constituted a danger to themselves. In 1789, six years before a
Brieve of Furiosity was laid against one John McCormack, he "had cut
his throat with some sharp instrument"; the wound was bandaged but
McCormack persisted in tearing the bandages off.
Outbursts of violence were often oassociated with other signs of madness,
particularly with what we would now refer to as delusion. Although this
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term is not used in any of the depositions it is clear that many witnesses
associated lunacy with a false or deluded imagination and with the ascendancy
of particular ideas that were manifestly absurd. John McCormack, for
instance, believed that he had "a cancer" in his leg and sent for a surgeon
in order to find out "whether it will be better to cut it off above or
below the knee"; on examination the leg was found to be "free of disease".
At least two witnesses reported that Janet Stevenson sometimes refused to
eat her food because she believed it to be poisoned and one of these witnesses,
a servant by the name of Ann Adam, had to taste the food before Stevenson
would touch it. This unfortunate woman also informed Ann Adam that she
believed that there was a plot "to pluck the eyes out of her head", and at
other times she expressed concern that her arm was going to be amputated
by the doctor. Occasionally her delusions took a happier turn and she
would "rave about being in love with one Mr. Muirhead".
This combination of unprovoked violence and raging delusion is well-
illustrated in the case of Charles Simpson (23rd March 1753). Simpson
had a number of distressing habits which included menacing people with
a pair of tongs, throwing his food at those who brought it to him, shouting,
raging and stamping around his room all night "like to break down the
floor", going to bed with his clothes and shoes on, barricading himself
in his room and threatening to throw someone down the stairs when he
refused to speak to him. According to James Walker, a surgeon, Simpson
displayed "an unusual tendency to unprovoked anger, thoughtfulness,
boldness, taciturnity, and fierceness and sometimes to loquacity". In his
more talkative moments, Simpson, who was totally blind, would inform
the assembled company that he was "on his way to London in a coach with
some ladies in it and that he was to get a post of £20, 000 per year"; but
his favourite story seemed to be that he was, "King Fergy, the Great
Ashada and Emperor of Germany, and all the World and said that he never
knew this until he was told by the Witch of Endor". At other times,
Simpson would request that King George, whom he believed to be in his
house, be "entertained with the Queen of Hungary and Duke William".
Simpson must have been an irritating patient for whenever anyone asked
him about his health he would reply by asking, "what business is it of the
enquirer ?".
Sometimes witnesses noted that anger and violence were provoked by
failure to acknowledge the truth of a lunatic's odd or deluded ideas. Thus
James Arbuthnot, who had "turned very furious" in June 1751 when he had
"stripped himself naked and went in below the bed", believed that he was
a peer of England and became "angry if he is not called the Viscount of
Arbuthnot". At other times Arbuthnot's delusions of grandeur must have
been insufficient to keep up his spirits and on at least two occasions he
tried to commit suicide. Believing that people were always intent on killing
him, Arbuthnot once tried to hang himself and later, when a surgeon had
"drawn blood of him", he tore off the bandages. Although he was found
bleeding heavily he asked that he be allowed to "bleed to death for he was
dying easily". Delusions of grandeur were quite often cited by witnesses and
sometimes appear to have combined terrestrial and religious ambition.
Thus Margaret Stewart, who was in the habit of bolting herself in her room,
called herself "Queen of Scotland, England and Ireland and Queen of
Heaven" and she proclaimed herself such by singing and dancing "without
any of her clothes on but her shawl".
When witnesses cited such delusions as evidence of madness they usually
combined this with references to an individual's capacity to judge correctly
and, by implication at least, his ability to distinguish between the real
and the imaginary. This connection between impaired judgement and the
tendency to be beguiled by fantasy is also common in much of the medical
literature of the time and witnesses accounts echo the observations of
physicians in this respect. Ever since the day on which he had stripped
naked and hidden under the bed John Arbuthnot had seemed "quite deprived
of sound judgement" and as further evidence of this it was reported that
while alone he often "talks as if people were in the room with him". A
number of witnesses in the Janet Stevenson case thought her "disordered
in her judgement" and one witness, Jean Campbell, said that Stevenson's
delusions about her food being poisoned persuaded her that her ability to
judge correctly had quite deserted her. Indeed, in most of the cases witnesses
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invoke the notion of impaired, disordered or distempered judgement and
although the meaning of this phrase is never spelt out in any detail the
context in which it is used makes it abundantly clear that the key considera-
tion was whether or not an individual could distinguish between true and
false ideas. Most usually those involved in these cases revealed their in-
ability to judge ideas correctly by entertaining beliefs in witches, by holding
manifestly absurd beliefs about their own status or convictions that their
rooms or houses were haunted by spirits.
A further point of overlap between witnesses' accounts and the observa-
tions of physicians is to be found in the importance attached to memory and
the belief that memory in some senses acts as a check against an otherwise
unruly imagination. Although it would be dangerous to read too much into
the fact that witnesses and trained physicians often say much the same thing
about madness, the similarities between both sets of accounts and the areas
of contact between them is often striking. Of all the cases examined the
one involving Robert Miller in April 1791 provides the best illustration of
the belief that the presence of insanity was sometimes marked by complete
amnesia.
In April 1791 Robert Miller had boarded a ship in Jamaica that was bound
for the Clyde and among his fellow passengers was a Glasgow merchant
called Robert Fleming. The morning after the ship set sail Fleming heard
Miller "walking up and down the cabin calling out in great agitation friends
where am I". During the voyage Miller behaved oddly and although he
generally talked "pretty rationally" on at least one occasion he declared
that "he was going to the wilderness of Sinai, that cold country where he
would know nobody". By the time the ship docked at Largs in early July,
Fleming had decided that Miller was "totally destitute of recollection", and
on several meetings after the voyage Miller appeared not to remember
either his fellow passenger or the voyage itself. When pressed about this
"he answered hesitatingly, I think I have some recollection of it".
Much the same report was given by Miller's negro servant, a man by the
name of Strathhaven. Strathhaven reported that soon after their arrival
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in Scotland Robert Miller had made arrangements for him to be baptised,
"in open church", and given the name of William Miller; but his master
promptly "forgot these circumstances" and continued to call his servant
by his original name. According to Strathhaven ) Miller had lost his memory
about six or seven months before they left Jamaica whereupon "he became
deranged in his mind and he continued in that state ever since". In fact,
since landing in Scotland Strathhaven had slept in the same room as his master
go prevent him from throwing himself over the window". Three of the
other four witnesses in this case confirmed that the ex-merchant from
Jamaica had lost his memory and one of them, fellow merchant Peter
Bold, said that he realised this to be the case "from his repeatedly asking
the same questions and receiving answers to them in the course of a few
minutes." Miller, who had been brought into the court so as to be identified
by Fleming, was unanimously declared to be "unsound in his mind and in-
capable to manage his affairs".
In Chapter Five reference was made to the tendency on the part of some
physicians writing in the late eighteenth century to attribute the increase in
madness to ennervating social habits, such as drunkenness and licentious-
ness, and it was also pointed out that drink was singled out as a particularly
pernicious form of indulgence that often led to insanity. In much the same
way many witnesses in these cases mention an individual's drinking habits
and although they do not directly attribute mental instability to repeated
intoxication the drift of their evidence nonetheless points that way. More
interesting than this, however, is the fact that on certain occasions witnesses
are clearly in some doubt as to whether an individual's odd behaviour
should be attributed to drink or lunacy. Such uncertainty on the part of wit-
nesses is comparatively rare but it does break through on at least one occasion.
This concerns the case of William Little Gilmour who was brought before the
Edinburgh Sheriff's Court on 17th January 1793.
From Gilmour's point of view his case got off to a bad start. The jury
having been sworn Gilmour was brought into court, but before the witnesses
were called he was shown three letters, one of which was dated 17th February
1793. He acknowledged that he had written these letters but refused to tell
the judge "upon what occasions and for what purposes", although he did
claim that the Lieutenant Colonel Little to whom the letters were addressed
was none other than himself. In further exchanges with the judge Gilmour
was equally obtuse and the first witness was called. Roderick McKenzie, a
soldier in the Town Guard in Edinburgh, reported that early one morning
he had taken charge of Gilmour at his home in Mussleburgh, just outside
Edinburgh, and before escorting him to the Court "he gave him half a
glass of wine which is the only liquor that he has drunk this day". Gilmour
had never been out of the soldier's sight and he declared himself "certain
that he has not drunk any other liquor". During the examination of this
witness Gilmour interrupted with a couple of inconsequential but ridiculous
remarks, both of which he declined to explain) and when asked if he knew
the name of the witless sitting near him he replied, "no, unless it is Sir
William Wallace the Great".
Following this, two certificates were produced in which Dr. Alexander
Monro reported Gilmour to be mad. These were later supplemented by a
third certificate signed by Dr. Andrew Duncan, the famous Edinburgh
physician. Unfortunately we know very little about Duncan's involvement
in this case, or what he said in his written report, except that he had
visited Gilmour on two occasions, although he was unable to remember the
date of his visit after which he had issued the certificate. By far the
fullest deposition is that of John Lamont, an Edinburgh surgeon, who had
known Gilmour for ten years. Lamont had also signed a certificate,
produced in court, although he was unable to decide whether "the body of
the certificate was of his own handwriting". Two incidents in which Lamont
was involved are particularly interesting.
On Friday 15th February 1792 Gilmour inherited an estate at Craigmillar
and four days later he was visited by Lamont and Monro, who found him in a
deranged state. Lamont attributed this "to his having drunk a great deal
of liquor on the day he was served heir to the estate and thereafter". Monro
• did not agree but Lamont, who had dined with Gilmour on 15th February,
told the court that by Monday 18th February Gilmour still "appeared much
intoxicated with liquor and was very furious"; so much so that he had ordered
Lamont to leave the room. Confirmation that alcohol was to blame for
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his condition came a few days later when Lamont visited the house of Ann
Ramsay, "a woman of the town", with whom Gilmour had been staying
for some nights in spite of the fact that he was a married man. Lamont
could not persuade Gilmour to leave Ann Ramsay's and a few days later
when he went again to the house) Gilmour was found "to be much intoxicated
with liquor". On this occasion, however, he was persuaded "after much
entreaty" to return to his own house although during the journey he appeared)
"sulky and furious" which Lamont "ascribed to the servant having refused
to give him drink". During his evidence Lamont was pressed about Gilmour's
condition on Monday 18th February and was specifically asked if on that
day Gilmour was "deranged in his mind or whether he [Lamont] does now
ascribe the situation in which he then found him wholly to intoxication?"
In reply Lamont "depones that he cannot make a positive answer to the
question". Another witness did confirm however that on 15th February
Gilmour's conversation was more "inconsistent and incoherent than
usual" and that "a few days later he was very roving".
Other witnesses included a watchmaker, James Howden, from whom
Gilmour had ordered a watch on 2nd February when he seemed "to be as
well as he usually was". But when Gilmour called again on 15th February,
to ask if the watch was ready, his conversation seemed a little unusual
and the watchmaker, who concluded that Gilmour was now "either wrong
or going wrong in his head", decided not to fulfil the order. Finally,
Gilmour's servant reported that fourteen or sixteen days before his
employer inherited the Craigmillar estate he seemed deranged, was restless
at night, called his servant to his room but then had nothing to say to him
and was "subject to fall into fits of passion without any cause". The jury,
having heard the evidence from ten witnesses, and listened to the way that
Gilmour replied to questions in court, unanimously declared that since
15th May 1792 Gilmour had been "of insane mind and furious". Responsibility
for administering his affairs, including the estate that he had inherited on
15th February 1792, was entrusted to the urger in this case, his brother
Walter, a Captain in His Majesty's 27th Regiment of Foot. Walter had
been described during the hearing as being "in entire possession of his
faculties and capable of managing his own affairs and of being entrusted with
the management of the affairs of the others".
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Whether this case illustrates the dangers inherent in Scottish law to which
Blackstone had drawn attention is difficult to say, but certain aspects of
the hearing suggest "sinister practice". Gilmour, who had no history of
mental instability, seemed suddenly afflicted, on the day he became a
wealthier man, with total derangement and an inability to look after himself
of his affairs. At no time during the inquest was he ever accused of
violence, delusion or forgetfulness, although it was alledged that his con-
versation was incoherent, on 15th February and shortly after, and that
before this date he was prone to fits of passion. So far as Lamont was
concerned, intoxication may well have been to blame although the surgeon
retracted somewhat under closer examination. But Lamont did reveal
that Gilmour, a married man, had spent a number of nights in the house
of "a woman of the town", that he was reluctant to leave, that during his
time there he seemed drunk and that when Lamont tried to entice him
out of Ann Ramsay's by inviting him to dinner Gilmour accepted on
condition that a Mr. Briggs and his wife should accompany him; Lamont
thought this odd since he "considered Mr. Briggs in no other light than
a servant". It is unfortunate that Dr. Andrew Duncan's written certificate
is not available but one can reasonably assume that he shared Alexander
Wood's view and did not attribute Gilmour's deranged behaviour to alcohol.
It is impossible to say whether Gilmour was simply enjoying an alcoholic
binge or completely out of his senses between 15th and 18th February,
1792, but it is clear that his behaviour, both then and subsequently, struck
his friends as peculiar and it seemed to violate accepted standards of
social decorum; for instance, that a man does not go out to dinner in the
company of his servant or sleep away from his wife and family.
At a superficial level what is particularly striking about this case is the
attention given to the effects of alcohol and the concern, on the part of the
counsel for the claimant, Walter Gilmour, to establish two things. First,
that William Gilmour was in a deranged state of mind before he inherited
the estate at Craigmillar and, second, that his state of mind and his
behaviour were not owing to alcoholic intoxication. The jury evidently
concluded that drink was not to blame for Gilmour's condition, although
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it is apparent that the effects of intoxication could be confused easily
with 'symptoms' of mental derangement; on this crucial question William
Gilmour's friend, John Lamont, was unable to give a 'positive answer'.
The interest of this case extends beyond this. Reading through the deposi-
tions it becomes apparent that very little of Gilmour's behaviour was viewed
as manifestly mad—his court behaviour notwithstanding—but that much of
it, particularly on and after 15th February, was thought to be socially
unacceptable. Although we are not told if Gilmour had long been in the
habit of staying with Ann Ramsay we do know that his conduct caused such
offence that his friend Lamont threatened to "apply to a magistrate' ? to have him
forcibly removed. In some respects therefore Gilmour's case reminds us
of that involving William Kelty, for in both instances much of the evidence
emphasises their unsociable behaviour, their odd quirks which are later
interpreted as signs of incipient derangement—for example Kelty's
reluctance to eat at regular times, and other ostensibly trivial breaches of
social convention. But more than this, both cases point to an important
assumption underlying both witnesses's depositions and the jury's conclusions.
Namely, that sanity is to some extent to be judged by the degree to which
a man is able to regulate his conduct in a socially acceptable manner.
In certain cases, such as that of Janet Stevenson, John Cochran or Charles
Simpson, the capacity for self-control seems totally absent. All three
individuals are scarcely aware of the oddity of their behaviour and apparently
incapable of ordering their social conduct. Kelty and Gilmour, on the other
hand, are clearly not oblivious of what is going on around them and until
the onset of their alleged loss of judgment they seemed perfectly sound in
mind and able to manage their affairs. But in both cases witnesses recall
how they gradually became aware of behaviour that did not seem totally
outrageous or ludicrous, but simply out of character. For some reason the
way that Kelty managed himself in public, talked to his customers and the
appearance he presented in his shop seemed to change and it appeared that
he gradually lost control over himself, his behaviour and his more gloomy
thoughts. The behaviour of both Kelty and Gilmour appeared, almost
imperceptibly, to be differentiating them from what the physician Cox
was to call "the generality of mankind" and the least equivocal signs of
this process was their gradual loss of self-control. Kelty, for example,
became unable to keep up the appearance of sound mind and to counter
his gathering sense of guilt; he seemed, in brief, to be so overtaken by
low spirits that they created what the physician Percival was to call "an
incongruity in his behaviour". In the words of Hobbes, it may be said
that Kelty—like Gilmour—was the victim of "too much appearing passion".
This assumption that an individual should be able to discipline his action,
sustain the appearance of mental wellbeing and behave in a socially
acceptable manner sheds light on two other cases which are both rather
different from those already discussed.
The first took place in Edinburgh on 28th February, 1791 and concerned
Sir Thomas Moncrieff. Before the case opened a warrant was issued
"to search the repositories of the said Sir Thomas Moncrieff for loaded
pistols", but the report on the search is not available. The most salient
signs of Moncrieff's condition, which had been deteriorating during the
year before the case, were his extreme vanity and equally intense
jealousy. Thus Alexander Monro, who also appeared in the Gilmour
case, reported that during a visit to the Moncrieff household, in the
previous January, he came to the conclusion that it would be dangerous
for Lady Elizabeth Moncrieff to continue living with her husband and,
moreover, it might be unsafe for anyone to talk to Lady Elizabeth while
her husband was present. In explaining this Wood . observed that Sir
Thomas "appeared to possess such a degree of jealousy approaching to
madness as might lead him to commit some act of violence without
just foundation". Even during his visit Wood himself had been accused of
taking "some freedoms"with Lady Elizabeth. Another witness stated that
"the gestures which he [Sir Thomas] made use of" alerted her to the fact
that he might be mad, particularly as he was also in the habit of starting
to speak and then abruptly stopping. The same witless had also been at
a dinner party with Sir Thomas during which he hit the table firmly, ', swore
a great oath' and threatened to kill a servant if he did not regard his
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employer as "the most perfect man". More detailed evidence came from
Sir William Murray, an acquaintance of long standing, who had always been
aware that his friend had "a very uncommon degree of pride and entertained
very exalted notions of his own dignity and importance". These habits
of mind seemed to get progressively worse and Sir Thomas's indecision with
regard to "his views in life" caused him such mental and emotional suffer-
ing—or what Sir William Murray called "agitations of mind"—that he once
confided to his friend that he thought he "would soon either die or go mad".
Throughout the inquest Sir Thomas made a number of unrecorded observa-
tions and these, combined with the witnesses depositions, convinced the
jury that the baronet had been mad for at least a year.
This case strongly brings to mind Thomas Arnold's description of madness
in terms of the ascendance of particular habits of mind, such as pride, that
finally become permanent and impair an individual's ability to lead a normal
life. In Sir Thomas's case neither his pride nor his jealousy were nipped
in the bud and over the years they flourished and increasingly distorted
his view of the world. Although he was aware of this himself there appeared
little that he could do to arrest the onset of madness and by the time that the
case was heard he appeared to have totally lost "his right judgement". The
disabling effects of violent passions, to which many physicians drew attention,
finally overwhelmed him and this gradual diminution of his capacity for self
control is remarked upon by all the witnesses. The point at issue in this
case therefore is not whether Sir Thomas behaved in a bizarre manner but
that he seemed no longer capable of regaining any equilibrium thereby er-
radicating his distressing "agitations of mind".
In the second case attention is focussed on the question, "What should count
as acceptable behaviour ?" This case is particularly interesting because it
involved an open conflict between James Morrison and his brother David,
each of whom accused the other of being mad and had evidence to prove it.
After a series of unexplained adjournments the inquest finally got started on
3rd February, 1752, andthe first witness set the tone for the rest of the
proceedings by claiming that David Morrison, the claimant, was "not provident
in his own affairs". This conclusion was based not on the witness's "own
particular knowledge" but upon reports that he had heard, although he did
add that on one or two occasions he had "seen him [David Morrison] in
low company". Other witnesses reported that the claimant drank a great
deal, that he had once pawned his hat, that he frequently stayed with his
sister in Leith although he had a house of his own in Edinburgh, and that
he was not provident. Evidence of David Morrison's lack of social grace
and discretion came from Dionysius Thomson, a Writer to the Signet in
Leith, who described the claimant's behaviour as "quite wild s
 and reported
that,
"he has seen him press himself into a company and refuse to go when
he was desired though he was told by them that they were upon
business. That he has picked quarrels with them and thrown glasses
with liquor in them. And that at one time saw him take six or
seven shillings out of his pocket and say he would not part so long
as that was to the fore. And he pressed the company to stay.
That the people in the tavern where he had occasion to be complained
of this behaviour on those occasions and desired him to go out of
the house which he refused to do'.
Such anti-social behaviour contrasted sharply with that of James Morrison.
Although one witness described him as "a weak man" the same witness did
point out that he answered questions "pertinently" and that once when he had
written a series of letters on the witness's behalf "they were to the same
purpose desired by the deponent". More tangible support for James
Morrison came from an old acquaintance by the name of John Crawford
who told the court that,
"he has been in company frequently with him That he behaved
discretely. That he has been three hours in company with him at
one time. That he conversed rationally and behaved as others in
the company did and at some of these occasions he took a hearty
glass with him".
hi other words, James Morrison was socially competent, able to hold his
drink, to converse rationally and avoid upsetting the balance of a protracted
social occasion. He was discrete and measured in his conduct, whereas
his brother David was rude, impetuous, sometimes drunk, a social embar-
rassment and a nuisance in the taverns he frequented. He seemed insensitive
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to the feelings of others, his oaf-like behaviour provoked complaints and
it would appear that he, rather than his brother James, should have been
brought before the court. Whether the jury took this view is impossible
to say for the papers relating to the outcome of the case have been lost and
so far have not been traced.
At this point it would be useful to shift the perspective for a moment
and stand back a little from the absorbing detail of each case. In his
Practical Observations of Insanity (1804) J. M. Cox made a couple of
observations that are directly relevant to this discussion. Addressing
the thorny question of what insanity actually is, Cox emphasised the difficulty
of providing a clear answer and of distinguishing precisely the point at
which an individual may be justifiably declared mad.
"As men are endowed with various degrees of intellect and as
almost every individual has his peculiarities, it is often difficult
to determine where these end and insanity begins, and what in
one would be termed aberration of mind, in another might be
called corruscations of genius". 4
Perhaps the witnesses to these cases, as well as the juries, would have
accepted the validity of Cox's remark in principle, but reading their
depositions there is little sign of hesitation or caution and the general
tenor is one of confidence, and a sense of ease in drawing the distinction
between mad and sane peculiarities of mind. The reason for this is not
complacency or conspiracy on the witness's part but rather a fairly
clear sense of how they expect an individual should behave in the company
of others and what type of behaviour would be both out of character and
out of keeping with prevailing conventions. Of course the substance of
such conventions is never made explicit but witnesses are inevitably
judging a man's sanity both in relation to their own conduct and that of
their fellows and, equally important, in relation to the individual's own
past behaviour. Thus John Rutherford was thought to be "unusually sullen",
Charles Simpson developed "an unusual tendency to unprovoked anger and
thoughtfulness", and Joseph Norrie (whose case was heard in May 1764),
was found to be "out of his ordinary temper". Sir Thomas Moncrieff's
jealousy and vanity may have been wholly in character but his social conduct
eventually became totally distorted by these powerful emotions. Uncharac-
teristic behaviour alerts witnesses to the possibility of madness, particularly
when their isolated observations are supplemented by hearesay or "report"
and by other instances of bizarre behaviour. Isolated instances of foolish
conduct and incidental quirks amount to very little, but placed in the wider
context of someone's general demeanour and past behaviour they inevitably
gain in significance. For example, it is reasonable to suppose that the jury
would have found it fairly easy to dismiss John Cochran's cup throwing
episode had they not also been told that he misspelt the word God and whistled
for his Creator in the fields.
Underpinning many of these depositions therefore is an implicit assumption
that sanity consists, at least in part, of an ability to imbue social conduct
with what Adam Smith aptly called "an even tenour or an equal propriety". 5
Without this, without any obvious sense of equilibrium or consistency, an
individual becomes vulnerable to the charge of madness. Janet Stevenson,
for instance, was reported to be "more moved when talking on some
particular subjects than she was at other times and at some of these occasions
she used so much address and artifice in her conduct that the deponent
doubts that she was really as bad as she appeared to be". But on other
occasions we have seen that Janet Stevenson lacked artifice and was unable
to keep her more fanciful ideas in check; similarly) the witness who had
wondered out loud whether or not Stevenson was mad had later heard by
report that such doubt was groundless. There is therefore in these accounts
a clear sense both of the degrees of madness and of the necessity to check
anti-social impulses, such as drinking, abusing or threatening friends, or
simply wishing to keep silent in company. Very often the atrophy of self-
control is marked by totally incoherent speech, by wandering attention and
by complete passivity in the face of a patently absurd association of ideas.
On numerous occasions those charged with madness are assumed to be
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"wrong headed" because they give stupid answers to questions, speak "things
that are inconsistent and without foundation in nature", hum and haa when
spoken too, talk coherently for a while and then run "into a rambling and in-
consistent way" or simply "laugh at those about them".
In characterising someone's behaviour as mad witnesses in these cases
are, on one level at least, simply affirming certain standards of social
decorum. But at the same time they are adopting a point of view that many
physicians had recommended; namely that,
"It should be laid down as an invariable rule that no man be
deemed insane till proved so by his actions: the singularity of
a man's modes and bent of thinking shall not condemn him afor
a maniac, but the acting on them". 6
Cox's golden rule, which is to be found also in the work of physicians such
as Battle and Percival, sheds some light on witnesses' accounts. These
reveal a concern not so much with what a man thought but rather with how
his ideas shaped, and in many cases distorted, his public behaviour. This
distinction between private idiosyncracies and public indiscretions is
absolutely central to much of what witnesses say in court. Coupled with
the assumption that an individual's conduct should be consistent and of an
even tenor is the equally important principle that "that man and that man
alone is properly mad.... who behaves according to erroneous persuasions". 7
This common sense belief, stated here by William Battie, permeates
many witnesses reports.
William Kelty, for example, was not declared mad because he believed
himself to be "the devil's volunteer" but rather because he was unable to
prevent this erroneous association of ideas from distorting his public behaviour
and persuading him that he was too worthless either to be visited or spoken
to. Similarly, James Arbuthnot's vision of himself as a Peer of England would
have been fairly innocuous had it remained a private fantasy and not one that
he tried to realise by insisting on being addressed as Viscount. Sir Thomas
Moncrieff too might never have put his sanity in question had he been able
to temper his jealousy or vanity; it is one thing to be jealous, but quite
another indiscriminately to accuse people of taking "freedoms" with one's
spouse. What witnesses are doing therefore is not necessarily passing
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judgment upon a man's ideas or notions, but upon their public display. To
some extent witnesses are describing as mad public behaviour of which
they do not and cannot approve. Thus Joseph Norrie reportedly conducted
his business affairs in a way that a witness could "not approve of as right"
and he was "sometimes lavish of his money. „ when the deponent thought he
had no occasion". The public behaviour of Kelty, Arbuthnot, Moncrieff,
Norrie and others serves therefore to create, in the minds of both witnes-
ses and jury, what Condillac had succinctly called "a visible difference"
between the lunatic and the rest of mankind.
Locke had drawn a similar distinction between an individual's private
vagaries and social conduct. Like Condillac after him) Locke conceded that
no one is free of those peculiar weaknesses that mark a man as mad once
they are repeatedly exposed in public. To Locke all men are unreasonable
to some extent but perfection of appropriate habits of thought and conduct
keeps this universal taint of madness within limits. Throughout the course
of the eighteenth century this distinction between what we would now call the
private and public self assumes increasing importance in a diverse range
of work. In literature, medicine and philosophy, authors are at pains to
emphasise that sanity has as much to do with mastering one's public
demeanour as with resisting the temptation of pernicious social habits.
What has to be controlled are those fantasies, aspirations or passions that
are incompatible with rational social conduct and, according to Shaftesbury,
"the stricter this discipline is, the more the man is rational in his wits". 8
In very much the same vein Bishop Butler observed, in 1726, "that every
man is to be considered in two capacities, the private and the publick",
and as this distinction gains in currency during the eighteenth century one
finds greater attention being paid to the way in which someone manages
the art of social life and the degree to which he refines his manners in
accordance with prevailing conventions. 9 By the late eighteenth century
even passing a man on the street is governed by convention and according
to Boswell in 1773, "now it is fixed that every man keeps to the right; or,
if one is taking the wall, another yields it, and it is never a dispute". 10
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By the middle of the eighteenth century it is entirely appropriate,
therefore, that the metaphor for social life should be that of the theatre.
According to Fielding "the world has often been compared to the theatre"
but by 1749, the year in which Fielding wrote Tom Jones,
"this thought has been carried so far, and is become so general
that some words proper to the theatre, and which were, at first,
metaphorically applied to the world, are now indiscriminately
and literally spoken of both; thus stage and scene are by common
use grown familiar to us, when we speak of life in generalli
and when we confine ourselves to dramatic performances".
As in the theatre so too in social life. The essential thing is to keep up
appearances and direct one's passions with apparent artlessness. Hence
Chesterfield's advice to his son to "make yourself absolute master of your
temper and your countenance" for the simple reason that, "mankind, as I
have often told you, is more governed by appearance than by realities". 12
Moreover, if the general rules of social conduct are not observed society
would, according to Adam Smith, "crumlie into nothing".
What is imperative therefore is not that passions are eradicated or •
incongruous notions banished but simply that both should be tempered by
custom. "A man need not conquer his passions, it is sufficient that he
conceal them", and so long as he indulges his appetites "after the manner
the custom of the country allows of he has no sensure to fear". 14 Bernard
Mandeville's exuberantly paradoxical Fable of the Bees contains perhaps the
most incisive analysis of the influence of custom and, more particularly,
of the powerful control that the dread of public shame exerts over every
individual. Custom may be a form of "tyranny" but it is undeniably neces-
sary and Mandeville gives little ground to those—such as Rouseau—who
were later to argue that observance of convention and adherence to social
rules merely serves to deform human nature and reduce it to what the
Frenchman called "an abject uniformity". 15 In anticipation of Adam Smith,
Mandeville argues that "all civil commerce would be lost, if by art and a
prudent dissimulation we had not learned to hide and stifle the ideas that
are continually arising within us". 16
 In expounding the importance of the
"dextrous management of ourselves" Mandeville was by no means alone
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and in the work of Hume, Hutcheson, Smith and Montesquieu [particularly
in the latter's discussion of treason, blasphemy and homosexuality], one
finds the same conviction that society depends upon the observance of
custom and an important distinction is to be drawn between public and
private life. To such authors a sign of sanity is the capacity to prevent
the troubled ambiguities of personal life from being shamelessly revealed
in public. 17
If a man's public behaviour should be marked by *regularity and constancy",
as Hume thought it should, does this inevitably mean that there are no
occasions in life when passions, idiosyncracies and small vanities may be
indulged ? The answer, given by many authors during the eighteenth century,
is yes, but only in private. Here all considerations of propriety and social
decorum may be rightfully ignored and privately each is entitled to give
expression to his natural self. A clear line is to be drawn therefore between
the private and natural realm and the sphere of public or conventional life.
Apart from Rousseau most authors do not conceive of the relationship
between these two realms in terms of hostility; the appropriate image is
rather that of checks and balances. The private realm provides a check
against the imperious influence of convention, it guarantees an area of
social life free of artifice, and against this one has to balance the public
realm, in which rules or conventions channel natural inclinations in
appropriate directions. Thus life, though it may be lived in public, is to
be realised in private; the area that encourages and allows for self-fulfilment.
In an interesting analysis of the history of the word privacy Raymond
Williams has observed that by the eighteenth century,
"seclusion in the sense of a quiet life was valued as privacy, and
this developed beyond the sense of solitude to the senses of decent
and dignified withdrawal, and of the privacy of my family and 18friends, and beyond these to generalised values of private life". 
The social grouping which embodies these values most clearly is the family
and it is instructive to consider that in the eighteenth century the concept of
the family—in the sense of a small kin group usually living in one house-
emerged most fully. What the family affords is the opportunity for withdrawal
and retirement, of release from the demands of social life.
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Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy contains perhaps the richest
illustrations of the infinite singularities of individual temperamentibut
despite the extraordinary antics of the Shandy family it is apparent that
no member of it is ever thought of by Sterne to be of unsound mind. And
the reason for this is that the eccentricities of Uncle Toby and Walter
Shandy are not broadcast to the world and in riding their respective
hobby-horses each takes care not to "jostle anyone on the way". As
Sterne says.
"So long as the man rides his hobbyhorse peaceably along the
King's highway and neither compels you nor me to get up behind
him, pray sir, what have either you or I to do with it?"19
The Shandy world is one of discreetly indulged enthusiasms, a world to
which idle passers-by are not privy. In such a world the centrally impor-
tant distinction is between private and public life, between life lived within
the family and that lived outside it. But as Sterne, implies what saves a man
such as Uncle Toby from the charge of madness is his ability in public
"to guard appearances, I believe, as well as most men". 20 This observation
brings us back to the court cases, for in all the cases discussed the
supposition underlying the charge of madness is that the individual concerned
is no longer able to guard appearances, thereby ensuring that private
vagaries are not translated into public indiscretions. In riding their
particular hobby-horses people such as Sir Thomas Moncrieff, Janet
Stevenson, James Arbuthnott or Charles Simpson 'jostle' those around
them and in a case such as Arbuthnot's a hapless bystander is likely to
be asked to "get up behind him" as he rides his hobby-horse.
If we return now to the court cases the full force of this distinction
between public and private life will become evident. In one particular
case, that of Archibald Gray versus his brotherJames Gray, the jury
explicitly states that the decision to declare a man insane should be
based solely on his public behaviour and not on his own privately held
views, no matter how extravagant these are. This case also throws into
sharper relief two important issues. First, it demonstrates that the
scandal generated by an individual's outrageous public behaviour, and
the shame this brings upon his family, is an important consideration in
assessing that person's sanity. Second, there are clear indications in
this case of the abuses which English authors, such as Blackstone, thought
were inherent in Scottish law.
Early in 1737 Archibald Gray, who was at that time travelling in
England, received an urgent and unexpected letter from his father requesting
that he return immediately to Glasgow, the family home. The reason for
this request was the rapidly deteriorating mental condition of Archibald
Gray's elder brother James. On his arrival in Glasgow Archibald Gray
found his father's concern well-founded.
"Upon my return home, upon enquiry, I found the truth of what my
father had wrote; and that in his opinion, and that of many of our
neighbours and friends, James Gray was truly disordered in his
judgement and unfit to manage his affairs, or to take care of the
substance which he had acquired; that he frequently exposed his
person, by frantic behaviour in public places; and in short, was
becoming  notoriously known and reputed a madman in Glasgow
and the neighbourhood; and it was justly, as we thought appre-
hended, that a person in this situation going about exposing him-
self to the mob, sometimes attacking people in the streets whom
he did not know, and carrying all his substance in three or four
bills in his pocket, was in some danger both as to his person and
effects." [Emphasis in the original.]
Alarmed by the discovery that his brother was becoming "openly and notori-
ously known" as a lunatic, an opinion widely shared by friends and neighbours
of the family, Archibald Gray presented a Brieve of Furiosity to the Regality
Court in Glasgow. The inquest took place in August 1737. Of the six
witnesses called the first to testify was Dr. George Montgoinerie, a
Glasgow physician, who gave it as his opinion that James Gray "is mad and
furious"; the reason for this opinion being Montgomerie's observation
of the accused,
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"walking up and down the streets of Glasgow as a furious and mad
man waving and shaking his stick... and saw him attack a gentle-
man, ... and he had observed James Gray to have a roving and
confused eye and other symptoms of madness".
The second witness, a surgeon by the name of John Gordon, gave "the same
reasons for his knowledge" that Gray was insane. Gordon also added that
Gray had once attacked him in the street and that he had seen the accused
walking around "with a pair of boots in his band and saw him throw the boots
from him". Shortly after this he was told byWilliam Stewart, a Glasgow
merchant, that he had seen James Gray "hang each of his boots about the
corner of the rail about King William's statue in Glasgow". When Stewart
-
returned the boots to their owner he was asked "to return them where they
had been placed for that was the proper place for them".
The introduction of this episode with the boots is crucially important for
it turns out to be the most decisive piece of evidence in the entire case. No
less than three of the six witnesses refer to it and it is an occurrence to
which they each attribute considerable significance. Thus William Stewart,
the fourth person to testify, repeated verbatim John Gordon's account and
merely confirmed that it was he who had removed the boots on James Gray's
behalf. Likewise David Young, another merchant, recounted the same
incident although he particularly remarked that James Gray had placed the
boots on the railing "with their feet upmost". Young then proceeded to
affirm the integrity of Archibald Gray, with whom he had had frequent
occasion to do business, and concluded by describing James Gray as "a
furious and mad man". The final witness, a merchant by the name of
William Gray, recounted how he had seen the defendant "leaping and
jumping backward and forward in the streets, shaking and waving his
stick, and some boys about him" Until the "great change and alteration",
which apparently came upon James Gray in 1735, the merchant had judged
him to be "a provident and discrete man". He considered his brother
Archibald, with whom he had conducted an amicable business relationship
for nine years, to be capable of managing his affairs and those of others.
The jury, which consisted of fourteen merchants and a senior stationer,
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unanimously pronounced James Gray to be in compos mends, but they took
the exceptional step of spelling out their "particular reasons" for this
decision. These reasons consist simply of a catalogue of James Gray's
public indiscretions, as reported by the six witnesses, but having listed
these events the jury's statement continued as follows.
"And that there are many degrees of that distemper [madness],
as well as of other distempers of the body, is certain. And this
man may not be utterly or constantly destitute of reason, nor so
furious as to need being chained, or to be dangerous to the lives
of himself or others; all of which may be true. And at that time
it may also be true, that he is so disordered in his judgement as
justly to be found in compos mentis".
The case of James Gray, however, does not end with this verdict for two
years later in a petition signed by his brother Archibald, on the 10th July
1739, it emerges that the Edinburgh Court of Session judges later "reduced
the verdict" and awarded costs against the petitioner. Archibald Gray's
petition further reveals that Archibald Ingram, to whom James Gray had
entrusted his possessions, contested the 1737 verdict on two points. First,
that Archibald Gray had prevented his brother from attenting the 1737
inquest by "tyrannically" confining him in a cell for lunatics; this cell was
one of the many "commodious rooms" adjoining the Glasgow house of
correction where "delinquents were kept at labour". Second, Ingram
alleged that Archibald Gray was heavily in debt, that he coveted his brother's
estate and had succeeded in packing the jury with his creditors.
At the Court of Session in Edinburgh in July 1739 Archibald Gray denied
Ingram's charges and defended his behaviour. He explained that he had
confined James in the house of correction on the advice of a physician, "who
thought it might be a mean of his sooner coming to himself, of attaining
to some greater quiet or composure of mind if he were prevented from
strolling about, and exposing himself to the mob in the street." Archibald
then gave details of further outrages comitted by his brother in the previous
year. Most notably in 1738, "he betrayed his madness to persons he had never
seen by coming to them upon the street and offering to wager L50,000 that
the town of Glasgow would soon be a terrification to all towns and countries".
Four months later he had ridden around the streets asking an "officer at
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the guard" to give him his sash and he had also called at Archibald Ingram's
shop asking if he had "any hops or hoops to sell, and saying, that he wanted
to make a bonfire at the Cross of all the hops or hoops in town". Eight
witnesses were then called and the record outlines the "sum of the proof"
under the following articles:
1. Until two or three years earlier James Gray had been a man of
sound judgement but in the last few years "a remarkable change
and alteration befel him" and was "noticed by his acquaintances".
2. "This alteration upon James Gray became so generally known and 
observed that he came to be held and reputed a madman or distracted
in the City of Glasgow, in the neighbourhood". [Emphasis in the
original.]
3. "The foundation of such alteration observed, and reputation of
madness acquired, appears partly from a proof of the several
instances and overt acts, whether by words or behaviour, that
hath been proved before the jury, and before your Lordships."
At this point there follows a catalogue of individual incidents including,
"running and crying in the fields, when nobody was near, coming
up to attack or abuse people in the streets, without the least
previous provocation or conversation; walling the streets with
a black sash about his waist, and sometimes about his hat, draw-
ing the mob after him in the streets, with his frantic motions;
setting up his boots upon the corner of the rails of the statue".
This list is very similar to that recorded by the jury at the inquest in
1737 but in the Quarter Session records the catalogue of James Gray's
public outrages is followed by a crucial passage that makes explicit the
commonsense assumptions with which the jury worked.
"All these particulars are entirely distinct from his peculiar notions
or conceits in a religion, as to the interpretation of projihecies,
or otherwise. Nobody will maintain that madness is to be inferred
from erroneous or groundless opinions; and yet when these transport
a weak man, so far as to lead him into a frantic behaviour, even
on that subject, such as crying out in a cathedral, or at the door
of a college, that there is the whore of Babylon, it seems hardly
possible to avoid joining that with other things, as a symptom or
indication of a distempered mind. For it is one thing, to study
prophecies, and apprehend that the meaning thereof is discovered,
wherein studious and learned men have been mistaken; and quite
another thing, to go to the streets and pronounce denunciations to
people whom the man never saw before". [Emphasis in the original.]
Shortly after this the record abruptly stops and so far it has been impos-
sible to trace the final outcome of the Gray saga. However a small clue to
its resolution is provided by the chance discovery of another petition written
by Archibald Gray, dated 1742, in which he vigorously protests against the
lawfulness of his imprisonment, in Edinburgh)on the grounds of Bankruptcy.
It is tempting to speculate that Archibald Ingram's allegations and James
Gray's appeal were upheld, and that Archibald Gray was in fact concerned
to gain custody of his brother's estate for purely financial reasons. The charge
of lunacy may have been used on this occasion as a strategy whereby Archibald
Gray could have freed himself from the unwelcome attention of those
creditors with whom he had allegedly packed the jury at the inquest in
1737. But until the record is traced such a conclusion must remain specula-
tive.
Although we do not know what finally became of James Gray the case made
against him, both in 1737 and 1739, gives us a fairly detailed picture of
what ordinary people, such as the witnesses and jurors in the cases, thought
madness was. More particularly the case makes explicit the commonsense
assumptions employed by jurors and witnesses in deciding whether or not
a man is to be declared mad. So far as James Gray's own family is concerned
it is quite clear that the scandalous nature of his public behaviour, his
apparent disregard for family honour and reputation, was a clear sign of
"distempered judgement". In his evidence Archibald Gray makes it
abundantly clear that his brother's notoriety is quite shameful. By 1737
when Archibald Gray returned to Glasgow from England his brother had
become "openly and notoriously known" as a lunatic, he was "the daily
spectacle of the rabble on the streets, and was reputed a madman by the
most sober and judicious persons in Glasgow". And many of the merchants
with whom Archibald Gray did business had "heard that James Gray was
distempered in his judgement". To the mob to whom he "exposed himself"
James Gray may have been something of a joke and it is apparent that his
241
shameless often amusing antics attracted attention and as he walked through
the streets waving his stick he usually had "some boys about him". To
Archibald Gray the entertainment provided by his brother for the "rabble on
the streets" must have been acutely embarrassing and the only way of
eliminating this threat to the family name and honour was to place James
in one of the commodious rooms set aside for lunatics in the house of cor-
rection. This shameful, scandalous quality of insanity is evident in some
of the other cases—as for instance that of William Gilmour who preferred
Ann Ramsay's hospitality to that of his own wife and family—but in the Gray
case concern to save the family from public embarrassment is particularly
clear. Banished to the house of correction, removed from public view,
James Gray's antics would not bring shame upon his family and his brother
would be able to keep secret the nature and extent of his infirmity.
The case also brings out into the open the important assumption that in
determining the soundness of a man's mind attention must be given not to
the validity of his ideas or opinions per se, but to the degree to which these
interfere with and distort his public behaviour. As the physician Thomas
Percival was to point out, at the end of the eighteenth century, madness has
its onset once an erroneous association of ideas produces "incongruity
of behaviour and incapacity for the common duties of life". The case of
James Gray exemplifies this principle. In 1737 the jury are at pains to
point out that there exist many degrees of madness and that although James
Gray is not "destitute of reason" and is not in need of chaining he is none-
theless considered to be "disordered in his judgement and in compos mentis".
Two years later the basis for this conclusion is fully spelt out. James Gray
entertains "peculiar notions or conceits" in religion but instead of indulging
these privately he is transported by them and unable to resist the opportunity
of pronouncing them in public. In riding his hobby-horse he is conspicuous,
clumsy and so convinced of the truth of his views that he endeavours to
convert people whom he "never saw before". As the jury emphasise)his
madness is not to be inferred from his "erroneous or groundless opinions"
but from his public, and for his family shameful revelation of these. When
242
someone contradicts his views James Gray is overwhelmed by "high
passions" and being unable both to control these and to keep his conceits
to himself he is rightfully declared to be man. His complete loss of
perspective, his inability to keep himself in check and to appreciate the
incivility of his behaviour renders him incapable for the common duties
of life. To those around him James Gray seems oblivious of the distinction
between his private and public self)and indifferent to the rule of social
life which prohibits the public revelation of private vagaries. Unable to
guard appearance or impose "regularity and constancy" upon his behaviour
James Gray becomes a public spectacle and a scandal to his family. Al-
though he is neither violent nor a danger to himself or others he is none-
theless deemed a fit object for the house of correction.
The Gray case is remarkable because of the way in which the jury, in 1739,
openly addresses the question, "What is madness ?" But in this case, as in
all the others, one gets the impression that both witnesses and juries
implicitly know who is mad and who is not. Unlike physicians they do not
agonise about where exactly to draw the line between madness and sanity,
but like physicians they attach enormous importance to the way someone
behaves in public, the use he makes of memory, his ability to clip the wings
of his imagination, to keep in check his stronger passions, to talk coherently
and concentrate upon the subject in hand. Failure to do any of these things
is taken as an unequivocal sign of madness. The disease may come on
gradually over a period of months, as it did in the case of William Kelty
and Sir Thomas Moncrieff, or it may suddenly afflict a man, as in the case
of John Cochran, but whatever form it takes its onset is marked by the
violation of the rules governing social life and by apparent indifference to
the conventions upon which society depends for its continued existence.
Principal among these conventions is the assumption that an individual
will control his public behaviour in an acceptable manner and will not, as
David Morrison did, rudely barge into a private meeting, abuse his drinking
companions, draw attention to himself or refuse to leave the tavern when
requested. Such behaviour may simply be regarded as unreasonable but in
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some of these cases there is evidence that unreasonableness is sometimes
equated with madness. In the medical literature the distinction between
lunacy and unreasonable behaviour was more carefully drawn and Locke
in particular took great care to differentiate between real madness, in the
sense of being overwhelmed by passion or transfixed by a particular
association of ideas, and the more common forms of unreasonableness
that do not amount to madness and from which no one is exempt.
In the court cases, however, such fine distinctions obviously are not made
and an individual who behaves in a way generally disapproved of exposes
himself to the charge of madness. This applies not only to the way in which
a man conducts himself on social occasions but also to the judgment he
shows in managing his affairs, including those of his business. Thus one
argument in support of the charge, made in 1794, that James Edwards was
mad was that he had "made a very foolish bargain in selling his estate and
such a bargain as no man in his senses would make". In passing this judg-
ment the witness in this case is, quite naturally, judging Edwards by his
own standards of business proficiency and behaviour but this is, as we have
seen, a common basis on which to assess the soundness of someone's mind.
To physicians, such as Beddoes, this tendency of the 'vulgar' "to attach the
imputation of extravagance to any mode of conduct varying from their own",
and to thereby "extend the boundaries of insanity so unmercifully", may be
quite reprehensible but as these cases reveal there do not exist independent,
neutral criteria upon which to base a decision. 21
Although the criteria are relative the witnesses's depositions do exhibit
considerable similarities with respect to the sort of behaviour that is seen
as a sign of madness. But what is missing in these depositions are any
refer nces to the insane behaving like animals, or as if they were possessed.
Of course, some lunatics are violent and dangerous, but throughout these
records there is little sense of the insane being terrifying or acting as if
they were guided solely by animal-like instincts. Instead, there are
repeated references to flights of fancy, loss of memory, incoherence,
behaviour similar to that of a drunkard, and other breaches of social
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decorum, such as refusing to talk to visitors. In some instances the
parallels between witnesses's depositions and accounts of insanity in
the medical literature of the time are quite striking and there is a sense
of agreement between physicians and witnesses as to what constitutes
madness. It would be treading on dangerous ground, however, to read
too much into this apparent overlap and one should be equally careful
in attempting to elicit what I have referred to as the common sense assump-
tions underpinning the accounts of witnesses; only in the James Gray
case are these assumptions spelt out fully.
One thing that emerges quite clearly is that madness, in its milder forms
at least, can be coped with fairly well at the level of day-to-day family
life and, indeed, that milder eccentricities are only interpreted as signs
of insanity once they become unmanageable and others find them difficult
to live with. Sir Thomas Moncrieff, for example, had for a long time
entertained absurdly vain notions about his own importance but it is only
when his family can no longer cope with his antics that the label 'madness'
is attached to his behaviour. One gets the impression that some of the
families involved in these cases could tolerate and accommodate a certain
amount of socially disruptive behaviour but that once this gets out of hand
more drastic measures have to be resorted to. Perhaps blind Charles
Simpson's delusions would not have prompted any action against him had
they not also been accompanied by violent behaviour, throwing food at
people, threatening to throw others down stairs, barricading himself in
his room and other irritating habits. Styling oneself 'King Fergy i is one
thing, behaving like a tyrant quite another.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of the preceding chapters has been comparatively simple.
To show that during the period 1650-1800 madness emerges both as a
distinct social problem in its own right and as a separate branch of medical
enquiry. Throughout much of the seventeenth century the social problem
posed by the insane was dealt with by a range of legislative measures and
custodial institutions designed to cope with a heterogeneous group of
social transgressors. At the same time the disease attracted the attention
of some physicians but strictly defined 'medical' explanations of the
disorder had to compete with well established views concerning the power
of divine or demonological possession, or accounts invoking astrological
occurrences, such as the position of the moon. By 1800 the insane are
still confined with criminals, the idle, poor and unemployed, and in the
medical literature there are traces of older, more 'traditional' interpre-
tations of the disease. But at the same time it is becoming apparent that
for the purposes of legislative control, social policy and medical training,
the distinctive medical and social problems associated with madness are
to be given a separate status. Special institutions are developed, forms
of treatment are refined and adapted specifically to the needs of the
insane, laws are passed for rguiating establishments in which they are
confined and, in 1807, the first House of Commons Select Committee is
set up to inquire into the state of lunatics. Rather earlier, in 1771,
when John Aikin proposes that for both custodial and therapeutic purposes
the insane should be placed in a 'common receptacle' it is significant
that he does not preface this proposal by spelling out exactly why the
insane are to be treated as a separate group. Rather, the distinctive-
ness and, as it were, the uniqueness of the difficulties posed by this
disorder constitute the unquestioned premise upon which his proposed
solution to the problem is based. Aikin's Thoughts on Hospitals (1771), the
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first book in which 'lunatic hospitals' are discussed, is an indication of
the change that had taken place in the preceding century.
In the course of this thesis this gradual process of differentiation, by
which insanity was distinguished from other forms of social transgression
and from other types of 'illness', has been examined at a number of
different levels. Most notably, at the levels of medical enquiry, the
institutional provision for the insane and the forms of treatment that
were developed to cope with their disorder. In reviewing the general
argument it would be a mistake, however, to try and show that changes
at any one of these levels preceded and somehow generated changes at
another; for example, the emergence of the lunatic asylum cannot be
accounted for solely in terms of an advance in the medical account of
madness. The process of differentiation and seclusion of the insane,
that occurs in the eighteenth century, cannot be reduced to a series of
neatly formulated relations of cause and effect. Of course, changes in
the medical interpretation of madness—specifically the development of
the view that the disease could be cured—promoted separate institutional
provision, but the purpose of this thesis has been to show that the
pressures and changes which brought about this development were various,
cpmplex and inter-related. In some cases these forces are difficult to
detect, in other instances they can only be inferred and nowhere is one
presented with an unambiguous pattern of development that is perfectly
explicable in terms of a handful of key factors. Indeed, the emergence
of insanity as a distinct medical and social problem is an often faltering
process—the insane are for instance incarcerated in workhouses until
well into the nineteenth century, while at the local level esoteric forms
of treatment and control persist—but I am certain that the developments
analysed in these chapters are genuine and I am equally sure that they
have significant implications for the way in which the psychiatrically
disturbed are currently regarded and cared for. That they have always
been recognised as a distinct group is quite evident and one only has to
recall the surviving seventeenth century petitions to the Lancashire
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Justices of the Peace, the existence of separate cells for lunatics in work-
houses and the depositions of witnesses appearing in the Glasgow and
Edinburgh Sheriff Courts, to appreciate that at the day-to-day level of
workhouse administration, family life and other social occasions,mad-
ness has always been recognised as a distinctive disability. But in the
course of the eighteenth century the need for special provision and the
scope for medical investigation of this disorder becomes fully apparent.
By the time that Cox published his Practical Observations on Insanity
(1804) it was taken for granted that psychiatric disorder was amenable
to rational medical enquiry. One hundred years earlier the disease cer-
tainly attracted medical attention but, as we saw in Chapter One, late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century treatises on the subject evinced
some uncertainty regarding the most appropriate perspective, or point
of view, upon which to base enquiry. Sydenham's proposal that physicians
follow the model of the painter or botanist, both of whom capture the
smallest spot of their "original", proves difficult to implement when the
object of enquiry is as elusive as the mind and its perturbations, none
of which can be precisely described or distinguished in the way that each
species of flora may. Finding it hard to encapsulate in their descriptions
the essential character of insanity some physicians endeavour to show
what madness is like by comparing it to other phenomena, such as a
savagery, by recounting their own experience of breakdown or by employ-
ing dramatic metaphors that enable both them and their readers to
visualise the disease's particular qualities. Underlying these imaginative
accounts is a deep seated dread of the disease where, according to
Nicolas Robinson in 1729, "nothing but horror reigns". 1 And foremost
among the reasons for this feeling is the belief that madness brutalises
human nature, that it strips an individual of many of his distinctively
human attributes thereby reducing him to a beast-like condition.
To physicians such as Cox, Ferriar or Arnold the metaphors used by
Blackrnore or Willis would have seemed rather archaic, for by the end
of the eighteenth century madness had shed much of its bestial, almost
other worldly quality and although still regarded as a disease 'so subversive
to human dignity', as Arnold noted, it is nonetheless approached with
greater equanimity and those who studied it did not seem to lack confidence
in their ability to shed light on the disorder. The recovery of nerve
in the eighteenth century, to which Peter Gay has drawn attention in his
study of the Enlightenment, is perhaps nowhere more evident than in
late eighteenth century medical accounts of insanity. 2 These accounts
proceed from the assumption that carefully conducted analysis will enable
the physician to break the disease down into its constituent elements, to
show how these interact and, finally, to produce a stable framework for
classification and explanation. Throughout the period of this study it
is repeatedly stated that madness can never be properly defined and the
boundary between sanity and insanity never fixed with certainty. But by the
end of the eighteenth century physicians proffer definitions with apparent
confidence, they describe the circumstances most usually associated with
madness, and they classify its numerous species. And at a time when,
to paraphrase Peter Gay, the world was being emptied of mystery, it
seems entirely appropriate that a physician such as Arnold should devise
an elaborate classificatory system encapsulating every species of madness
or that a fellow physician, William Perfect ) should abandon any pretence to
a system and choose instead to describe in detail more than fifty separate
cases of the disorder. In their different ways Perfect and Arnold
exemplify the confident spirit of enquiry, the belief that although it may
be impossible to formulate an all embracing definition of the disease it
is nonetheless reasonable to expect that medical science will illuminate
its darker recesses; and, moreover, that it will enable physicians to
determine the difference between sanity and insanity.
To physicians such as Cox, Arnold, Ferriar or Percival, late eighteenth
century accounts of insanity could be said to represent an 'advance' upon
those written a century earlier in two important respects. First, the
perspective of medical science now afforded a stable orientation to their
object of enquiry and provided a fairly robust framework within which
accounts of the disorder could be developed. Unlike their predecessors
such physicians had no need of the images or analogies provided 'by
travel literature, and they could dispense with somewhat transtendant
and intangible notions concerning "Reason" or man's precarious
position in the chain of creation. But the self-sufficiency sof medical
enquiry was enhanced by another important development—the emergence
of a set of criteria for assessing the soundness of an indivIduaVs mind
and determining whether or not insanity was present. Of course, these
criteria were based on subjective judgment, for the disorders to 'which
the mind was prone did not admit of the arts of weighing OT measuring.
But this subjective judgment could be tested against the accounts of
madness provided by other physicians and there was, moreover„ (consid-
erable agreement among physicians regarding the criteria to be usea
diagnosing the disease.
At the most general level the presence of insanity was to be inferred
not from some rather vague process described as 'reason becoming
brutal' but rather from the clear indication that, as William Battle said,
an individual behaves as if his erroneous perceptions were true or„ ac-
cording to Thomas Percival, that a particular association of ideas has
assumed such a hold over the mind as to diminish an individual's tapacrty
to fulfill the common duties of life. More concretely, it could be argeved
that bellying oneself to be made ofwax merely alerts the physician to the
presence of delusion but refusing to sit near a. fire or stand in the sun
on account of one's unusual constitution actually confirms the initial
suspicion. As Locke pointed out, the upshot of diagnosing madness solely
on the basis of someone's private thoughts and habits of mind would be to
condemn virtually the whole of mankind to Bedlam.
In addition to this fairly general distinction between public conduct and
private idiosyncracies, between the observance of customary forms of
behaviour and their vblation, there are other, fairly specific criteria upon
which the assessment of sanity can be based. For example, the restraint
imposed upon passion; the retention of some sense of proportion in relation
to individual fantasies of grandeur, worthlessness or divine inspiration;
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the ability to distinguish between a 'true' and 'false' association of ideas
and to prevent the latter from giving form and substance to social behaviour;
the capacity to concentrate attention upon a single subject without becoming
obsessively preoccupied by it; to hold a coherent conversation and to
separate actual experience from that occurring in a dream.
To some extent no individual is exempt from the disturbances of mind
associated with insanity but so long as these never become habitual and
permanent then the disease will probably be avoided. And one way of
preserving equilibrium, according to the late eighteenth century view,
is to resist those social activities that have deleterious psychological
as well as physical consequences. Among the social habits that pre-
cipitate insanity one must include, according to Cox,
"early dissipation, unrestrained licentiousness, hhabitual
luxury, inordinate taste for speculation, defective systems of
education, and laxity of morals". 3
This emphasis upon what may be called the social process and the relation-
ship between it and various forms of madness marks an important innovation
in the interpretation of madness. Although physicians do not pretend to
correlate social processes and changes with mental disturbances in any
precise way they nonetheless attend closely to these non-medical causes
of insanity and much of their therapeutic effort is directed towards
creating an environment purged of harmful social pressures.
From the point of view of the historian or sociologist interested in this
area a valuable contribution to the subject would be to look more closely
at the rather vaguely described social pressures to which physicians refer;
one recalls for instance Arnold's attribution of the increase in melancholia
to "the present universal diffusion of wealth and luxury to almost every
part of the island". 4 It would be interesting to examine how these social
changes affected particular families, such as those referred to in the
preceding chapter, and against the backdrop of a fuller description of the
life styles of particular groups or classes to consider changes in the
incidence of madness, the forms that it takes and the most salient symptoms
of the disease at any one time. More attention could perhaps be given to
an assessment of these social factors and the relationship between these
and the prevailing medical interpretation of madness and the measures
used to treat it.
In a moment I shall consider the way in which the late eighteenth century
medical account of madness prepared the way for, and indeed provided a
therapeutic justification for, the seclusion of the insane in special asylums,
but before doing so it is worth recalling the social changes that in turn
fostered this gradual process of differentiation and institutionalisation.
Throughout the period covered by this study the insane were confined in a
range of establishments, most notably their own homes, private madhouses,
houses of correction, gaols or workhouses, but by the end of the eighteenth
century it was this latter institution that fulfilled the central role in the
containment not just of insanity, but virtually every other form of social
disorder. As we saw in Chapter Four, measures designed to stem the
anti-migratory tendency of labour, to seal poverty off within a parish, to
eliminate the threat posed by idle vagrants and vagabonds, to eradicate
idleness and, in the eighteenth century, to stem the tide of criminal
activity resulted in the apparently arbitrary confinement of lunatics with
every other class of social transgressor. The formulation of a legal
distinction, in 1714, between pauper lunatics, particularly those who
were 'furiously mad)t and idle rogues, vagabonds or sturdy beggars did
not significantly alter the position of the workhouse as the chief reposi-
tory for the pauper insane. At the same time this institution came under
increasing pressure as a result both of the continued increase in the
number of pauper lunatics and the parallel increase in the number of
criminals, poor and unemployed; these increases are at least partly
attributable to the expansion in the total population, which rose from
6,5000,000 in 1750 to 9,000,000 in 1800.
The overcrowding produced by this increase inevitably compounded
the difficulty of maintaining order and discipline in the workhouse and
the presence of troublesome lunatics, who disturbed and terrified other
inmates, only made it more difficult to eradicate what one observer
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called "the vice, disorder and guilty idleness" characteristic of many
workhouses. 5 And as the workhouse assumes a more explicitly custodial
and disciplinary function, and as it becomes increasingly apparent that
"it is impossible to keep them [the poor] in tolerable order without a strict
discipline", so the presence of disruptive lunatics is seen to be incompa-
tible with the goals of this establishment. 6 Provision of separate cells
or 'commodious rooms' for the insane does not constitute a permanent
solution and by the late eighteenth century there is evidence of mounting
institutional pressure for the removal of lunatics from establishments
that were manifestly ill adapted to their needs. Allied to this was the
growing recognition, on the part of both physicians and social reformers,
that the 'objects' of a proper lunatic asylum and a charity workhouse
were, as Dr. Andrew Duncan succinctly observed, "by no means analogous".
As Duncan went on to point out, the realisation of these two conflicting
sets of goals required two quite different systems of 'discipline and
administration'. 7
Underpinning Duncan's argument that a separate system of discipline
and administration should be developed to deal with the insane is an impor-
tant assumption: that in many cases of insanity "skilful practice in an
appropriate institution" will either cure the disease entirely or consider-
8
ably "soften its violence". The idea that the insane could be cured by
skilful management was by no means new, in 1758 for instance William
Battle had put forward the same argument when he attacked the practice
of treating the insane 'as criminals', but by the 1790s—when Duncan out-
lines his scheme for an Edinburgh asylum—the case for separate, "appropri-
ate" institutions had become overwhelming. In part at least this must be
attributed to the medical advance referred to above. The late eighteenth
century account of madness, inclining as it does towards a view of the
insane as the casualties of social progress, serves to differentiate the
insane from other categories of social deviant on two counts. One, unlike
criminals who are assumed to be entirely responsible for their behaviour
the insane are not held fully accountable for their condition. Two, whereas
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those who are criminal or idle are to be 'mended', as Locke said, by
severe discipline, and punishment, the victims of mental disorder are
to be 'treated', not punished , and an attempt should be made to incul-
cate the habits of mind compatible with sanity.
One reason for exempting lunatics from full responsibility for their
condition is that "the madman knows everything about him but reasons
9falsely and absurdly respecting them". (Cox) The implied obverse of
this view, which had first been formulated by Locke, is that criminals
or other social miscreants are capable of reasoning correctly on the
basis of what they see around them. The corollary therefore to this
argument is that the insane, who are suffering from a disorder which
renders them incapable of formulating correct conclusions, do not violate
wilfully the norms and conventions by which social life is governed;
criminals on the other hand do, and are therefore to be punished. To
some extent the opinions held by physicians such as Cox, Arnold,
Ferriar or Percival on this question of responsibility are slightly ambigu-
ous. On the other hand they each emphasise the close connection between
voluntarily indulged habits—such as 'hard drinking'—and madness, while
on the other hand they represent the mentally disturbed patient as the
victim of a disorder—or disease—to which some are more vulnerable than
others. Percival, for instance, argued that "lunacy subverts the whole
rational and moral character" and the clear implication of such an argument
is that "mates, although they may have originally set in motion the process
that will conclude finally in madness—for instance by 'early dissipation'—
10
are nonetheless not entirely accountable for their condition. Whereas
the criminal engages in crime in the full knowledge both of what he is
doing and the possible consequences, the same cannot be said of the lunatic
whose disease has subverted his capacity to distinguish between right or
wrong, good or evil, true or false.
The argument that the insane suffered from diminished responsibility is
to be found also in the seventeenth century. In legal commentaries, such as
that by Dalton in 1635, the distinction was neatly phrased in terms of the
'voluntary ignorance' of the criminal and the 'involuntary ignorance' of the
lunatic. But according to both Dalton and a seventeenth century physician
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such as Thomas Willis this difference did not mean that the insane were to
be exempted from punishment. Although Dalton conceded that "a mad man is
only and enough punished by his madnessel he nonetheless believed that
lunatics should be punished for their behaviour. Hence the validity of the
right granted to each individual to punish "his kinsman that is madde". 11
In much the same vein Willis believed it necessary for a lunatic to be con-
trolled or "kept in, either by warnings, chiding, or punishments inflicted
12
on him".	 In other words, no significant distinction was made between
the methods of control appropriate for criminals, vagrants, vagabonds,
rogues or lunatics, and it was not until the Parliamentary Act of 1714 that
the insane were exempted from the whipping to which rogues and vagabonds
were liable.
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, these methods strike a
physician such as Ferriar as arbitrary, cruel and entirely unsuitable.
Observing that lunatics 'harden themselves' against violent measures
Ferriar, and many of his contemporaries, develop a system of management
designed to break 'diseased' habits of mind, to shatter 'false' associations
of ideas, induce counter associations, restore equilibrium to the passions
and instill the habit of self-discipline. Of course, the insane are still to
be kept in safe custody—so as to prevent them from committing the "mis-
chiefs which they are liable to do themselves and others"—but the important
thing is that they should be treated as rational and returned to 'usefulness
in society'. 13
 Whereas the idle or criminal are to be punished and
subjected to enforced discipline, the insane are to be restored to reason-
ableness by a more complex and subtle system of persuasion, insinuation,
awe, example, degradation, mildness and menaces, praise, labour and
sundry other activities designed to divert the mind from its real or imagined
ills. But such a therapeutic regimen requires that lunatics are removed
from workhouses and secluded in special institutions. As we saw in Chapter
Five, the principle of seclusion, or confinement, is fundamental to the
system of moral management development in the late eighteenth century.
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Seclusion fulfills a dual function. It removes the insane from society to
which they are, as Aikin remarked, "multiplied objects of alarm", and it
makes it possible for treatment to be conducted under conditions over which
14
the physician can exert control.	 The methods of management developed by
Ferriar, Cox or Percival could not have been used to good effect in the
houses of correction or workhouses in which the insane were confined. In
this respect late eighteenth century therapeutic measures differed signifi-
cantly from those advocated a century earlier by a physician such as Willis.
The "threatenings, bonds or strokes, as well as Physick" with which Willis
proposed to control the insane could be employed in a variety of settings
and unlike his successors Willis does not specify that the insane be placed in
15
separate asylums.	 But by the end of the eighteenth century the develop-
ment of the view that insanity was often curable, or at least manageable,
under special conditions, contributed to the separation of the insane from
other categories of deviant and their seclusion in what Duncan called
"appropriate institutions"
In the relatively private world of the asylum the victims of lunacy would
learn, once again, the rudiments of reasonable public conduct. The ability
to conduct oneself appropriately in public is thus established as a criterion
of 'cure' and it is for this reason that Cox, for instance, suggests that no
individual should be declared "perfectly compos mentis and proper to be
at large and mix again in society.... till he had undergone an examination
in the presence of his friends, particularly on those points which were the
basis of his hallucination, nor till he was able to reason calmly and dispas-
16
sionately on the subject of his indisposition." 	 First among the disciplines
to be learned in the asylum is that of self-control. Instilling this habit is,
according to Ferriar, "the first salutary operation in the mind of a lunatic"
and while medicine "may restore him more early and more completely
to the command of his intellect and operations, discipline must direct him
17in their exertion".
But the discipline must come from within and operating almost imper-
ceptibly it should finally imbue an individual's social conduct with regularity
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and constancy. Central to the late eighteenth century account of insanity,
and the related forms of treatment, is an assumption that madness
consists, in part at least, in a violation of the distinction between private
and public live, as a result of which private eccentricities are publicly re-
valed. As we saw in the preceding chapter this important distinction is
also to be found in some of the philosophy and literature of the period, and
in certain of the Sheriff Court cases, notably that involving James Gray,
the Jury explicitly differentiates between privately held 'conceits' and
their public dramatisation. In both the witnesses depositions and the trea-
tises of physicians it is made clear that social behaviour constitutes the
only sure basis on which to assess someone's state of mind and when, as
Laurence Sterne observed, an individual"guards appearance as well as
any man" then there is no justification for charging him with madness—
no matter how extravagant his privately indulged vanities. To a large
number of authors, including Locke, Mandeville, Hume, Sterne, Smith,
Percival, Cox or Ferriar, what makes the continued existence of social
life possible is the observance of conventional codes of conduct, of the
web of social rules which give form and shape to social behaviour. And
in the work of many physicians one finds an optimistic belief that the
is	 insane, in whom 'diseased' habits of mind have become fixed, can be freed
of their delusions, impressed with a regard for what Adam Smith called
the "general rules" and, finally, restored to society.
The developments examined in this thesis mark only the beginning of a
process of institutionalisation that really flourished in the kineteenth
century. More recently, in the last decade or so, the value of this legacy
has been questioned and among the alternatives proposed there has been
an attempt to base psychiatric care on the community. At the same time
attention has been given to the dangers of re-defining social problems as
medical ones, a practice that can be traced back directly to the eighteenth
century. But the physical isolation of a proportion of the mentally ill, their
incarceration in substantial but now rather dilapidated hospitals, and their
separation from the wider community, are still evident. If one wants to
discover the origins of these developments it is, I believe, necessary to
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look in detail at the period covered by this study. At the level of material
provision things have, of course, improved considerably but as in the
eighteenth century, so today, once a person has been declared mad there
are, as Thomas Percival noted at the end of the eighteenth century, "grounds
for apprehension that the party will be consigned to neglect and oblivion". 18
At the level of the day-to-day response to this disorder one wonders how
much things have changed since Percival's time. How different, for instance,
would be witnesses depositions in inquests involving an individual's state
of mind ? Perhaps one would also find marked continuity between the kind
of things alleged lunatics said or did, what they worried about, or what they
dreamed of doing and contemporary accounts of this disorder. Whatever
the changes and improvements it seems apparent, however, that the prob-
lems of understanding and defining madness are scarcely less intractable
than they were for the physicians with whom this thesis has been concerned.
Although I am not qualified to speak on such matters I suspect that J. M.
Cox's conclusion is as valid now as it was nearly two hundred years ago.
"Almost every individual has his peculiarities, and it is often
difficult to determine where these end and insanity begins". 19
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